Center for the production of Soviet artillery during the Second World War. The experience of using artillery in the Great Patriotic War and modern practice. Experience teaches gunners

SOVIET ARTILLERY

IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Report 35 p., 9 figures, 5 tables, 9 sources.

ARTILLERY COMBAT, ARTILLERY GROUP, ARTILLERY OFFENSIVE, ARTILLERY ATTACK PREPARATION

The object of the research is the domestic artillery, the history of its development during the Great Patriotic War, the improvement of the material part, forms and methods of its combat use.

The aim of the work was to study the experience in solving issues of combat use: maneuvering and massing artillery, grouping and managing artillery, planning and organizing an artillery offensive, organizing anti-tank defense, planning and conducting counterpreparations during the Great Patriotic War in all types of hostilities.

Based on the results of the work, a teaching manual is being prepared for publication and a report is made at a military scientific conference.

Introduction

2 Artillery fighting

Conclusion

List of sources used

Introduction

Despite the radical transformations that have taken place in the development of weapons, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of combat use missile forces and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War played an extremely important role and became the main fire force of the Ground Forces. She was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle of Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Formidable fighting qualities were demonstrated by Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery with its fire played a decisive role in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the offensive of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade of hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery support. The main defense was anti-tank artillery. It accounts for over 70% of the destroyed enemy tanks. The respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the "god of war".

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery has increased in quantity by 5 times. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA by 1.3 and 3.2 times, and England by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry provided the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to inflict crushing fire strikes on the enemy. The power of the artillery, mass heroism and military skill of the Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

1 The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

1.1 Development of the material part of artillery

During the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing materiel of artillery, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the angles of fire, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental cannon of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal angle of fire, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.

In the 1930s, 37-mm and 45-mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of fighting all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of the 76-mm gun mod. 1939 (USV), 122 mm howitzers mod. 1938 (М-30), 152-mm howitzer-guns 1937 (ML-20), 203-mm howitzers mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main performance characteristics artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are shown in Table 1.

In the pre-war years, mortars were re-created. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where fighting showed the high effectiveness of this weapon.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

	Organizational affiliation	Firing range, km	Projectile weight kg	Projectile muzzle velocity	Implement weight kg
45 mm PT cannon 1937
76 mm cannon 1927
76-mm cannon 1939 g (USV)
122 mm howitzer 1938 (M-30)
152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10)
107 mm cannon 1940 (M-60)
122 mm cannon 1937 (A-19)
152-mm howitzer-gun 1937 (ML-20)
152 mm cannon 1935 (Br-2)
203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4)
210-mm cannon 1939 (Br-17)
280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5)
305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18)

So, if during the entire 1939 1678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940 they were fired 5322. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service. and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began back in the 20s in the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments, research and experiments were most fully developed in the 30s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery installations was not put into service.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat units was manufactured, in February they switched to their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made on the all-round development of multiple launch rocket systems and on the immediate deployment of their mass production.

Thus, thanks to the care of the party and the government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having, in the main, modern material part of the artillery. A number of guns fully met the requirements of wartime, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice also required new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.

By the end of the war, the specific weight of anti-tank guns in ground artillery was 14%, for firing from closed firing positions - 86%. In artillery, for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), BM RA - 3%.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army of the first period of the war - 45-mm gun mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further enhanced its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943, a new system entered service - the ZIS-2 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank gun, the combat characteristics of which would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

To improve the armor of enemy tanks, Soviet designers responded with the creation of a 100-mm field gun of the 1944 model BS-3. The gun possessed high ballistic performance, combined the qualities of an anti-tank and a hull gun (firing range 20 km). The weapon was distinguished by the originality of the design of the units and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm cannon mod. In 1927, a new system arrived, which was distinguished by simplicity of production and higher maneuverability. By imposing the 76-mm barrel on the carriage of the 45-mm cannon mod. 1942 was created by the regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1943 (ob-25).

Since 1942, it was adopted by the divisional artillery, instead of the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. She became not only the best, but also the most massive gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from the ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for battles won alone with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration of the corps control link in 1943, it became necessary to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the samples created in the pre-war period, a 152-mm hull howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by overlaying the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer model 1938 (M-10) on the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer model 1938 (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War, are shown in Table 2.

On the basis of pre-war developments and the experience of using rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. In the Great Patriotic War, dozens of types of unguided rockets and launchers were used. The most famous are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 projectiles on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 was put into service.

The main direction of improving rockets during the war was improving accuracy, as well as increasing the weight of the warhead and the range of the projectile. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army rockets during the Great Patriotic War are shown in Table 3.

Table 2 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

Name	Weight in firing position, kg	Firing range, km	Projectile weight, kg	The initial velocity of the projectile, m / s	Rate of fire, rds / min
45 mm PTP (M-42) mod. 1942 g.
57-mm anti-tank gun (ZIS-2) mod. 1943 g.
76-mn P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942 g.
76 mm P (ob-25) mod. 1943 g.
100 mm P (BS-3) mod. 1944 g.
152 mm D (D-1) mod. 1943 g.
160 mm M mod. 1943 g.

During the war, the number of mortars increased almost sixfold. This is due to the high fighting qualities and the ability to provide their mass production at a lower cost. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain-pack mortar (1943) were modernized. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars were not further developed and were removed from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 to 1943 (Figure 5) was also modernized. The result was a system that to this day with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had a non-detachable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Projectile type
Time of adoption	January 1943	April 1944	April 1944	October 1944
Caliber, mm
Explosive weight, kg
Table range, max., M
Range deviation at max. range, m
Directional deviation at max. Range, m

Self-propelled artillery received its development, in essence, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, a light self-propelled gun SU-76, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon, was put into service. The gun was located in an open top and rear armored wheelhouse. It was first used in battles in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, on the basis of the T-34, the production of the SU-122 SPG began, in August 1943, the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which was replaced by the new SU-100 at the end of 1944.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed "St. John's Wort", were created in 1944 on the basis of the heavy tank IS-2. There are cases when ISU-152 shells tore off the towers from heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to accompany all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, perfectly showing their fighting qualities during the assault on the forts of Konigsberg and during street battles in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was removed from the subordination of the Commander of the Red Army artillery and subordinated to the Commander of armored and mechanized forces, in combat use it was equated to tanks and is not considered further in this work.

1.2 Development of the organization of artillery

The development of organizational forms of Soviet artillery took place depending on the economic capabilities of the country and the specific conditions of warfare. Two stages can be noted in the development of the organization of artillery. At the first stage, which coincides with the first period of the Great Patriotic War, organizational forms adapted to the conditions of defense and the material capabilities of the state. The transition of the Soviet Army from defense to offensive operations marked the beginning of the second stage in the development of the organization of artillery. Naturally, at each stage, the decisive factor was our ability to provide troops with materiel.

During the war organizational changes took place both in the military artillery and in the artillery of the RVGK. At the very beginning of the war, an imbalance between the military artillery and the RVGK was revealed. Their specific gravity was 5 and 95%. This was, as before, a consequence of the idea of a purely maneuverable nature of a future war. The error had to be urgently corrected.

Already in July 1941, due to the weakening of the artillery of rifle formations, the artillery of the RVGK was strengthened. She could maneuver, carry out the massing of artillery in the main directions. This increased the overall degree of utilization of the capabilities of the type of troops in operations. In general, the artillery of the RVGK received the greatest development, especially with the transition of the Red Army to strategic offensive operations. By the end of the war, its share increased to 50%. By the way, in the Wehrmacht, measures to increase the artillery of the RGK were taken too late, and its share did not exceed 18%.

Military artillery developed evolutionarily. It was based on the regular artillery of rifle divisions. Corps artillery existed at the beginning of the war, in 1941 it was transferred to the artillery of the RVGK, and with the restoration of the corps, it appeared again. There was no army artillery before the war and at the beginning of the war; it began to be created in the spring of 1943.

The staff of the rifle division during the war years changed 6 times. During the course of the war, divisional artillery was reinforced mainly by mortars. The staff, established in December 1942, became the main one. Fundamental changes concern divisional artillery. So, in July 1941, the second (howitzer) artillery regiment was withdrawn, and at the end of 1944, an artillery brigade of a three-regiment structure (including a regiment of 160-mm mortars), an anti-aircraft division, a self-propelled division was included in the staff of the guards rifle division. installations, anti-tank battalion (armed with 76-mm cannons). The number of guns and mortars in the division increased to 282.

In the rifle corps, according to the state of 1943, there was a corps artillery regiment. From December 1944, the Guards Rifle Corps usually had two artillery regiments or a two-regiment artillery brigade.

In April 1943, army artillery appeared in the combined arms army: cannon and anti-tank artillery regiments, a mortar regiment. In 1944, two-regiment cannon artillery brigades began to be created in the armies on the basis of cannon regiments.

The artillery of the RVGK grew especially rapidly. Its numbers increased primarily due to light artillery and mortars. In total, during the war years, the number of mortars in the artillery of the RVGK increased 17 times, guns - 5 times. Therefore, the artillery of the RVGK was a means, first of all, of the quantitative strengthening of the artillery of combined-arms formations and formations in the main directions.

In the artillery of the RVGK, the number of separate units continuously increased, especially in 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, it had 199 cannon regiments, 196 howitzer regiments, 240 anti-tank regiments, 256 anti-aircraft regiments, 138 rocket launchers, and 83 mortar regiments. This led to a sharp increase in the number of reinforcement artillery in the composition of the fronts. Even in the defensive operation at Stalingrad, some fronts had up to 70 reinforcement regiments. To control such a mass of artillery and quickly create the necessary groupings, it was necessary to form fundamentally new artillery formations of the RVGK - artillery and guards mortar (rocket artillery) divisions, artillery breakthrough corps. Along with them, there were separate artillery, mortar and guards mortar brigades. In order to massively use artillery forces and means in the fight against tanks, anti-tank regiments and brigades were created in the artillery of the RVGK.

The first artillery divisions, created in the fall of 1942, were eight-regimental (two cannon, three howitzer and three anti-tank, 168 guns in total). Since 1943, brigade artillery divisions and breakthrough artillery corps have been created. The breakthrough artillery division consisted of six brigades (light, howitzer - all three regiments, cannon - two regiments, heavy howitzer and high-power howitzer; a total of 356 guns and mortars), in 1944 the division included seven brigades.

In anti-tank artillery in the summer of 1941, instead of 72-gun brigades, 16, 20, 36-gun regiments, armed with 37, 45, 76 or 85-mm guns, began to be created. From July 1942, all anti-tank artillery was renamed fighter-anti-tank, and the regiments received a single organization (5 batteries, 20 guns). In 1943, a more expedient form of organization was found — an anti-tank artillery brigade. She had three regiments (60 guns) of 45, 57 and 76 mm caliber. In 1945, the brigades were partially re-equipped with 100-mm cannons.

The creation of large artillery formations was a new moment in the organization of artillery. They became, in the hands of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, a powerful means of quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the artillery of the fronts and armies operating in the direction of the main attack. With their creation, the possibilities of massing artillery and maneuvering with large masses of it in battle and operation increased. It was due to her that it became possible to create artillery groups at all levels, from regiment to army. This harmonious system of artillery groups existed for over 50 years.

1.3 Development of the combat use of artillery in offensive and defensive operations

In the first major offensive operations of the Red Army in late 1941 and early 1942. serious shortcomings were identified in the combat use of artillery, in the organization and conduct of an offensive by large formations and formations. So, in the counteroffensive near Moscow, artillery was relatively evenly distributed in the zones of the advancing armies, which did not allow achieving fire superiority over the enemy.

One of the main requirements of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was the decisive concentration of forces and resources in the area of the proposed breakthrough. Gradually, the maneuver and massing of artillery outgrew the tactical framework and were carried out on an operational, and even strategic, scale.

Already from the second half of 1942, there was an increase in the number of artillery in the areas of breakthrough of formations (formations) and an increase in the degree of its massing, which is characterized by the width of these areas and the number of guns, mortars and rocket artillery on them.

In offensive operations in the areas of the breakthrough, the following operational densities were created: in 1941-1942. - up to 70-80; in 1943 - up to 130-200; in 1944 - up to 150-250; in 1945 - 250-300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area.

The decisiveness of the massing is evidenced by the fact that with the width of the breakthrough sections accounting for 10-15% of the total length of the front line, up to 80-90% of all artillery was concentrated on them.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of artillery as a kind of troops during the war, the increased scale of maneuvering and massing artillery in the main directions of formations and formations in battles and operations forced to look for new forms of its combat use.

The basis of the combat employment of artillery is the distribution of its forces (formations) and the choice of forms and methods of engaging the enemy with fire.

Until 1944, i.e. Before the troops were saturated with artillery from the RVGK, artillery groups were created according to the nature of the tasks performed, i.e. on a target basis.

The artillery grouping during this period is distinguished by a great variety: infantry support groups (SM), long-range (DD), destruction artillery (AR), guards mortar units (GMCh), direct-fire guns (OPN) and others. The development of the group is shown in Table 4.

In 1944, an artillery grouping system was developed, created according to the organizational and tactical principle. In special instructions approved by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, the most appropriate, corresponding to nature, was determined. modern combat and operations, grouping of artillery. It provided for the creation of a regimental artillery group (PAG) in a regiment, a divisional artillery group (DAG) in a division, a corps artillery group (KAG) in a corps, and an army artillery group (AAG) in the army.

