The legendary Soviet medium tank T-34, covered with military glory, has been in service with the Red Army since December 1939. Its design marked a quantum leap in tank building. It organically combined projectile armor with powerful armament and a reliable chassis. High protective properties were ensured by the use of armored thick rolled sheets and their rational slope. In terms of armament, this tank corresponded to the best examples of heavy tanks. High mobility was provided by a specially developed powerful diesel engine and wide tracks.

During the Great Patriotic War, along with the increase in the production of tanks for the belligerent army, intensive work was carried out to improve the design of the tank and simplify the technology of its manufacture. The original welded turret was replaced with a more efficient cast hex turret. Engine life has been extended by the use of new air cleaners and lubricants and an all-mode governor. An improved main clutch and the introduction of a five-speed gearbox significantly increased the speed of the tank.

The first samples of T-34 tanks, produced in 1940, had the following technical characteristics:

• Assembled weight - 26 tons.
• The number of the crew is 4 people.
• Frontal armor - 45 mm, slope - 30 °, tower - 52 mm with an inclination of 60 °, sides and stern, respectively, 45 mm and 45 °, roof and bottom - 20 mm.
• Power unit - diesel engine V-2-34, power 500 hp.
• The number of high-speed gears is 5.
• Fuel tank capacity - 450 liters.
• Armament - 76.2 mm L-11 cannon, two 7.62 mm DT machine guns. Ammunition - 77 shots and 3906 rounds.
• Dimensions: length - 5920 mm, width - 3000 mm, height - 2410 mm.
• Cruising on rough terrain - 225 km.

In the year 1941, the cannon was replaced by an F-34 of the same caliber, but much more power. In the 1942 production year, taking into account the shortcomings of the previous models, the thickness of the armor of the hull and turret was increased to 60 mm, and additional fuel tanks were installed. Weak spots were taken into account and in the year 1943 they used a hexagonal turret with 70 mm thick armor and a commander's cupola. In 1944, the name of the tank changed - T-34-85. His turret was enlarged, in which 3 people were already accommodated, the armor was increased to 90 mm thick, new DTM machine guns were installed.

From the very beginning, the tank was designed according to the classical scheme: the device of the front part - the fighting compartment, including the turret, the rear - the engine compartment and drive wheels.

The main parts of the T-34 tank design were:

• The building is divided into functional areas.
• Power plant with transmission.
• Weapon complex.
• Observation tools.
• Chassis.
• Electrical equipment.
• Means of communication.
• Tank hull.

It was welded from rolled armored plates. The aft upper plate was attached on two hinges, as well as bolts to the lower aft and side plates. With the bolts unscrewed, it could be folded back, which provided access to the engine. In the upper frontal plate there was a hatch for the driver, on the right - a ball mount for a machine gun. The upper side plates had an inclination of 45 °, the lower ones were installed vertically. There were four holes for the balance axle of the road wheels.

The bottom of the body was usually made of two sheets, which were butt welded with a seam overlay. On the right, in front of the bottom, in front of the location of the machine gunner, a hatch was made for an emergency exit. Hatches were also cut through, through which fuel from the tanks, oil from the gearbox and engine were drained. The painting of the tank provided its camouflage on the ground.

Inside the hull, the T-34 tank was divided into functional zones. The control compartment was located in front. It contained a driver-mechanic with a machine gunner. Here pedals and levers of control drives, sensors, control and measuring devices were installed. Behind the control compartment was the fighting compartment, including the turret, which housed the crew commander and the gunner, and in the T-34-85 there was also the loader.

Power plant with transmission

This is the next functional area. It was separated from the fighting compartment by a steel removable partition. An engine was installed in the center of the power zone. On the sides - oil tanks, water radiators and rechargeable batteries... A hatch with an armored cover was cut out in the roof, through which the engine was accessed. Elongated slots for air flow were located on the sides. They were closed with armored shutters.

In the aft there was a transmission or power train compartment. This is a set of mechanisms that transmit torque on the engine crankshaft to the drive wheels. As a result, the speed of the tank and the thrust forces change over a wider range than the engine allows. When moving from a standstill, the main clutch smoothly transfers the load to the engine, smoothing out sharp changes in the number of revolutions of the crankshaft and the speed of the tank. Its other function is to disconnect the engine from the gearbox during gear changes.

The gearbox is mechanical, five-speed - four gears for forward movement and one - backward. Switching - by means of the control drive. In order for the T-34 tank to turn, it was necessary to slow down the track in the direction of which the turn was made. The braking system was based on floating band brakes. They can be activated from the management department. For this, on the sides of the driver there are right and left levers, as well as foot drives.

In addition to the main clutch, gearbox, final drives and brakes, the transmission compartment also included an electric starter, fuel tanks and air cleaners. In the roof of the compartment, a rectangular air duct hatch was provided, closed with a metal mesh. Under it were adjustable armored blinds. In the stern plate, the exhaust pipe caps and two brackets for installing smoke bombs were fixed.

Armament installed on the T-43 medium tank

The main armament of the T-34 tank was originally a semi-automatic 76-mm L-11 cannon, issue of 1939, with a wedge-shaped vertical breechblock. In 1941 it was replaced by an F-32 cannon of the same caliber. Later, the T-34-85 tank received the 85-mm D-5T cannon, and then the ZIS-S-53. The tower had the ability to rotate, so the cannon and a machine gun paired with it could conduct a circular attack. The telescopic sight provided a firing range with a direct fire of almost 4 km, and from a closed position - up to 13.6 km. The range of destruction with a direct shot with an armor-piercing projectile reached 900 m. The tower was rotated using a manual or electric drive. It was installed on the wall near the cannon. The maximum rotation speed from the electric motor reached 30 degrees per second. Vertical aiming was done manually with a sector lifting mechanism, which was also located on the left side of the gun.