Artillery groups created in combined-arms formations from regiment to army were intended to solve problems in the interests of these formations. For example, CNCP supported rifle battalions, fought against mortars, and sometimes with enemy artillery. With the development of the offensive, part of the artillery from the regimental group was reassigned to the commanders of the first echelon battalions, which ensured closer interaction of artillery with combined-arms subunits with the development of combat in depth and increased the independence of the forward subunits of the regiments.

For divisional artillery groups, the main targets were artillery and enemy reserves. In addition, by the decision of the division commander in the most crucial periods of the battle, the divisional group was wholly or partially involved in strengthening the fire of regimental artillery groups, especially when breaking through the defenses of the enemy's first echelon battalions, repelling counterattacks by his brigade (divisional) reserves, when breaking through intermediate defense lines on the move. in depth, etc.

The army (corps) artillery group, created to solve tasks in the interests of the main grouping of the army (corps), was capable of successfully fighting the enemy's artillery, defeating its reserves in the concentration areas, on the march and during deployment, disrupting the enemy's command and control, and increasing artillery fire divisions of the first echelon and support the entry into battle of divisions of the second echelon.

Depending on the situation, sometimes the army (corps) artillery group, by decision of the army commander (corps commander), was subdivided into subgroups of divisions operating in the main direction. Along with the AAG, a group of GMCh (Guards Mortar Units) was created in the army, later called the Army Group of Rocket Artillery (AGRA).

To destroy the enemy tank groupings that had broken through, anti-tank artillery reserves (APTRes) were created in armies, corps and divisions.

The new artillery grouping had fundamental differences from the previously created one. Groups were to be created at all levels of the combined arms command and report directly to the combined arms commander. Groups have become an organic part of the combined-arms battle formation and operational formation of troops. During the battle and operation, they did not disintegrate, but could only change their composition, supporting units and formations at all stages of the battle and operation.

The amalgamation of artillery into artillery groups ensured the possibility of a massive use of artillery weapons by the corresponding artillery commanders and the continuity of the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks for the entire period of the battle. First of all, the effectiveness of the effective destruction of the enemy by artillery was increased.

The beginning of a new stage in the development of the combat employment of artillery, primarily the effective destruction of the enemy, was the directive letter of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated January 10, 1942 No. 03 on the artillery offensive.

Its essence boiled down to three basic requirements, without the fulfillment of which one cannot count on the success of the offensive; this is a decisive massing of assets and forces in the breakthrough sector, the continuity of artillery support for the offensive, and an organic combination of fire and strike by the advancing troops.

“The artillery should not act randomly,” the directive said, “but concentrated, and it should not be concentrated anywhere on the front, but in the area of action of the shock group of the army or front. ... To make artillery support real and the infantry offensive effective, it is necessary to move from the practice of artillery preparation to the practice of an artillery offensive. ... Artillery cannot be limited to one-off actions within an hour or two hours before the offensive, but must advance together with the infantry, must fire at short breaks during the entire offensive, until the enemy's defensive line is broken to the full depth. "

For the first time, an artillery offensive was carried out in January 1942 in the offensive zone of the 20th Army of the Western Front during the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses on the river. Lama. And in full in the operation of the group of fronts, it was carried out in November 1942 in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. In subsequent years, all issues of the artillery offensive developed and improved.

The artillery offensive was divided into three periods - artillery preparation, artillery support for the attack, and artillery accompaniment by infantry and tank fire in a battle in depth.

The artillery preparation for the attack (APA) was planned in all cases in the most detail. Its duration and formation depended on specific conditions and significantly differed from one another, which is presented in Table 5. This made it possible to avoid a template that could lead to the loss of tactical surprise. The achievement of tactical surprise also determined the desire to conduct a relatively short APA.

The duration of the artillery preparation for the attack, as a rule, was 1-2 hours. But depending on the specific conditions, the APA were planned to be both longer and shorter. So, the longest APA was in the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation of the Karelian Front in 1944 - 3 hours 32 minutes (including 30 minutes of fire control), a three-hour artillery preparation of the attack was carried out during the assault on the Konigsberg fortress. The shortest artillery preparation was in the 5th Shock Army in the Berlin operation - 20 minutes. By the end of the war, in view of the increase in the number of artillery attracted, they strove to reduce the duration of artillery preparation to 40-20 minutes.

The main content of the APA was massive artillery strikes to the entire tactical depth of the enemy's defense. At the same time, depending on the nature of the enemy's defense (increase in depth, separation of battle formations, transition to trench, multi-position defense), as well as on the amount of artillery involved, the depth of simultaneous suppression of defensive targets changed. So, in 1941-1942, when the enemy's defense was focal and shallow, massive artillery fire was conducted mainly to a depth of 1.5-2.5 km and at artillery batteries. In 1943, when the German-fascist troops went over to trench defense and the depth of its main strip increased, the artillery led massive fire to a depth of 3-4 km or more, in 1944 - up to 6-8 km and in 1945 - up to 8-10 km.

Artillery preparation began, as a rule, with a sudden powerful fire raid, which was achieved in short term inflicting maximum losses on the enemy who did not have time to take cover, and was directed, first of all, against manpower and fire weapons in strong points of the first line or in the first trench. By the end of the war, the duration of the first fire raids increased in comparison with 1941-1943. from 3-5 to 10-15 minutes.

In order to reduce artillery preparation, especially strong structures were destroyed in a few days or on the eve of the offensive. For example, in the Krasnoselskaya and Vyborgskaya operations of the Leningrad Front, the period of destruction was one day; during the storming of Konigsberg by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the period of opening and destruction was four days; during the Crimean operation by the 4th Ukrainian Front - two days.

Conducting (since 1942) on the eve or on the day of the offensive, reconnaissance in force by the forces of forward battalions or reconnaissance detachments required a partial re-planning in a limited time of the initial version of the artillery offensive. In this regard, in 1945, it was practiced advance planning of several options for artillery preparation and support for the attack, depending on the actions of the forward battalions. Thus, the gap between the end of the battle of the forward battalions and the entry of the main forces into battle was closed.

Artillery preparation ended with a powerful fire raid lasting 5-10 minutes (1941-1943) or 15-25 minutes (1944-1945).

The fire raid, which ended the artillery preparation of the attack, was planned to be powerful and was carried out with an increase up to the maximum fire rate. In terms of its power and character, it, in fact, did not differ from the artillery fire at the beginning of the artillery support of the attack. By this, they tried to eliminate the noticeable transition from artillery preparation to support for the attack. As a rule, one of the fire raids on enemy artillery and mortar batteries blocked the moment of the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of artillery support. Consequently, the enemy's batteries were exposed to strong fire impact at the most crucial moment, when the infantry and tanks launched an attack.

In a number of cases, to deceive the enemy, false fire transfers were successfully used, which, with good organization (with a simultaneous demonstration of the attack), gave good results. However, the complexity of their implementation and the lengthening of the period of artillery preparation forced to abandon false transfers of fire.

Artillery support for the attack was carried out, as a rule, to the depth of the defense of the first echelon regiments, and the method of its implementation depended on the nature of the enemy's defense. The main methods were the sequential concentration of fire, a single barrage and their combination. In addition, the artillerymen of the 1st Belorussian Front developed and first used a double barrage in the Belorussian operation in 1944. Other types of attack support methods were used - a growing barrage, a creep method, combing fire, a mortar barrage, etc.

Using various combinations of types of fire, massively attracting artillery, it was possible to achieve success. For example, in the Oryol offensive operation, artillery support for the attack in all armies was planned differently. So, in the 11th Guards Army, the following method of artillery support for the attack was chosen: a combing artillery fire was prepared along the lines every 100 meters to a depth of 500-700 m. For each strong point or center of resistance occupied by forces up to the battalion, 5-6 divisions concentrated fire. The fire on each object continued for 5-10 minutes, and with repeated attacks - up to 15 minutes.

The depth of artillery support for the attack was increasing and by the end of the war it had reached 3-4 km. At the same time, the Soviet artillery successfully coped with the task of organizing support for the attack of infantry and tanks at night (Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front).

In the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, a lot of experience was gained in the implementation of the third period of the artillery offensive - the accompaniment of infantry and tanks during combat in the depths of enemy defenses.

Fire support for the battle in depth was based on the principle of the continuity of interaction between artillery and infantry and tanks. It was achieved by reinforcing infantry units with direct escort guns, allocating artillery spotters to tanks, by creating artillery groups capable of providing fire support to infantry at any time, and by timely massing artillery and its fire in the main directions of the offensive.

Escort of infantry and tanks in combat in the depths of enemy defenses was carried out by escorting them with fire and wheels and carried out by concentrated fire from divisions, individual batteries and guns on targets that impeded advance. For direct support of the formations during the battle in the depths, they were attached to anti-aircraft artillery units, fighter-anti-tank regiments on a mechanical thrust, and when entering a breakthrough, they were reassigned to a part of howitzer regiments and rocket artillery regiments. Artillery was successfully used to repel enemy counterattacks and deliver fire strikes against resistance nodes. She followed as part of the columns of tank and rifle formations closer to their heads, which made it possible to quickly bring artillery into action. Detailed planning of the third period of the artillery offensive was first carried out in the counter-offensive operation at Stalingrad.

One of the important problems of using artillery in the war was the organization of the fight against enemy artillery. Counter-battery combat was usually planned depending on the situation by the artillery headquarters of the corps, army and, less often, the front. The main purpose of the counter-battery fight was to suppress the batteries. The destruction of enemy artillery batteries was also used on the Leningrad Front. In offensive operations, the fight against enemy artillery was usually assigned to long-range groups and began simultaneously with the artillery preparation of the attack. It was planned in most detail for the first two periods of the artillery offensive.

The organization of counter-mortar warfare proved to be a more difficult problem, mainly due to the difficulties in reconnaissance of mortar batteries. Since the fight against mortars had its own specifics, special divisional and corps counter-mortar groups were created for its conduct, which consisted mainly of howitzer and mortar units.

The development of the combat use of artillery in defense took place in close connection with the development of forms and methods of conducting defensive battles and operations. Experience shows that the importance of artillery in defense has been steadily increasing. The main tasks solved by the artillery were the fight against the enemy's artillery and his tanks, the defeat of the advancing groupings, and the air cover of the combat formations of the troops.

The difficult conditions in which the war began, the forced retreat of Soviet troops, heavy losses in people and military equipment (including artillery), the need to conduct defense in wide zones caused a number of shortcomings in the combat use of artillery in the first period of the war (especially in the summer autumn campaign 1941). The most serious shortcomings include: equal distribution of artillery between divisions and in divisions along the entire defense front (including anti-tank artillery); insufficient organization of a wide and flexible maneuver of artillery means (especially in hostilities in the summer of 1941). But, despite the shortcomings that took place, artillery was of decisive importance in the defeat of the advancing enemy groupings.

In connection with the heavy losses that the enemy suffered from the blows of our troops, he was forced to abandon the offensive in several directions and concentrate efforts on one one. This raised the problem of organizing the maneuver to an even greater extent. Meanwhile, it could be successfully carried out only when the troops held the defensive lines, preempting the enemy in concentration additional forces and funds.

Under these conditions, the task of artillery, especially military artillery, was to support the infantry while maintaining its defensive positions and to timely build up artillery assets at the expense of the RVGK artillery. The main command took all measures to concentrate the maximum amount of artillery to defeat the main enemy groupings. With the increase in the number of artillery, the possibilities for operational and tactical maneuver of artillery in defense also increased.

An example of a decisive artillery maneuver in defense is the concentration of up to 50% of all RVGK artillery in the front lines of action. western direction in the fall of 1941. The same picture is in the southwest and Stalingrad directions. So, in the summer of 1942 on the Stalingrad direction there were only 4,282 guns, and by the end of the defensive operations their number had increased to 12,000. Army artillery also took part in the maneuver.

As a result of the maneuver, the density of artillery in the defense increased. The operational density of artillery in operations in the main directions reaches 50-80, and in the secondary directions - 15-20 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. In the defensive operation of the 13th Army of the Central Front near Kursk in 1943, the density of artillery reached 105 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (this was the highest density of artillery in defense during the war).

The artillery grouping in defense did not qualitatively differ from its grouping in the offensive, but the artillery groups had less artillery than in the offensive. However, there were also exceptions. In 1942, during the defensive operations at Stalingrad, a front-line artillery group was created for the first time. In those specific conditions, when the most important task of the front was to retain a large city, the creation of such a group fully justified itself. In defensive operations near Leningrad, experience was gained in creating a front-line artillery group for counter-battery combat. It was based on the 3rd Leningrad counter-battery artillery corps.

When creating an artillery grouping, as well as in an offensive, the need emerged to have artillery groups in the hands of each combined-arms commander. In addition, the defense provided for the creation of various artillery reserves (anti-tank and general).

The artillery fire system was built for the entire depth of the defense. The basis of the fire system was artillery and mortar fire from closed firing positions, combined with direct-fire and machine gun fire. The artillery fire system included: long-range fire attacks, concentrated fire, moving barrage fire, stationary barrage fire, and direct fire.

Artillery counterpreparations (AKP) occupied a special place in the fire defeat of the enemy in defense. The AKP was prepared in the presence of a sufficient amount of artillery and time to prepare the fire system and was carried out on the scale of the army (and sometimes the front). In the fall of 1941 it was carried out in the armies of the North-Western and Western fronts, in September-October 1942 in the armies of the Stalingrad front, in 1943 on the Central and Voronezh fronts near Kursk and in other defensive operations of the war.

So, powerful AKP, with the aim of disrupting the enemy's impending attack on Leningrad, were carried out on September 12 and 21 in the zone of operations of the 42nd Army. Their duration was from 15 to 30 minutes. More than four artillery regiments were involved, as well as the artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and coastal artillery. They fully achieved their goal, the enemy's attacks began separately and were unsuccessful.

In the defensive battle near Moscow, the command of the Western Front provided for the conduct of artillery counter-training in the zones of action of the 20, 16 and 19 armies. The AKP was planned according to four options, depending on the possible directions of the enemy's strikes, up to 300 guns were involved in the participation. Enemy attacks in the center of the Western Front were weakened by artillery counterpreparations and were unsuccessful.

The defensive battle near Kursk began with a powerful artillery counter-preparation, which anticipated the start of the enemy's offensive by 10 minutes. The AKP was planned in advance on the scale of the Central and Voronezh fronts in several ways. The average density of artillery was 30 guns and mortars and 3 rocket launchers per kilometer. In the most important areas, the density reached 60-70 guns and mortars. Duration of counterpreparation - 30 minutes. Powerful artillery fire strikes were unexpected for the enemy, as a result, the enemy began his artillery preparation with a delay of 2 hours, disorganized and scattered. The first blow of the enemy was significantly weakened, his troops, still in their initial position, suffered losses, were upset and demoralized. In total, 0.5 combat set of ammunition was spent on artillery counter-training.

In organizing and conducting artillery counter-training, there is a noticeable tendency to an increase in the number of artillery used in it, which significantly increased the effectiveness of counter-training.

Anti-tank defense was greatly developed during the war. Before the war, it was seen as a combination of fire from individual direct-fire guns on individual tanks and concentrated fire from closed firing positions against groups of tanks in areas of their concentration or during movement and attack. It was also envisaged to create an anti-tank rifle, and in the event of a breakthrough of tanks into the area of the main firing positions of artillery, direct fire with batteries in closed firing positions.

However, at the beginning of the war, significant shortcomings in the organization of anti-tank defense were revealed, the most important were: lack of proper interaction of artillery with other means of struggle (with tanks), underestimation of engineering barriers and obstacles, insufficient density of anti-tank artillery and its even distribution along the front; shallow depth of anti-tank defense; artillery from closed firing positions fought against tanks only sporadically.

Taking into account these shortcomings, the Red Army artillery headquarters in July 1941 developed for the troops "Instructions on the organization of the artillery fire system in defense." Here the requirement was put forward - the massive use of enemy tanks to oppose the massive use of anti-tank weapons and, first of all, artillery.

Ultimately, these problems were solved by developing an anti-tank defense system, which is a system of anti-tank strongpoints and areas, as well as anti-tank reserves.

Anti-tank strongpoints, created by artillery, merged with infantry strongpoints, representing a single system of combined-arms defense. This gave them greater stability in the fight against enemy tanks, with amphibious assault forces on tanks and with infantry advancing behind the tanks. For greater stability of the defense of individual strongholds, close interaction was organized between them along the front and depth, and the fire of the strong points was linked into a single interacting system, first on the scale of divisions, then corps, armies and, finally, the front.

Areas occupied only by artillery and prepared to combat tanks with direct fire were called anti-tank areas. They were created, as a rule, in the depths of the defense.

An even more durable anti-tank defense system was developed in 1944. From that time on, it included company anti-tank strongpoints, united in battalion anti-tank nodes, anti-tank areas (as part of anti-tank artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations), artillery and anti-tank reserves. The role of artillery occupying closed firing positions in the fight against tanks increased more and more. She was now located in tank-hazardous directions and conducted massive fire on enemy tank groupings, and with the breakthrough of tanks into the depths of the defense, she struck them with direct fire.

Gradually, an insurmountable anti-tank defense was developed and created in the tactical and operational zones of struggle. Already in the defensive period at Stalingrad, this system was quite perfect, but its classic expression was the anti-tank defense system in the Battle of Kursk.

New in anti-tank defense by artillery means was the gradual development of tactics for the combat use of artillery and anti-tank reserves. At first they were allocated in armies, divisions, and then on the fronts. In the operational zone, they began to allocate artillery and anti-tank reserves for each (or for two adjacent) directions. Hence, it became necessary to organize interaction between them and other reserves of divisions, corps, armies and fronts, as well as between them and the system of anti-tank strong points and areas formed by the troops of the first echelons.

The developed anti-tank defense system proved its vitality - it turned out to be insurmountable for the enemy's tank groupings.

2 ARTILLERY COMBAT

2.1 Leadership of the artillery of the Soviet Army

In July 1941, the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army was restored, to which Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov was appointed and the Main Directorate of the Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was formed. It included a headquarters, a combat training department for ground and military anti-aircraft artillery, an inspector, a personnel department and several departments.

The Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA), which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters, as well as in close contact with the headquarters of the Rear Services of the Red Army, was engaged in providing the army with weapons and ammunition. At industrial enterprises there were military representatives responsible for the quality of weapons and ammunition supplied to the troops. GAU KA also carried out maintenance, evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment. To solve these problems, the Artillery Armament Supply Directorate, the Artillery Armament Operation Directorate, the Artillery Armament Repair Directorate, the Tractor Directorate, and others were created in the GAU KA.

On November 8, 1942, an order was issued by the NKO to increase the role of artillery commanders in directing the combat activities of artillery. The chiefs of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, and the army became, respectively, the commanders of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, the army, and the corps. The commander of the Red Army artillery was at the same time the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

By a GKO decree of April 29, 1943, the guards mortar units were subordinate to the commander of the Red Army artillery. The commander of the GMCh became the deputy commander of the Red Army artillery for the guards mortar units. Major General of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev was approved for this position. The full integration of the GMCh with artillery contributed to a clearer planning of the effective engagement of the enemy and their more expedient combat use, taking into account the fire capabilities of the artillery.

The same GKO decree under the commander of the artillery of the Red Army created a Military Council consisting of Colonel-General of Artillery ND Yakovlev, Major-Generals of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev, L. M. Gaidukov and I. S. Prochko.

Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov was the Commander of the Red Army's artillery, the Commander of the country's air defense and was the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on many fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

At the very beginning of the war, he personally developed and submitted to the State Defense Committee specific proposals on the organization of anti-tank defense. N.N. Voronov was the author of a new, more perfect structure of artillery, which provided for the creation of artillery brigades and divisions of the RVGK, and then artillery breakthrough corps. Under his direct leadership, methods of combat use of rocket artillery were developed, as well as a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters on an artillery offensive.

Under his leadership, the artillery headquarters, which was headed by Colonel-General of Artillery F. A Samsonov throughout the war, developed and introduced into the troops new methods of combat applications of artillery, methods of controlling concentrated, massed and accompanying fire. So, summarizing the first experience of using a double barrage on an operational scale, N.N. Voronov issued instructions for organizing and mastering it by all artillery commanders and staffs.

NN Voronov rendered great and effective assistance to the chiefs of artillery of the fronts in the development and implementation of plans for an artillery offensive. During the elimination of the encircled enemy grouping near Stalingrad, as a Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the Don Front, he took part in organizing an artillery offensive, in which, for the first time in the practice of the Great Patriotic War, a barrage of fire was used to a depth of 1.5 km.

On January 18, 1943, N.N. Voronov, the first in the Soviet Armed Forces, was awarded the rank of Marshal of Artillery.

2.2 Military exploits of artillerymen

The success of artillery combat operations was determined not only by the availability of modern material, but also by its skillful use, the heroism of the artillerymen, high combat and moral character all the personnel of our artillery.

The special services of artillery to the Fatherland are marked by the assignment of honorary titles to a number of its units and formations, primarily of the guards. The first in artillery were the guards in January 1942, eight regiments that distinguished themselves in the battle of Moscow. During the war years, this title was awarded to six artillery divisions, 7 rocket artillery divisions, 11 anti-tank brigades, 64 artillery regiments and others. More than 2,100 artillery formations and units were awarded military orders.

EXPERIENCE TEACHING ARTILLERS

For centuries, artillerymen and engineers strived to make the artillery weapon technically perfect. How much effort, perseverance and hard work it took to do this. But these works were not in vain. Now our artillery can successfully solve all the tasks that arise in front of it in battle.
A weapon, however perfect it may be, cannot by itself decide the fate of a battle. One must be able to correctly apply it in battle, be able to derive the greatest benefit from it.
The largest technical improvements in artillery have usually come about as a result of wars; in battles and battles, new principles of the combat use of artillery were born.
During the war, mistakes were corrected, new methods of using artillery in combat were tested in practice. The experience of the civil war was very valuable in this respect.

At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in battle in the old way - the way it was used to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with the new forms of combat, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old tactics of artillery were replaced by tactics of flexible maneuver and a decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples show how old obsolete traditions were broken in the combat use of artillery. In October 1918, the 70,000-strong White Guard army of General Krasnov, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pressed the heroic defenders of the city to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The stock of shells and cartridges of the defenders of the city was coming to an end, and the routes of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the White Guards. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to advance, bombarding the Red Army units with shells. Due to the lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn more and more often had to fight back with bayonets and sabers. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. Towards evening, our observers noticed that new military units had arrived to help the White Guards. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
This is a critical moment. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
In this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mobilized all forces and means to repulse the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated in the central sector of the front opposite the Voroponovo station.
On a 40-kilometer front, there were about 200 guns. Almost all of them were now drawn to the central sector of the front. The batteries stood only a few dozen paces apart, preparing to repel the attack of the White Guards.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon moved to the attack and their infantry. The officers' regiments marched in full dress uniform, chain by chain, column by column. In front was the officer's brigade, followed by the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army men would not stand, that the mere sight of a mass of armed men steadily moving forward would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for a prearranged signal. Already the advanced lines of the Whites, half a kilometer from our infantry ... Already there are only 400 meters left ... Every second one could expect that the White Guards' chains would change from a quick step to a swift run and go over to the attack. At this moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white clouds of smoke hanging in the clear morning sky. And after that the whole steppe rumbled. The sounds of gunfire and the explosions of shells merged into a continuous, continuous rumble. Each battery fired at its assigned sector of the front, and all together created a solid wall of fire. The shells exploded in the thick of the advancing enemy columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the White Guards lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At that time, an armored train approached from the north along the circular railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front sector, trucks, converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns, burst forward; the batteries moved the fire into the depths of the White Guards in order to cut off the escape routes of their forward units. The red infantry launched a counterattack. She moved quickly forward. And as the artillery carried the fire farther and farther, the still smoking battlefield, strewn with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed by shells, opened before the eyes of the observers. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments in disarray rolled back south and west, scattered across the steppe. The siege ring was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin directed the rout of General Yudenich's White Guard troops, who were rushing to Petrograd. The position of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that in the rear of the Red Army at the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" and "Seraya Horse" a counter-revolutionary mutiny was raised. It was impossible to take the well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of a small number of artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed to attack the rebel forts with a combined strike from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and implemented. The suppression of the rebellious forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebellious forts, which could not withstand the powerful blows of naval artillery, were taken by Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were driven back to Estonia. Powerful support was provided by artillery to infantry on the Southern Front, when troops under the leadership of MV Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. Studying the experience of past wars helped our party and the Soviet Government correctly outline further steps towards the development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery must solve in battle. The rearmament of the artillery with new types of guns, which followed in 1937 and 1938, contributed to a significant increase in its power. The force of the crushing blows of the Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the Soviet country. In the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit the enemy's manpower, destroyed him military equipment and destroyed its powerful engineering structures.

After the First World War of 1914-1918, many military experts in Western Europe argued that artillery no longer had crucial in battle and that in modern wars, the success of the battle will be decided by tanks and aircraft - these new types of troops. The Nazis also thought so. They assigned the main role on the battlefields to tanks and aircraft and believed that artillery fire could be replaced with mortar fire. The Nazis hoped that the ability to quickly manufacture mortars in mass quantities would make the mortar a decisive force in the infantry offensive. Reality has shown that they were grossly miscalculated. The situation was no better in the artillery of the British and American armies. The British only after the defeat at Dunkirk began to re-equip their artillery and finished it by the end of the war, and american army entered the war, armed with light and anti-tank artillery, a slightly improved 75-mm French gun of the 1897 model. The development of our Soviet artillery proceeded along completely different paths. The plan for the creation of the armed forces of our state was based on taking into account the experience of past wars and on the principle of close interaction of all types of troops in battle. Creating new types of troops - aviation and tanks - our party and the Soviet Government paid unremitting attention to the development of artillery, the improvement of its military equipment and the increase in the power of its fire.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government also tirelessly cared about the education of well-trained artillery cadres, devoted to the cause of the Party and our Socialist Motherland. In 1937, on the day when the Soviet people honored their aviation and celebrated its successes, Comrade which pointed out the importance of artillery in modern warfare: “It is not only about aviation in modern warfare. The success of a war is not decided by aviation alone. Who thinks that with the help of one powerful aircraft; you can win a war - deeply mistaken. If you and I look into history, we will see what an important role artillery played in all wars. Aircraft on the battlefield appeared relatively recently; it begins the first fight with the enemy deep in the rear, instills fear and panic, shakes the enemy morally, but this is not what is required for the final defeat and victory over the enemy. Artillery was always required to decide the success of a war. How did Napoleon win? First of all, with its artillery. How were the French defeated in 1870 at Sedan? Mainly artillery. How did the French beat the Germans at Verdun in the world war? - Mainly artillery. For the success of the war, artillery is an exceptionally valuable branch of the armed forces. " To make our artillery first-class, many conditions were required. What was needed above all was a powerful industry equipped with last word technology. We needed experienced designers who had completely mastered modern science; we needed engineers, technicians and workers, metallurgists, mathematicians, mechanics, ootics, electrical engineering, radio engineering ... The industrialization of the country, carried out under the leadership of our Communist Party, brought success to the cause. Without the development of heavy industry, we would not have had such a powerful artillery that has earned the honorable name - the main fire strike force of the Soviet Army. During the years of the first five-year plans, scientific research work was widely developed, which ensured a high technical level of our artillery. Institutes and technical schools have trained thousands of engineers and technicians. Cadres of skilled artillerymen were also trained. Thanks to the concerns of the Communist Party, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had first-class artillery, which in every respect surpassed the artillery of any of the capitalist countries. During the war, work on the creation of new types of artillery weapons expanded even more widely. As you know, in the first two years of the war, the Nazis had to strengthen the armor protection of their tanks: it turned out that their armor was easily penetrated by Soviet artillery shells. In 1943, on the Soviet-German front, new powerful tanks appeared with the "fearsome" names "tiger" and "panther". Their armor was very thick and durable. It was necessary very quickly to create a new anti-tank weapon "that could penetrate the armor of powerful Nazi tanks. In a very short time, such a weapon was created. The new gun appeared on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and immediately gained great popularity among Soviet soldiers; this gun pierced the armor of all tanks and self-propelled guns that were in service with the Nazi army. Ground and anti-aircraft artillery was armed with new materiel. Rocket mortars entered service, the appearance of which on the battlefield was a complete surprise to the Nazis. The Soviet artillery was also well equipped with all types of reconnaissance and communications equipment and fire control devices.
Even in the period of defensive battles with superior enemy forces, the Communist Party foresaw a radical turn in the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and prepared the Soviet Army for the final defeat of the enemy. In the upcoming battles, artillery with its massed fire was supposed to destroy enemy fortifications, suppress enemy fire weapons, exterminate manpower and clear the way for our infantry, cavalry and tanks. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery successfully coped with all these tasks,

THE REAR HELPS THE FRONT

To conduct modern warfare, you need a lot of military equipment and especially artillery weapons. War requires constant replenishment of the materiel and ammunition of the army and, moreover, many times more than in peacetime. V war time not only are defense plants increasing their output, but many “peaceful” plants are switching over to defense work. Without the powerful economic foundation of the Soviet state, without the selfless labor of our people in the rear, without the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, without their material and moral support, the Soviet Army would not have been able to defeat the enemy. The first months of the Great Patriotic War were very difficult for our industry. The unexpected attack of the German fascist invaders and their advance to the east forced the evacuation of factories from the western regions of the country to a safe zone - to the Urals and Siberia. The movement of industrial enterprises to the east was carried out according to plans and under the leadership State Committee Defense. At remote stations and half-stations, in the steppe, in the taiga, new factories grew with fabulous speed. The machines started working in the open air as soon as they were installed on the foundation; the front demanded military products, and there was no time to wait for the completion of the construction of factory buildings. Among others, artillery factories were deployed. The speech of the Chairman of the State Committee played a huge role in strengthening our rear and mobilizing the masses to defend the Motherland. Defense of J. V. Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941. In this speech, JV Stalin, on behalf of the Party and the Soviet Government, called on the Soviet people to reorganize all work on a war footing as soon as possible. “We must,” said JV Stalin, “strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all our work to the interests of this cause, ensure the intensified work of all enterprises, produce more rifles, machine guns, guns, cartridges, shells, aircraft, organize the protection of factories. power stations, telephone and telegraph communications, establish local air defense. " The Communist Party quickly rebuilt everything National economy, all the work of party, state and public organizations in a military manner. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people were able not only to fully provide the front with weapons and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves for the successful completion of the war. Our party has transformed the Soviet country into a single military camp, armed the home front workers with an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. Labor productivity has increased tremendously; new improvements in production technology have sharply reduced the time required to manufacture weapons for the army; the output of artillery weapons increased significantly, and the quality of artillery weapons was continuously improved.
The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery guns have increased. Initial speeds have increased significantly. The armor-piercing ability of Soviet artillery shells has increased several times. The maneuverability of artillery systems has been significantly increased. The most powerful self-propelled artillery in the world was created, armed with such heavy weapons as a 152 mm howitzer cannon and a 122 mm cannon. Particularly great successes were achieved by Soviet designers in the field of jet

Neither fascist artillery nor fascist tanks could compete with Soviet artillery and tanks, although the Nazis robbed all of Western Europe, and the scientists and designers of Western Europe mostly worked for the Nazis. The Nazis had the largest metallurgical plants in Germany (Krupp plants) and many other plants in European states occupied by Hitler's troops. And nevertheless, neither the industry of all Western Europe, nor the experience of many Western European scientists and designers could provide the Nazis with superiority in the creation of new military equipment.
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, a whole galaxy of talented designers has been raised in our country, who, during the war, created new types of weapons with exceptional speed.
The talented artillery designers V.G. Grabin, F.F.Petrov, I.I. Ivanov and many others created new, perfect models of artillery weapons.
The design work was carried out at the factories as well. During the war, factories produced many prototypes of artillery weapons; a significant part of them went into mass production.
For the Second World War, a lot of weapons were required, incomparably more than for past wars. For example, in one of the greatest battles of the past, the Battle of Borodino, two armies - Russian and French - had a total of 1227 guns.
At the beginning of the First World War, the armies of all the belligerent countries had 25,000 guns, which were scattered on all fronts. The artillery saturation of the front was insignificant; only in some areas of the breakthrough, up to 100–150 guns were collected per kilometer of the front.
The situation was different during the Great Patriotic War. When the enemy blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1944, 5000 guns and mortars from our side took part in the battle. When the powerful enemy defenses were broken through on the Vistula, 9,500 guns and mortars were concentrated on the 1st Belorussian Front alone. Finally, during the storming of Berlin, 41,000 Soviet artillery pieces and mortars fell on the enemy.

In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used up during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense factories had to have, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to continuously transfer countless cannons and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry in just one month produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.

Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a continuous stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the able hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its production from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army in increasing quantities with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment.
The artillery industry produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles and about 2 million submachine guns. In 1944 alone, 7 billion 400 million cartridges were produced.
The Soviet people, selflessly working in the rear, helped the Soviet Army to defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War speaks of the vitality of the Soviet social system, of the invincibility of the cause for which the Soviet people fought under the leadership of our party in the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people complete victory over a powerful and insidious enemy in the most difficult of all wars that humanity has ever had to wage.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party brought together and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people towards a common goal, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the party became even closer to the people, and became even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.

SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral qualities.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery with its fire repelled the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the German fascist army, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, helped our infantry to stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did the artillery solve its combat missions?
When Hitler's armored hordes attacked our homeland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from Soviet artillery, which took on the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army to thwart Hitler's plans for a "lightning-fast" defeat of our Motherland.

For a more successful fight against Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a crucial role in the defeat of enemy tanks.
Bravely defending the prepared lines, the Soviet artillerymen dealt blow after blow to the enemy. Each city, which the enemy approached, turned into a fortress, on the approaches of which the best German fascist units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities has gone down in history forever: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad.
In all defensive battles, artillery with its fire ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. In the defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with hired artillery, coastal and naval artillery successfully operated, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery became especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, for the capture of which the Nazis threw 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized ones, to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of the winter of 1941.

For twenty days in a row, the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. The artillerymen courageously fought against fascist tanks, set fire to and knocked out armored vehicles in dozens and hundreds. One of the regiments of anti-tank artillery destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the outskirts of Moscow. For the courage shown in the battles against the German fascist invaders, for the perseverance, courage and heroism of the glorious destroyers of enemy tanks, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment.

The Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy's strike forces, stopped it, "and then, pulling up and concentrating the reserves, on December 6, 1941, launched a counteroffensive. Near Moscow and in other sectors of the front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. During the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of cars and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of the enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, the fascist troops were not only stopped, but completely defeated. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the German fascist army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin wrote in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day on November 19, 1944: “As you know, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the enemy's advance near approaches to Leningrad and Moscow ".

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLES OF STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned what role it played: Soviet artillery in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that it is necessary to tell about it in a little more detail.
Having suffered defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear, and then strike at Moscow. In this adventurous plan of the fascists, the capture of Stalingrad was envisaged. To accomplish this task, the Hitlerite command concentrated on the Stalingrad direction huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation: and many other military equipment.
The fascist command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and capturing Kuibyshev by August 15 and ending the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. The breakthrough of the front was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
In developing their plans, the Nazis hoped that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France in order to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
Indeed, the American-British imperialists were constantly postponing the opening of a second front in Europe; they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would fall into economic dependence on the United States of America and England.
In addition, they hoped that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Hitlerite Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in the New York Times, US Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany ... And thus, let them kill as much as possible. "
In violation of their allied obligations, the American-British imperialists conducted peace negotiations with fascist Germany secretly from the Soviet Union.

In the days of the heavy battles of Stalingrad, the American-British imperialists had under arms about six million inactive soldiers and huge masses of military equipment. These forces and means could “provide substantial assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942 the American-British reactionaries raised a fuss in their newspapers that American and British troops were not prepared to open a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fearing for his rear.
At the same time, the imperialists of the United States and Britain supplied Hitlerite Germany with the most important military materials through "neutral" countries.
This is how the monopolists of the United States and Britain openly and secretly helped Hitlerite Germany in her struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they grossly miscalculated, they did not take into account the ability of our army to long-term resistance; Nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Hitlerite command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops at Stalingrad. The Soviet troops were given the task in stubborn battles to wear out and bleed the German fascist troops rushing to Stalingrad, and then to surround them and destroy them. This plan was successfully implemented.

In the battles that unfolded between the bend of the Don and the Volga, our army inflicted strong blows on the German fascist troops, destroying the best Hitler regiments and divisions and delaying the advance of Hitler's troops. To cover the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to wage bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September did the fascist German troops manage to approach the outskirts of the city.

At Stalingrad, the Nazis met resistance unprecedented in the history of war and the stubbornness of the Soviet troops and workers of the Stalingrad enterprises.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were broken against the staunch defenses of our troops. The corpses of the Nazis were littered with the approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks. The forces of the enemy were melting away. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad smashed "selected Hitlerite troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly important role in this battle, it waged a fierce and long-term struggle against the German fascist tank and mechanized troops on the far and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. The artillerymen blocked the path of the enemy's infantry and tanks with the fire of their guns, inflicting enormous damage on him in manpower and equipment. By this, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber cannons to high-power guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant expectation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis made an average of 10 attacks per day. The struggle was fought for every inch of Soviet land, for every quarter, for every house, for every floor of a house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. Every block, street, house, they turned into fortresses, which destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Hitlerite command.
In the same months, the Nazis undertook 4 offensive operations, which lasted several days; they threw more than ten divisions into battle at once, supported by 400-500 tanks.
The German fascist invaders managed to break into the city, but they could not completely capture it.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - "Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy" - and tried at all costs to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle banners, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not shame the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight until last opportunity... Under your leadership, our fathers won the Tsaritsyn battle, under your leadership we will also win in the great battle of Stalingrad! " The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingraders - city residents took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force a Russian woman to help them bypass the house, which was defended by our submachine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the courtyard under the fire of our riflemen and shouted: "Shoot, comrades!" Almost all the Nazis were killed. One of the fascists, wounded, shot at a woman. When our arrows ran up to her, she said: "Still, I was not mistaken." Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad were only the first stage Battle of Stalingrad... Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the Nazis' offensive in the Stalingrad direction.

The devastating fire of the Soviet artillery produced tremendous devastation in the enemy's position.

In the course of the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, the Nazi armies were drained of blood. They lost 182,000 killed and over 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops destroyed and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, over 2,000 guns and mortars. 1337 aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft. All this reflected on the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the "inaccessibility of the Stalingrad fortress", about the "Volga Verdun", about the "incomprehensible stubbornness of the Russians."
Lance corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to take 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will throw us back. "
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions at Stalingrad during the winter, and in the summer to start the offensive again in order to achieve their insane goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were going on in the streets of the city, our new units and formations were concentrated in the Stalingrad area, armed with new military equipment, capable of defeating the enemy.
To defeat the enemy, it was required to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Especially a lot was needed for artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts. The artillery was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses with its fire and ensure the transition of our troops to the counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the roar of engines could be heard incessantly. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front, ”and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out in secret. The troops approached the front only at night. During the day they took refuge in settlements and in numerous gullies, carefully camouflaging themselves from aerial observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. Soviet artillery reconnaissance did a great deal of work in the preparatory period. She identified important targets on which the artillery had to bring down its fire. Much attention was paid to organizing interaction between various branches of the armed forces.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to surround and completely destroy all enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
For this, our troops, in close cooperation, had to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then with a swift attack of mobile troops in the direction of the Don, encircle the Nazi hordes near Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to a plan developed by the Supreme High Command, Soviet troops went over to a decisive counter-command.

Before the start of the infantry and tank offensive, artillery preparation of an unprecedented force was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down on enemy positions a huge amount of shells and mines. A sudden powerful fire strike was struck at the enemy's centers of resistance at the front line and in the depths of the defense, at its mortars and artillery batteries, at command posts, at reserves. The whole area was, as it were, plowed up by a gigantic plow of war. The surface of the earth was dug with many craters from the explosions of shells, mines and aerial bombs. Whole enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in panic, finding no escape. The losses of the fascists in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog that limited visibility, our artillery coped with its tasks perfectly.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massed artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, artillery from only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, 126 defensive structures. A lot of enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed by artillery fire.
Having broken through the enemy's front, our troops began to advance rapidly. Our artillery advanced along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, the Soviet artillerymen showed the high skill of controlling massive fire. They smashed enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the rout of the Hitlerite army, a rout in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry, on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected German fascist troops was surrounded. The history of war knows no example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler turned to the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded at all costs to keep the position near Stalingrad.
The Hitlerite command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To help them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groupings and continued to develop the offensive further and further west.

This is how the Nazis' attempts to free their encircled armies ended ingloriously.
Meanwhile, our troops, which surrounded the main grouping of the Nazis at Stalingrad, were preparing for its destruction.
In the last, decisive battle, according to the plan of our Supreme High Command, it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy forces into parts and then destroy each isolated enemy grouping separately. The artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy's fortifications, suppressing and destroying his fire weapons and manpower.
On January 10, at 8 hours 5 minutes, from the front commander's point, there was a command to begin the offensive. The air shuddered with the thunder of the artillery cannonade, which simultaneously began on the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and assault aviation appeared in the sky.
The offensive of our troops was supported by heavy artillery fire. The artillery was used in large masses and provided good fire for the actions of our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and aerial bombs merged into a continuous hum. Losses inflicted on the enemy

fire of our artillery, mortars and aviation, were very significant. According to the testimony of the prisoners, "whole battalions knelt down and turned to God with prayer, asking him to spare and protect them from the fire of Russian artillery."
Our tanks with the landing forces landed on them rushed towards the enemy; after them the rifle subunits went on the attack. Within two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, with fierce battles advanced east to Stalingrad and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the Mamayev Kurgan area, joined forces with General Chuikov's troops advancing from Stalingrad.
The fascist German troops were cut into two parts: the northern one in the area of the tractor plant and the Barricades plant and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern group of Hitler's troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops began an assault on the northern grouping of enemy forces. After the artillery preparation, the enemy's defense was broken, and on the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery fulfilled the tasks assigned to it with honor. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire

98 tanks were destroyed and burned, over 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1000 wood-earthen emplacements and over 1500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.

Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles at Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy forces had been defeated ended at 16 o'clock on February 2, 1943.
The Battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong elite Hitlerite army, which consisted of 22 divisions.

The size of an unprecedented massacre in history is evidenced by the numbers of enemy losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of the killed Nazis were picked up and buried in the ground. In the period from January 10 to February 2, the front forces destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.

In addition, it was captured: guns - 5762, mortars - 1312, machine guns - 12701, tanks - 1666, armored vehicles - 216 and many other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of warfare - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles of Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army, was especially clearly revealed. On the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear to what extent artillery must be used to achieve victory in a modern war. The Stalingrad victory showed how the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals has grown.

The battle of Stalingrad put an end to the offensive of Hitler's troops into the interior of our country. The mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land began. The word "Stalingrad" became a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It resonated in the hearts of all honest people in the world and raised them to fight against fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.

The defeat of the Hitlerite army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and the secret ally of Nazi Germany, Turkey, to refrain from intending to openly oppose the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE AT KURSK
Back in January - February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the Voronezh and Kursk regions and threw the Nazi troops back far to the west.
In the outlines of the front, a ledge formed, which went deeply into the enemy's disposition. At this line, the front stabilized, and both belligerents began to prepare for summer hostilities.

Hitler's army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. By strikes from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to take the Kursk grouping of our army into "ticks" in order to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk region, to capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move to Moscow.

To be able to imagine the scale of this battle, suffice it to say that the Nazi command concentrated in the Kursk direction: more than 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy tanks "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", 6,763 guns, 3,200 mortars and 1,850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this plan of the enemy was solved in a timely manner by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent the Hitlerite command from carrying out his plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared for both defense and offensive.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created a powerful defense in the sectors of a possible offensive of the Nazis in order to wear out and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then go over to a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy.

The gunners carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces for the offensive in the starting areas, our artillery, 10 minutes before the start of the offensive, made a powerful fire attack on the enemy. Several hundred guns suddenly dropped their shells on the German fascist positions. The artillery crushed the enemy infantry, his tank and motorized troops preparing for the offensive, as well as batteries, observation and command posts of the enemy.

The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 ammunition and fuel depots were blown up, 60 observation posts were suppressed, many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.

A surprise attack by our artillery and mortars upset the battle formations of enemy infantry and tanks. Having suffered heavy losses in artillery, the Nazis were forced to shift part of the artillery tasks to aviation. Only a few hours later did the Nazis come to their senses from the unexpected blow and were able to undertake their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with a large force of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. The famous battle of Kursk began.
South of Orel and north of Belgorod, fighting broke out, unprecedented in fierceness and in the number of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction from the Orel region, the Nazis threw into battle 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions, and from the Belgorod area - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to go on the offensive. The infantry followed the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.

Despite the enormous forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met with heavy massed fire from our artillery and defending troops. Enemy tanks took off into the air, exploding in minefields, caught fire from well-aimed shots of artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to the attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. On the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged a few kilometers into our location.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle unprecedented in its size unfolded again, in which more than 1,500 tanks and large air forces participated from both sides. In one day of the battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a single meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern grouping of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day - and the southern. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result of huge losses, were forced to end the offensive along the entire front. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of the Hitlerite command collapsed. The stable, prearranged defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be really insurmountable.
Our artillery played an exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk, which bore the brunt of the fight against the masses of Nazi heavy and light tanks, who were trying to breach our defense line. The struggle of Soviet guns with enemy armored vehicles ended in victory for the Soviet artillerymen. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the armed forces, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
The artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and increased the glory of the Russian artillery with heroic deeds. In some cases, the gunners fired until the last shell, and then turned into hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen against enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyri, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved to the gun of Sergeant Major Sedov. Sergeant Major Sedov, letting the enemy go 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired a cannon at the most vulnerable spots of the tanks, preventing the enemy from recovering. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four "tigers" from his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when the enemy shell smashed the gun, Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued the battle with the Nazi tanks.
An invaluable service to the ground forces was provided by anti-aircraft artillery, which operated together with them on the battlefield. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and drained of the elite fascist divisions in the battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy's front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then developed into a powerful offensive on the front over 800 kilometers long. The pre-prepared, deeply echeloned, powerful defensive lines and fortified centers of resistance, created by the Nazis for almost two years, were destroyed by our artillery, which operated in conjunction with other branches of the armed forces.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi armies near Kursk, the fascist myth that "the Russians can only attack in winter" was dispelled. The Soviet troops proved that in the summer they break through the enemy defenses and conduct the offensive as well as in the winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be marked with an artillery salute.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. On the significance of the Battle of Kursk, Chairman of the State Defense Committee JV Stalin said: "If the Battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the Battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe."
After the defeat at Kursk and Kharkov, all hopes of the Nazis to stay in the east were dashed.
A continuous advance of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The major victories of the Soviet troops were not only important for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and disabled. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, honorably performed all the tasks assigned to it.
Having driven out Hitler's troops from our country, the Soviet Army shifted its military operations to enemy territory. Soviet troops, advancing westward, liberated one country after another, enslaved by Nazi Germany. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and that the Soviet Union alone, alone would put an end to Nazi Germany and its satellites, were the American and British generals forced to hurry up with the opening of the second front with a delay of two years.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the German fascist armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment that participated in it, and in terms of the force of the blows, this was an offensive unparalleled in the history of war. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and no less than 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke into the enemy's defenses on the 1200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; by the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers from enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on Western front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines covering the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN
The battle for Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
The Hitlerite command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, so a system of heavily fortified defensive zones with numerous concreted firing points and other engineering structures had been created in advance over the entire vast territory from the Oder to Berlin.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and the approaches to it were also turned into a fortified area. On the outskirts of Berlin, the Nazis built an additional three powerful strips of fortifications. Berlin was divided along the circumference into eight defense sectors, the city center was most strongly fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete gun emplacements were erected on every street. To defend the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis deployed several armies. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to the defense of Berlin. Members of the Nazi Party were mobilized to create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with Faust cartridges (a new rocket weapon for fighting tanks). Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Hitlerite command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of military equipment.
Soviet soldiers irresistibly rushed to Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command in the artillery units, a struggle unfolded for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. The units read with enthusiasm the address of the Military Council of the front, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to defeat the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, seize the capital of Germany, Berlin, and hoist the banner of Victory over it. "
To complete this last battle, such a quantity of manpower and military equipment was concentrated, which made it possible in the shortest possible time to break the resistance of the fascist troops and capture Berlin. No other operation has involved as much artillery as it was concentrated for the offensive on Berlin.
The preparation for the offensive was carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this for the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But the offensive from our side did not follow, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, the artillery fire was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.

The attack was scheduled for another day.
The beginning of the general offensive on Berlin was announced by a volley of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly struck at the enemy's defensive lines.
After artillery and aviation training, Soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the attack. The swift offensive of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected and overwhelming for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed forward positions and broke into the enemy's defensive zone. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and his weapons, Soviet tanks and the infantry advanced swiftly. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow, their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Units of the Soviet Army pursued the enemy on the heels and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the battalion commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the den of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery

the fire continued to grow - after Major Zyukin's batteries, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops approached Berlin, the more the resistance of the Nazis increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21, the storming of the city itself began.
Our soldiers met with a prepared defense. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous heaps and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock the enemy out of every street, from every building. Fierce battles took place on the stairs of multi-storey buildings, in basements, on roofs. From building to building, from block to block, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankmen, sappers, signalmen were advancing in battle.
In these difficult conditions, our gunners brilliantly coped with the assigned front tasks. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defenses and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns over dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks to cross the Spree River and the canals, of which there are a lot in the city. Having suppressed the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, the artillery ensured the capture of coastal areas.
So, clearing block after block, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the storming of the Reichstag, the last short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed into the attack and burst into the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted for several hours.
At 14:20 on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison surrendered unconditionally to the victorious Soviet troops.
Soviet artillery, with its crushing blows, contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
In the battle for Berlin, 41,000 artillery pieces and mortars took part, firing a huge number of shells and mines with a total weight of over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were taken prisoner by Soviet troops. (475)
The greatest offensive in history by the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the Nazis and brought the peoples of Europe liberation from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany ended with the victorious Battle of Berlin. In commemoration of the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery salvos from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of an attack on our homeland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades provoked military clashes in Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, elite troops - the one and a half million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of a military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, the ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla dealt crushing blows to the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the combat operations of our troops were distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to get ready for battle, as they were already overtaken by the shells of the Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, together with infantry and tanks, in a short time fought through the whole of Manchuria and ended its military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
With their military operations, the Soviet artillery largely contributed to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan declared itself defeated and surrendered unconditionally.
In the war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the West and against the Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland, saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and state system, the victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is told in this book shows how varied and responsible the combat work of gunners is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps not a single type of weapon requires from a commander and a soldier such discipline of mind, will and knowledge as artillery. "
On the battlefield, gunners must be proactive, courageous and courageous; the fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the artillerymen of our glorious Soviet Army who are selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
With such a cadre of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the armed forces, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and are showing tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party, having outlined a majestic program of building communism in the USSR, set the Communist Party the task of strengthening the active defense of the Soviet Motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies in every possible way.
Our people, defending the cause of peace by all means, can boldly rely on their Soviet Army and its main firepower - artillery.

Let's take a look at its effectiveness and the effectiveness of armored forces. Taking the most accurate criterion of efficiency as a point of account - the number of destroyed enemy soldiers.

I'm not going to calculate the number of tanks, guns and mortars that took part in the battles to one. It's not needed. We are interested in the order of the numbers.

To avoid screaming, we will take the most kosher initial figures from the tables of reference work:

Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU
Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences
Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
HISTORY
WORLD WAR II
1939-1945
Order of the Red Banner of Labor
Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Moscow.

And we will not even look closely at them, although honestly I really want to say. Ask what and how they counted in these tables.

The most massive German artillery system, the 75 mm anti-tank gun RAK.40, was produced from 1942 to 1945, a total of 23303 units were produced (2114, 8740, 11728 and 721, respectively. All figures for Shirokorad).

The most common Wehrmacht howitzer, the cornerstone of divisional artillery - 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 (in all modifications) was released during the WWII, 18432 units (since 1939 - 483, 1380, 1160, 1249, 4103, 9033, 1024).

A similar number of 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns were fired.

Let's not waste time on trifles. As a basis for calculations, we take tables No. 6 and No. 11 above, with general data.

About amendments to tables.

As we know, the Allies supplied tanks and artillery Lend-Lease and in fairly large quantities. We will neglect these figures, we will count them for the post-war issue of tables.
Let us also remember that at the beginning of the war there were 117,581 artillery systems and almost 26,000 tanks in the Red Army and Navy, let's drop these numbers into the offset of the weapons of the districts that did not participate in the war, the Far Eastern Front and other little things in life. On the German side, we will balance the captured weapons of the countries captured by Hitler and the entire production of weapons and military equipment up to 1940 inclusive. In general, we will calculate the efficiency based on the 1941-1945 production.

We consider (Germany-USSR):
Artillery (all in thousand units):
1941: 22.1 - 30.2; 1942 40.5 - 127.1; 1943 73.7 -130.3; 1944 148.2 -122.4; 1945 27 - 72.2.
Mortars:
1941: 4.2 - 42.4; 1942 9.8 - 230; 1943 23 - 69.4; 1944 33.2 -7.1; 1945 2.8 - 3.
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
1941: 3.8-4.8; 1942 6.2-24.4; 1943 10.7-24.1; 1944 18.3-29; 1945 4.4 - 20.5.
Total:
Artillery:
311,5 - 482,2
Mortars:
73 - 351,9
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
43,4 - 102,8
Or:
427,9 - 936,9 .

In general, the USSR produced more than double the number of tanks, guns and mortars than Germany. But that is not all! As my readers probably know, the USSR was not at war with Germany alone. And whether anyone likes it or not, Hitler's losses on the Western Front (I will equate West Africa with him) are about a third of the total during WWII.

Since this material will spoil a lot of chairs at Internet potsreots, I will be kind, let us assume that although the aforementioned weapons and military equipment were involved in the West, a quarter of its total number was used.

3/4 of 427.9, that's about 321 thousand tanks, artillery systems and mortars who killed the soldiers of the Red Army and 936,9 killing Wehrmacht soldiers.

Let's round the numbers to 320 000 and 930 000 accordingly, for simplicity of further calculations. Even 350 000 and 900 000 ... Let's remember about the allies of the Reich.

Now we find out how many of each other's servicemen were killed.

Regarding the losses of the Soviet Union, curious people can go on reference and get acquainted with the calculations that slightly refute Grigory Fedotovich Krivosheev, with the same ones as his original ones.

I must say that shadow_ru The mistakes of "Griff ..." are far from being alone, with the calculations in the balance of the re-called, with a giggle (already) have been procrastinating among people interested in the issue since at least 2006. In general, everyone who needs to know about these more than 2 million fighters, but no one in the government is interested in this.

Total reliable figure of irrecoverable demographic losses of the USSR Armed Forces (calculated by the balance method without Krivosheevsky errors with balance) - 11 405 thousand people.

With the loss of the enemy in "Vulture ..." is also a very funny situation, for example the result of viewing the last edition... This is just aerobatics, to recognize the figures of the German explorer Rüdiger Overmans as kosher and to start to bring a new balance like this:

"After 2000, German scientists headed by the historian Professor Rüdiger Overmans carried out many years of work on a thorough analysis of reporting and statistical documents stored in the archives of Germany. As a result of the study, it was found that the total irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 5 million 300 thousand soldiers and officers. This information is published in the book "German military losses in World War II", Munich.
Taking into account the results of the study of German scientists, the authors of this work made appropriate adjustments to the previously available information about the irrecoverable losses of the countries of the fascist bloc on the Soviet-German front. They are reflected in table. 94".

Tab. 94 corresponds to table. 201 editions of "Russia and the USSR ..." and instead of 3,604.8 thousand killed, died from wounds, etc.

Further, the authors conclude that the ratio of irrecoverable losses was 1: 1.1 (previously it was 1: 1.3).
Mega-perederg, you will not say anything. For Overmans, this number is the total number of those killed, killed and died on all fronts, as well as in captivity.

In this situation, if Grigory Fedotovich again made a slight mistake by 2 million people, it is logical to refer to the figures he recognized as reliable, directly... So to speak, without intermediaries:

Roughly, the Wehrmacht and SS troops lost 3.55 million people in the East, killed in action and died in captivity.
The ratio of 11.405 million versus 3.55 is certainly unpleasant, but we must not forget that about 3.9 million Soviet soldiers died in captivity. In Overmans, as you can make sure, only post-war mortality is highlighted, but this is normal, in the first half of the war the Germans were able to be taken prisoner extremely badly, respectively, their mad mortality is quite comparable with the mortality in the German VP camps in the same period, later, when the attitude towards them improved didn't really matter. Let's take the total number of Germans who died in Soviet captivity at 205,000. Too lazy to look for an exact figure.

In general, the mortality figures of 46, 47 and subsequent years are practically only the Soviet Union, the Allies dispersed the bulk of the Boshes to their homes by the end of 1945.

As a result, on the Eastern Front, approximately 7.5 million were killed directly in battles. Soviet soldiers and about 3.7 million military personnel of Germany and its allies (130,000 Romanians, 195,000 Hungarians, 58,000 Finns - I don't know how G.F.'s 682,000 balance, I don't think the rest are Slovaks)

And now we count the efficiency.
Not so long ago, Christoph Russ's book "Human Material. German Soldiers on the Eastern Front" (M., Veche, 2013, ISBN 978-5-9533-6092-0) was published concerning the 253rd Infantry Division operating in the east.
The impressions can be read. Among other things, it gives the ratio of shrapnel and bullet wounds among the military personnel of the division, 60 to 40%. The infantry division for 4 years of the war is a very good selection, and we dance from it.

We multiply 3.7 million troops of the Reich and its allies by 0.6, we get 2.22 million invaders who died from shrapnel wounds - mostly from artillery fire. Although the figure is very optimistic, the Finns have a ratio of bullet wounds to shrapnel wounds in the Continuation Wars of 69% to 31%. We drop 120,000 on losses from aviation and estimate losses from artillery (including tanks) and mortar fire at about 2 million souls... We'll drop another 100,000 on grenades. Everything here is greatly overestimated, but let it be. I will save the hearts of the saviors of my homeland.

Based on Ozeretskovsky's "Wound Ballistics", on the other side of the front, on average, during the war, approximately the same ratio was observed, adjusted for a higher mortality rate from shrapnel wounds (scan.

2,000,000 / 900,000 = 2.22 people.
4,275,000 / 350,000 = 12.21 people .

I kiss on the forehead. The effectiveness of enemy tanks and artillery in terms of a mortar or gun crew, platoon, battery or tank there exceeded the Soviet one by about 6 (six) times.

If anyone wants, we can jointly repeat the calculations not with approximate, but with exact numbers.
I can't imagine how this ratio can be lowered at least to 1: 5. But maybe I'm wrong?

It is possible to further glorify the personnel policy of the most effective manager of the century in the 20s and the first half of the 30s with "politically valuable" graduates of artillery schools, even when they graduate, they have no idea of logarithms. Obviously not atheists could expect miracles in this world.

Artillery during the Second World War Part I

M. Zenkevich

Soviet artillery was created during the Civil War and went through two stages in its pre-war development. In the period from 1927 to 1930. the modernization of the artillery weapons inherited from the tsarist army was carried out, as a result of which the main tactical and technical characteristics of the guns were significantly improved in accordance with the new requirements, and this was done without large costs on the basis of the available weapons. Thanks to the modernization of artillery weapons, the artillery firing range has increased by an average of one and a half times. The increase in the firing range was achieved by lengthening the barrels, increasing charges, increasing the elevation angle and improving the shape of the projectiles.

The increase in the power of the shot also required some alteration of the carriages. In the carriage of the 76-mm cannon mod. In 1902, a counterbalancing mechanism was introduced, muzzle brakes were installed on the 107-mm and 152-mm guns. A single sight of the 1930 model was adopted for all the guns. After the modernization, the guns received new names: 76-mm cannon of the 1902/30 model, 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 etc. Of the new artillery models developed during this period, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 The beginning of the second stage in the development of Soviet artillery dates back to the early 1930s, when, as a result of the accelerated development of heavy industry, it became possible to begin the complete rearmament of artillery with new models.

On May 22, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted the artillery armament system developed by the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) for 1929-32. It was an important program document for the development of Soviet artillery. It provided for the creation of anti-tank, battalion, regimental, divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). The system was adjusted for every five-year plan and was the basis for the development of new weapons. In accordance with it, in 1930, the 37-mm anti-tank gun was adopted. The gun carriage of this gun had a sliding frame, which provided a horizontal firing angle of up to 60 ° without moving the frame. In 1932, a 45-mm anti-tank gun was adopted, also on a carriage with a sliding frame. In 1937, the 45-mm cannon was improved: a semiautomatic device was introduced into the wedge breechblock, suspension was used, and ballistic qualities were improved. Large-scale work was carried out to re-equip divisional, corps and army artillery, as well as high-power artillery.

As a divisional gun, the 76-mm gun mod. 1939 with a semi-automatic wedge gate. The carriage of this gun had a rotating upper machine, high-speed lifting and turning mechanisms, and sliding beds. The undercarriage with suspension and rubber tires on wheels allowed a transport speed of up to 35-40 km / h. In 1938, a 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 This gun, in terms of its tactical and technical data, far surpassed all foreign samples of this type. The corps artillery was armed with a 107-mm cannon mod. 1940 and 152-mm howitzer mod. 1938 g.

The army artillery consisted of: 122-mm cannon mod. 1931/37 and 152-mm howitzer mod. 1937 The first sample of the 122 mm cannon was developed in 1931. The 122 mm cannon mod. 1931/37 was obtained by imposing the barrel of a 122-mm cannon mod. 1931 on a new carriage arr. 1937, adopted as a single gun carriage for a 122 mm cannon and a 152 mm howitzer. For all guns of divisional and corps artillery, a sight was adopted that was independent of the gun, which made it possible to simultaneously load and aim the gun at the target. The problem of creating high-power Soviet artillery was also successfully resolved.

In the period from 1931 to 1939. adopted for service: 203-mm howitzer mod. 1931, 152-mm cannon mod. 1935, 280 mm mortar arr. 1939, 210-mm cannon mod. 1939 and 305-mm howitzer mod. 1939 Carriages of 152-mm cannons, 203-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars of the same type, tracked. In the stowed position, the guns consisted of two carts - a barrel and a gun carriage. In parallel with the development of the material part of the artillery, important measures were taken to improve ammunition.

Soviet designers developed the most advanced long-range shells in shape, as well as new types of armor-piercing shells. All shells were equipped with domestically produced fuses and tubes. It should be noted that the development of Soviet artillery was influenced by such a widespread idea abroad at that time as universalism. It was about the creation of so-called universal or semi-universal weapons, which could be both field and anti-aircraft weapons. For all the attractiveness of this idea, its implementation led to the creation of overly complex, heavy and expensive weapons with low combat qualities. Therefore, after the creation and testing of a number of samples of such guns in the summer of 1935, a meeting of artillery designers was held with the participation of government members, at which the insolvency and harmfulness of universalism was revealed and the need for specialization of artillery according to its combat purpose and types was indicated. The idea of replacing artillery with aircraft and tanks did not find support in the USSR either.

This path, for example, went german army, which made the main emphasis on aviation, tanks and mortars. Speaking in the Kremlin in 1937, I.V. Stalin said: “The success of a war is not decided by aviation alone. For the success of a war, artillery is an exceptionally valuable branch of the armed forces. I would like our artillery to show that it is first class. "

This line of creating powerful artillery was strictly implemented, which was reflected, for example, in a sharp increase in the number of guns of all purposes.If on January 1, 1934, the Red Army had 17,000 guns, then on January 1, 1939, their number was 55,790. and on June 22, 1941, 67355 (excluding 50-mm mortars, of which there were 24158). In the pre-war years, along with the rearmament of rifled artillery, extensive work was carried out to create mortars.

The first Soviet mortars were created in the early 30s, but some leaders of the Red Army viewed them as a kind of "surrogate" of artillery, of interest only to the armies of underdeveloped states. However, after the mortars proved their high efficiency during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, their mass introduction into the troops began. The Red Army received 50-mm company and 82-mm battalion mortars, 107-mm miners and 120-mm regimental mortars. In total, over 40 thousand mortars were delivered to the Red Army from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941. After the start of the war, along with solving the problems of increasing the supply of artillery and mortar weapons to the front, design bureaus and industrial enterprises developed and introduced into production new artillery systems. In 1942, the 76.2-mm divisional gun mod. 1941 (ZIS-3), the design of which, with high combat characteristics, fully met the requirements of continuous production. To combat enemy tanks in 1943, a 57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2 was developed on the carriage of a 76.2-mm cannon mod. 1942 g.

A little later, an even more powerful 100-mm gun mod. 1944 From 1943, 152-mm corps howitzers and 160-mm mortars began to enter the troops, which became an indispensable means of breaking through enemy defenses. During the war years, the industry produced 482.2 thousand guns.

351.8 thousand mortars were manufactured (4.5 times more than in Germany, and 1.7 times more than in the United States and the countries of the British Empire). In the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army also widely used rocket artillery. The beginning of its use can be considered the formation in June 1941 of the First separate battery, which had seven BM-13 installations. By December 1, 1941, in field rocket artillery, there were already 7 regiments and 52 separate divisions, and at the end of the war the Red Army had 7 divisions, 11 brigades, 114 regiments and 38 separate divisions of rocket artillery, for which more than 10 thousand Multiple-charge self-propelled launchers and over 12 million rockets.

volley "Katyusha"

ZIS-3 76-MM GUN, SAMPLE 1942

A few weeks after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow on January 5, 1942, the ZIS-3, the famous 76-mm divisional gun, received the go-ahead.

"As a rule, we received the tactical and technical requirements for the development of new guns from the Main Artillery Directorate," says the well-known designer of artillery systems V. Grabin. But some of the guns were developed on our own initiative. ...

Caliber 76 mm - 3 inches - from the beginning of this century was considered the classic caliber of a divisional gun. A cannon powerful enough to hit enemy manpower from closed positions, suppress mortar and artillery batteries and other fire weapons. A cannon mobile enough to, while moving across the battlefield by the forces of a combat crew, accompany the advancing units not only with fire, but also with wheels, crushing bunkers and bunkers with direct fire. Experience of the First World War. showed that with the saturation of the trench defense with fire weapons, the advancing units needed battalion and regimental melee artillery. And the appearance of tanks required the creation of special anti-tank artillery.

Equipping the Red Army with military equipment has always been in the center of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On July 15, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a historic decision to create new military equipment, including artillery. fulfilling the program drawn by the party, Soviet designers were working on the creation of both melee artillery and anti-tank artillery (37 and 45-mm guns). But when, by the end of the 30s, there was a gap between the capabilities of these anti-tank guns and the armor of tanks, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed a tactical and technical assignment for a 76-mm divisional gun capable of fighting against tanks.

Solving this problem, the team of designers, headed by V. Grabin, in 1936 created the 76-mm divisional gun F-22. Three years later, the F-22 USV was adopted. In 1940, the same team developed a 57 mm anti-tank gun. And finally, in 1941, by imposing a 76-mm barrel on the improved carriage of this gun, the designers (A. Khvorostin, V. Norkin, K. Renne, V. Meshchaninov, P. Ivanov, V. Zemtsov, etc.) created the famous ZIS -3, - which was highly appreciated not only by our allies, but also by opponents.

... "The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm weapon of the Second World War is absolutely justified," said the German professor Wolf, the former head of the department of artillery structures at Krupp. structures in the history of barrel artillery ".

The ZIS-3 was the last and most advanced 76mm divisional gun. Further development of this class of guns required a switch to a larger caliber. What is the secret of the ZIS-3's success? What, if I may say so, is the "highlight" of its design?

V. Grabin answers these questions: "In lightness, reliability, convenience of combat operation of the crew, manufacturability and low cost." Indeed, not containing any fundamentally new units and solutions that would not be known in world practice, the ZIS-3 is an example of a successful design and technical formation, an optimal combination of qualities. All non-working metal has been removed in ZIS-3; the muzzle brake was used for the first time in domestic serial 76-mm divisional guns, which reduced the length of the recoil, reduced the weight of the recoil parts and lightened the carriage; riveted beds are replaced by lighter tubular ones. Leaf springs in the suspension device are replaced by lighter and more reliable spring springs: A carriage with sliding beds is used, which sharply increases the angle of horizontal firing. For the first time a monoblock barrel was used for this caliber. But the main advantage of the ZIS-3 is its high manufacturability.

The design team headed by V. Grabin paid special attention to this quality of the guns. Working according to the method of accelerated design of artillery guns, in which design and technological issues are solved in parallel, engineers systematically reduced the number of required parts from sample to sample. So, the F-22 had 2080 parts, the F-22 USV - 1057, and the ZIS-3 - only 719. The number of machine-tool hours required for the manufacture of one gun also decreased accordingly. In 1936 this value was 2034 hours, in 1939 - 1300, in 1942 - 1029 and in 1944 - 475! It is thanks to its high manufacturability that the ZIS-3 went down in history as the first gun in the world, put on line production and assembly line assembly. By the end of 1942, only one plant was producing up to 120 guns per day - before the war, this was its monthly program.

ZIS-3 towed by T-70M

Another important result achieved when working using the accelerated design method is wide unification - the use of the same parts, assemblies, mechanisms and assemblies in different samples. It was the unification that made it possible for one plant to produce tens of thousands of guns for various purposes - tank, anti-tank and divisional. But it is symbolic that the one hundred thousandth cannon of the 92nd plant was precisely the ZIS-3 - the most massive cannon of the Great Patriotic War.

Projectile type:	Initial speed, m / s	The range is straight. shot at a target height of 2 m, m
High-explosive fragmentation
Armor piercing
Subcaliber armor.
Cumulative

A-19 122-MM GUN SAMPLE 1931/1937

“In January 1943, our troops had already broken through the blockade and fought stubbornly to expand the breakthrough at the famous Sinyavino heights,” recalls Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, former commander of the artillery of the Leningrad Front: “The firing positions of one of the batteries of the 267th corps artillery regiment were in a swampy area, camouflaged by thickets of dense bushes. Hearing ahead of the roar of a tank engine, the senior on the battery, not doubting that the tank was ours, and fearing that he would crush the cannon, decided to warn the driver. But, standing on the carriage, he saw that a huge, unfamiliar tank with a cross on the turret is moving directly at the gun ... The shot was fired from some 50 m. fled without even having time to turn off the engine. ”Then our tankers pulled out the enemy vehicles.

A serviceable "tiger" passed through the streets of besieged Leningrad, and then both tanks became exhibits of a "trophy exhibition" in the Moscow Gorky Park of Culture and Leisure. So the 122-mm corps cannon helped to capture one of the first "tigers" that appeared at the front, and helped the personnel of the Soviet Army to recognize the vulnerabilities of the "tigers".

The First World War showed how dearly France, England and Russia had to pay for their neglect of heavy artillery. Counting on mobile warfare, these countries relied on light, highly mobile artillery, believing that heavy weapons are unsuitable for rapid marches. And already in the course of the war, they were forced to catch up with Germany and, making up for lost time, urgently create heavy weapons. And nevertheless, at the end of the war, the United States and England considered corps artillery generally unnecessary, and France and Germany were satisfied with the modernized corps guns at the end of the First World War.

The situation was completely different in our country. In May 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic approved the system of artillery weapons for 1929-1932, and in June 1930, the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to accelerate the development of industry in every possible way, primarily defense. The industrialization of the country has become a solid foundation for the production of modern military equipment. In 1931, in pursuance of the approved weapons system, the 122-mm A-19 cannon was manufactured at the artillery plant No. 172. This gun was intended for counter-battery warfare, for disrupting enemy command and control, suppressing his rear, preventing the approach of reserves, the supply of ammunition, food, etc.

"The design of this gun, says Major General of Engineering and Technical Service N. Komarov," was entrusted to the design bureau of the All-Union Arsenal Arsenal. The working group headed by S. Shukalov included S. Ananiev, V. Drozdov, G. Vodokhlebov, B Markov, S. Rykovskov, N. Torbin and I. The project was done quickly and immediately sent the drawings to the 172nd plant for the manufacture of a prototype. capabilities of the plant.

In terms of projectile power and firing range, the gun surpassed all foreign guns of this class. True, she came out somewhat heavier than them, but the large weight did not affect her fighting qualities, since she was designed for mechanical traction.

The A-19 differed from the old artillery systems in several innovations. The high initial velocity of the projectile increased the length of the barrel, and this, in turn, gave rise to difficulties with vertical aiming and when transporting the gun. In order to unload the lifting mechanism and facilitate the gunner's work, we used a counterbalancing mechanism; and in order to protect the critical components and mechanisms of the gun from shock loads during transportation, the fastening mechanism was stowed: before the trip, the barrel was separated from the recoil devices, pulled back along the cradle and fastened with stoppers to the carriage. For the first time on tools of such a large caliber, sliding frames and a rotating upper machine were used, which provided an increase in the angle of horizontal firing; suspension and metal wheels with rubber tires on the rim, which made it possible to transport the gun along the highway at a speed of up to 20 km / h " ...

After comprehensive tests, the prototype A-19 was adopted by the Red Army. In 1933, the barrel of a 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1930 model was put on the carriage of this gun, and the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1934 model entered service, but work on improving the single carriage continued. And in 1937, the Red Army adopted two body guns on a unified gun carriage - a 122-mm cannon of the 1931/1937 model and a 152-mm howitzer - a 1937 cannon. In this carriage, the lifting and balancing mechanisms are divided into two independent units, the elevation angle is increased to 65 °, a normalized sight with an independent line of sight is installed.

The 122-mm cannon gave the Germans many bitter minutes. There was not a single artillery preparation in which these wonderful weapons did not participate. With their fire, they crushed the armor of Hitler's "Ferdinands" and "Panthers". It is no coincidence that this gun was used to create the famous ISU-122 self-propelled gun. And it is no coincidence that this gun was one of the first to open fire on Nazi Berlin on April 20, 1945.

122-mm cannon model 1931/1937

B-4 203-MM MODEL GAITZER 1931

Direct fire from howitzers of high power of the artillery of the reserve of the main command (ARGK) is not provided for by any firing rules. But it was for this kind of shooting that the commander of the battery of 203-mm howitzers of the Guard, Captain I. Vedmedenko, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the night of June 9, 1944, on one of the sections of the Leningrad Front, under the noise of a firefight that drowned out the roar of engines, tractors dragged two huge massive tracked guns to the front edge. When everything calmed down, only 1200 m separated the camouflaged guns from the target - a giant bunker. Reinforced concrete walls two meters thick; three floors, going underground; armored dome; approaches, covered by the fire of flank bunkers - this structure was not without reason considered the main point of enemy resistance. And as soon as dawn broke, Vedmedenko's howitzers opened fire. For two hours, a hundred-kilogram concrete-piercing shells crushed two-meter walls, until finally the enemy fortress ceased to exist ...

“For the first time, our artillerymen began to shoot direct fire at concrete fortifications from ARGK high-power howitzers in battles with the White Finns in the winter of 1939/1940,” says Artillery Marshal N. Yakovlev. and on the front line among the soldiers and officers who directly serve these wonderful weapons. "

In 1914, the mobile war, which the generals counted on, lasted only a few months, after which it took on a positional character. It was then that the number of howitzers began to increase rapidly in the field artillery of the belligerent powers - weapons capable, unlike cannons, of hitting horizontal targets: destroying field fortifications and shooting at troops hiding behind the folds of the terrain.

Howitzer; as a rule, it leads a hinged fire. The destructive effect of a projectile is determined not so much by its kinetic energy at the target as by the amount of explosive contained in it. Lower than the cannon, the muzzle velocity of the projectile allows you to reduce the pressure of the powder gases and shorten the barrel. As a result, the wall thickness decreases, the recoil force decreases and the carriage becomes lighter. As a result, the howitzer turns out to be two to three times lighter than a cannon of the same caliber. Another important advantage of the howitzer is that, by changing the magnitude of the charge, it is possible to obtain a beam of trajectories at a constant elevation angle. True, an alternating charge requires separate charging, which reduces the rate of fire, but this disadvantage is more than compensated for by its advantages. In the armies of the leading powers, by the end of the war, howitzers accounted for 40-50% of the total artillery fleet.

But the trend towards the construction of powerful field-type defensive structures and a dense network of long-term firing points insistently demanded heavy guns with increased range, high projectile power and overhang of fire. In 1931, following the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Soviet designers created a domestic high-power howitzer B-4. It began to be designed at KB Artkom in 1927, where the work was headed by F. Lender. After his death, the project was transferred to the Bolshevik plant, where Magdesiev was the chief designer, and among the designers were Gavrilov, Torbin, and others.

B-4 - 203-mm howitzer model 1931 - intended for the destruction of especially strong concrete, reinforced concrete and armored structures, to fight large-caliber or sheltered by strong structures enemy artillery and to suppress long-range targets.

To speed up equipping the Red Army with a new weapon, production was organized simultaneously at two factories. Working drawings in the process of development were changed at each plant, adapting to technological capabilities. As a result, practically two different howitzers began to enter service. In 1937, unified drawings were worked out not by changing the design, but by assembling individual parts and assemblies that had already been tested in production and operation. The only innovation consisted in setting up a tracked course. allowed firing directly from the ground Without special platforms.

The B-4 carriage became the basis for a whole family of high-power guns. In 1939, a number of intermediate samples were completed by the 152-mm gun Br-19 and the 280-mm mortar Br-5. This work was carried out by a team of designers. plant "Barrikada" under the leadership of the Hero of Socialist Labor I. Ivanov.

Thus, the creation of a complex of high-power ground weapons on a single carriage was completed: cannons, howitzers, and mortars. The tools were transported by tractors. For this, the guns were disassembled into two parts: the barrel was removed from the gun carriage and placed on a special gun cart, and the gun carriage, connected to the front end, made up the gun carriage.

Of all this complex, the B-4 howitzer was the most widespread. The combination of a powerful projectile with a high elevation angle and a variable charge giving 10 muzzle velocities determined its brilliant fighting qualities. At any horizontal targets at a distance of 5 to 18 km, the howitzer could shoot along the trajectory of the most advantageous steepness.

B-4 justified the hopes placed on it. Having started her military path on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, she went along the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, participated in all large artillery preparations, the storming of fortresses and large cities.

203-mm howitzer model 1931

Projectile type:		Initial speed, m / s
Concrete piercing
High-explosive
Concrete piercing

ML-20 152-MM GUN-GUN, SAMPLE 1937

“When I am asked what type of artillery fire makes the highest demands on the art of personnel, says Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, I answer: counter-battery warfare. who fires back, threatening the shooter The greatest chances of winning the duel are with the one who has higher skill, more precisely a weapon, a more powerful projectile.

The experience of the fronts showed that the best Soviet weapon for counter-battery warfare was the 152-mm howitzer-gun model of 1937 ML-20 ".

The history of the ML-20 dates back to 1932, when a group of designers of the All-Union Arsenal Arsenal - V. Grabin, N. Komarov and V. Drozdov - proposed to create a powerful 152-mm corps cannon by superimposing the barrel of the 152-mm Schneider siege cannon on the carriage 122 mm cannon A-19. Calculations have shown that such an idea is realistic when installing a muzzle brake, which takes away part of the recoil energy. Tests of the prototype confirmed the validity of the admitted technical risk, and the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/34 model entered service. In the mid-30s, a decision was made to modernize this weapon. The modernization work was headed by the young designer F. Petrov. Having studied the features of the carriage of the A-19 gun, he revealed the main disadvantages of this gun: the lack of suspension at the front end limited the speed of movement; the lifting and balancing mechanism was difficult to fine-tune and provided an insufficiently high vertical aiming speed; it took a lot of energy and time to transfer the barrel from the marching position to the firing position and back; the cradle with recoil devices was difficult to manufacture.

Having developed anew the cast upper machine, dividing the combined lifting and balancing mechanism into two independent - sector lifting and balancing, having designed a front end with suspension, a sight with an independent aiming line and a cradle with a cast trunnion clip instead of a forged one, the designers created for the first time in world practice an intermediate type weapon with properties and guns and howitzers. The elevation angle, increased to 65 °, and 13 variable charges made it possible to obtain a gun, which, like a howitzer, has hinged trajectories and, like a cannon, high initial projectile velocities.

A. Bulashev, S. Gurenko, M. Burnyshev, A. Ilyin and many others took an active part in the development and creation of the howitzer-gun.

"ML-20, developed by us in 1.5 months, was presented for state tests after the very first 10 shots fired at the factory range," recalls Lenin and State Prize laureate, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of Engineering and Technical Service, Doctor of technical sciences F. Petrov. These tests were completed at the beginning of 1937, the gun was accepted into service and put into mass production in the same year. small angles of elevation began to "give a candle" - spontaneously lift up to the maximum angle. It turned out that for a number of reasons the worm gear was not self-braking enough. We, and especially me, this phenomenon caused a lot of trouble, until after exhausting days and sleepless nights, enough a simple solution. indented steel disc. At the moment of firing, the end part of the worm comes into contact with the disk, which, creating a large additional friction, prevents the worm from turning.

What a relief I felt when, having found such a solution and quickly sketching out sketches, I introduced him to the director and chief engineer of the plant, as well as the head of the military acceptance. All of them ended up in the assembly shop that night, which, however, happened quite often, especially when it came to fulfilling defense orders on a tight schedule. An order was immediately given to make the parts of the device by morning.

When developing this tool, we paid special attention to improving manufacturability and reducing cost. It was with the production of the howitzer-gun in artillery technology that the widespread use of steel shaped casting began. Many assemblies - upper and lower machines, hinge and trunk parts of beds, wheel hubs - were made of cheap carbon steels. "

Originally intended for "reliable action against artillery, headquarters, offices and field-type structures," the 152-mm howitzer-gun turned out to be a much more flexible, powerful and effective weapon than previously thought. The combat experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War continuously expanded the range of tasks assigned to this remarkable weapon. And in the "Service Manual", published at the end of the war, ML-20 prescribed the fight against enemy artillery, the suppression of long-range targets, the destruction of pillboxes and powerful bunkers, the fight against tanks and armored trains, and even the destruction of balloons.

During the Great Patriotic War, in all major artillery preparations, in counter-battery combat, in the assault on fortified areas, the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model was invariably involved. But a particularly honorable role was played by this weapon in the destruction of heavy fascist tanks. A heavy projectile fired from a large initial speed, easily tore off the "tiger" tower from the shoulder strap. There have been battles when these towers literally flew in the air with limp gun barrels. And it is no coincidence that the ML-20 became the basis of the famous ISU-152.

But, perhaps, the most significant recognition of the excellent qualities of this weapon should be considered the fact that the ML-20 was in service with Soviet artillery not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the post-war years.

BS-3 100-MM FIELD GUN, SAMPLE 1944

"In the spring of 1943, when Hitler's" tigers "," panthers "," Ferdinands "began to appear on the battlefields in large numbers, - recalls the famous artillery designer V. Grabin, - in a note addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I suggested 57 mm anti-tank gun: ZIS-2 cannon, create a new weapon - a 100 mm anti-tank gun with a powerful projectile.

Why did we choose the 100 mm caliber, new for ground artillery, and not the already existing 85- and 107-mm guns? The choice was not accidental. We believed that a weapon was needed, the muzzle energy of which would be one and a half times greater than that of the 107-mm cannon of the 1940 model. And 100-mm guns have long and successfully been used in the navy, a unitary cartridge was developed for them, while the 107-mm cannon had separate loading. The presence of a shot, mastered in production, played a decisive role, since it takes a very long time to develop it. And we had little time ...

We could not borrow the design of the naval gun: it is too cumbersome and heavy. The requirements of high power, mobility, lightness, compactness, high rate of fire led to a number of innovations. First of all, a high performance muzzle brake was needed. The previously used slot brake had an efficiency of 25-30%. For the 100-mm cannon, it was necessary to develop a double-chamber brake design with an efficiency of 60%. To increase the rate of fire, a wedge-shaped semi-automatic shutter was used. Lead designer A. Khvorostin was entrusted with the configuration of the gun. "

The contours of the weapon began to appear on the Whatman paper in the May holidays 1943. In a few days, the creative groundwork was realized, formed on the basis of long reflections, painful searches, studying combat experience and analyzing the best artillery structures in the world. The barrel and the semi-automatic breech were designed by I. Griban, the recoil devices and the hydropneumatic balancing mechanism were designed by F. Kaleganov, the cradle of cast construction was designed by B. Lasman, the equal-strength upper machine was V. Shishkin. The issue with the choice of the wheel was hard to decide. The design bureau usually used the automobile wheels of the GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks for the guns, but for new cannon they didn't fit. The next car was a five-ton YAZ, however, its wheel turned out to be too heavy and large. Then the idea was born to put paired wheels from GAZ-AA, which made it possible to fit into the given weight and dimensions.

A month later, the working drawings were sent to production, and after another five months the first prototype of the famous BS-3 - a cannon designed to combat tanks and other motorized vehicles, to fight artillery, to suppress long-range targets, to destroy fire means of infantry and manpower, enemy forces.

“Three design features distinguish BS-3 from previously developed domestic systems,” says A. Khvorostin, winner of the State Prize. the requirements for lightness and compactness of units, and the change in the carriage scheme significantly reduced the load on the beds when firing at the maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine. any angle of horizontal guidance, did not exceed 1/2 of the recoil force. new scheme simplified the equipment of the combat position.

Thanks to all these novelties, BS-3 stood out with an unusually high metal utilization rate. This means that in its design it was possible to achieve the most perfect combination of power and mobility. "

The BS-3 was tested by a commission chaired by General Panikhin - a representative: the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army. According to V. Grabin, one of the most interesting moments was the shooting at the Tiger tank. A cross was drawn on the turret of the tank in chalk. The gunner received the initial data and fired a shot from 1500 m. Approaching the tank, everyone was convinced: the shell almost hit the cross and pierced the armor. After this, the tests continued according to a given program, and the commission recommended the weapon for service.

BS-Z tests prompted a new method of dealing with heavy tanks. Once at the range, a shot was fired at a captured Ferdinand from a distance of 1500 m. And although, as expected, the projectile did not penetrate the 200-mm frontal armor of the self-propelled gun, its gun and control complex were out of order. BS-Z proved to be able to effectively fight enemy tanks and self-propelled guns at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot. In this case, as experience has shown, the crew of enemy vehicles was struck by fragments of armor that broke off from the hull due to the enormous overvoltages arising in the metal at the moment the shell hit the armor. The manpower that the projectile retained at these ranges was sufficient to bend and twist the armor.

In August 1944, when the BS-Z began to enter the front, the war was already drawing to a close, so the experience of the combat use of this weapon is limited. Nevertheless, BS-3 rightfully occupies an honorable place among the weapons of the Great Patriotic War, for it contained ideas that were widely used in artillery designs of the post-war period.

M-30 122-MM MODEL GAITZER 1938

"W-wah! A gray cloud shot up on the enemy's side. The fifth round hit the dugout where the ammunition was stored. A grenade with a deceleration fuse hit several rolls and exploded inside the warehouse. Following the barely audible sound of a burst, a large black pillar rose high up. smoke, and a huge explosion shook the neighborhood "- so in the book" Howitzers Fire "P. Kudinov, a former artilleryman, participant in the war, describes the everyday combat work of the M-30 of the famous 122-mm divisional howitzer model 1938.

Before the First World War in the artillery of the Western powers, the caliber of 105 mm was adopted for divisional howitzers. Russian artillery thought went its own way: the army was armed with 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1910 model. The experience of military operations has shown that a projectile of this caliber, possessing the most advantageous fragmentation effect, at the same time gives a minimally satisfactory high-explosive effect. However, at the end of the 1920s, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 model did not meet the views of experts on the nature of a future war: it had insufficient range, rate of fire and mobility.

According to the new "System of artillery weapons for 1929-1932", approved by the Revolutionary Military Council in May 1929, it was planned to create a 122-mm howitzer with a weight in the stowed position of 2200 kg, a firing range of 11-12 km and a combat rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Since the model developed for these requirements turned out to be too heavy, the modernized 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was retained in service. And some experts began to lean towards the idea of abandoning the 122-mm caliber and adopting the 105-mm howitzer.

“In March 1937, at a meeting in the Kremlin,” recalls the Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service F. Petrov, “I spoke about the reality of creating a 122-mm howitzer and, answering numerous questions, gave out what they say, My optimism was fueled by the great, as it seemed to me then, the success of our team in creating a 152-mm howitzer - the ML-20 cannon. responsibility for everything I said at a meeting in the Kremlin, I suggested that the management of my plant take the initiative in developing a 122-mm howitzer. For this purpose, a small group of designers was organized. But the persistence and enthusiasm of the designers - S. Dernov, A. Ilyin, N. Dobrovolsky, A. Chernykh, V. Burylova, A. Drozdov and N. Kostrulin - took their toll: In 1937, two projects were defended: the one developed by the team of V. Sidorenko and ours. Our project was approved.

In terms of tactical and technical data, primarily in terms of maneuverability and flexibility of fire - the ability to quickly transfer fire from one target to another - our howitzer fully met the requirements of GAU. According to the most important characteristic - muzzle energy - it was more than twice as good as the 1910/30 model howitzer. Advantageously, our gun differed from the 105-mm divisional howitzers of the armies of the capitalist countries.

The estimated weight of the gun is about 2200 kg: 450 kg less than the howitzer developed by the team of V. Sidorenko. By the end of 1938, all tests were completed and the gun was put into service under the name of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model. "

Fighting wheels were for the first time equipped with an automobile-type travel brake. The transition from the traveling position to the combat position took no more than 1-1.5 minutes. When expanding the beds, the springs were automatically turned off, and the beds themselves were automatically fixed in the extended position. In the stowed position, the barrel was secured without disconnecting from the rods of the recoil devices and without pulling back. To simplify and reduce the cost of production in the howitzer, parts and assemblies of existing artillery systems were widely used. So, for example, the bolt was taken from a standard howitzer of the 1910/30 model, the sight from a 152-mm howitzer was a cannon of a 1937 model, the wheels were from a divisional 76-mm cannon of a 1936 model, etc. Many parts were manufactured by casting and stamping. That is why the M-30 was one of the simplest and most inexpensive domestic artillery systems.

A curious fact testifies to the great survivability of this howitzer. Once during the war, it became known at the plant that the troops had a weapon that had fired 18 thousand shots. The plant offered to exchange this copy for a new one. And after a thorough factory inspection, it turned out that the howitzer has not lost its qualities and is suitable for further combat use. This conclusion was unexpectedly confirmed: during the formation of the next echelon, as if it were a sin, a shortage of one weapon was discovered. And with the consent of the military acceptance, the unique howitzer again went to the front as a newly manufactured weapon.

M-30 direct fire

The experience of the war showed that the M-30 brilliantly performed all the tasks that were prescribed to it. She destroyed and suppressed the enemy's manpower as in an open area. and located in field-type shelters, destroyed and suppressed infantry fire weapons, destroyed field-type structures and fought against artillery, etc. enemy mortars.

But most clearly the advantages of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model were manifested in the fact that its capabilities turned out to be wider than prescribed by the leadership of the service. -In the days of the heroic defense of Moscow, howitzers fired direct fire at fascist tanks. Later, the experience was reinforced by the creation of a cumulative projectile for the M-30 and an additional point in the service manual: "The howitzer can be used to combat tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles of the enemy."

See the continuation on the website: WWII - Weapons of Victory - WWII Artillery Part II

Appendix 7

Deliveries and losses of artillery and ammunition in the Great Patriotic War

Table 46. Artillery supply to the fronts from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 47. Supply of artillery pieces to new formations in 1941-1944.

Table 48. Deliveries of artillery systems by the industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 51. Industrial deliveries of tank weapons from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 53. Ammunition consumption in 1941-1945 (thousand pcs.)

Table 54. Production of ammunition in 1941-1945 (thousand pcs.)

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