Shooting could be carried out both mechanically and electrically. Ammunition consisted of 77 shots. It was located in the aft area, on racks, as well as in clamps on the starboard side and in boxes at the bottom of the fighting compartment. Machine guns were equipped with 31 magazines with 63 rounds in each. In addition to the main ammunition, tankers were provided with cartridges in boxes, pistols, machine guns and grenades.

Chassis

The undercarriage of the T-34 tank was a tracked propeller with a suspension. They provided high cross-country ability. It has two track chains, two drive and guide wheels and 10 rollers. The track chain has 72 tracks with a pitch of 172 mm and a width of 500 mm. The weight of one caterpillar is 1070 kg. Cast drive wheels were used to rewind and tension the tracks.

The suspension in the T-34 tank was with helical coil springs. The front roller has a double spring. It was located vertically in the bow and fenced off with shields. For the rest of the rollers, the suspension was placed obliquely in the mines of the tank hull. Track rollers were mounted on axles with bearings pressed into the balancers. All rollers are double with rubber tires.

Electrical equipment

The electrical equipment of the T-34 tank included both sources and consumers of electricity, including:

• Electric starter.
• Electric motor for turning the tower.
• Cooling fans.
• Electric trigger of the cannon, as well as the coaxial machine gun.
• Electric motors for the heater (it was installed in the post-war models of the tank) and the oil pump.
• Alarm and lighting devices.
• Sight heater.
• Radio station.
• Intercom.
• The sources of electricity included a generator and 4 batteries in pairs on both sides of the engine. The voltage in the system is 24 V, the power of the generator is 1 kW.

Means of communication

The telephone and telegraph radio station provided two-way communication between the tank and other objects. The range of action depended on the time of year and day. She was the largest on the phone with a four-meter whip antenna in winter. In summer, especially at night, the level of interference increased, which reduced the communication range.

The transceiver and its power supply were attached with brackets to the rear and left turret plates behind the seat of the tank commander. In 1952, a radio station was installed, working as a telegraph for both reception and transmission. The intercom in the tank has been updated. Now it consisted of several devices - for the commander, gunner and driver. The device provided communication between the crew members among themselves, and for the gunner and commander - also with external respondents.

Organization of the work of the tank crew

The best option, what composition should be the crew of the T-34-85 tank - five people:

• Tank commander.
• Driver mechanic.
• Shooter-machine gunner.
• Gunner.
• Charging.

The tank commander is seated behind the gunner, to the left of the cannon. For convenience, it is served by a commander's cupola with observation devices. Tasks of the commander: review and control of the battlefield, instructions to the gunner, work with the radio station, general management of the crew.

The driver is in a seat that can be adjusted in height. In the frontal sheet in front of him there is a hatch with an armored cover. Two periscopes are permanently installed in it. Their prisms are closed from below with protective glasses that protect the driver's eyes from fragments. Soft foreheads are placed over the periscopes to protect the driver's head from possible bruises. Devices and mechanisms for the driver:

• Control levers.
• Backstage from the gearbox.
• Manual fuel supply.
• Brake.
• Main clutch pedal.
• Panel-indicator of control devices.
• Two cylinders of compressed air for air starting the engine.
• Electrical appliance panel.
• Tachometer.
• Starter button.
• Speedometer.
• Fire extinguisher.

The machine gunner is located to the right of the driver. Its task is to fire from a machine gun inserted into the ball of the upper frontal plate of the hull. A special telescopic sight is used for aiming at the target. Shooting is carried out by pulling the trigger, several shots in bursts from a distance of up to 800 m. The machine gun is equipped with automatic equipment powered by the energy of powder gases.

The gunner is located in the tower, on the left side. At the command of the commander or choosing the target on his own, he aims the cannon and coaxial machine gun at the target. Then he fires a shot with a trigger or with the help of an electric trigger. The gunner has at his disposal a periscopic sight that provides a fourfold increase. The cannon with a coaxial machine gun is aimed at the target by the turret rotation mechanism, as well as by raising the cannon.

The loader is located on the right side of the cannon. At the command of the commander, he chooses the type of shot, how to load the cannon, reload the coaxial machine gun, and observes the progress of the battle. His seat is suspended with three straps - two from the turret shoulder strap, the third from the gun cradle. By changing the position of the belts, the seat is height-adjustable.

To ensure urgent repairs and necessary safety measures, two cylinders of carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are installed inside the tank. Kits of spare parts, accessories and tools are placed not only inside the tank, but also outside. These include, but are not limited to: tow rope, tarpaulin, gun spare parts, backup tracks, with and without ridges, track pins, trench tools. Smoke bombs are installed at the stern.

Service of the T-34 tank after the second world war

After the Second World War, foreign-made tanks were used in Yugoslavia, including the Russian T-34, transferred by our country in 1945. They were assigned to two tank brigades. The Yugoslav leadership attempted to master the production of T-34-85 tanks. The task was to increase the service life of the machine. Many design changes were planned. For example, it was proposed to install another diesel engine with an improved transmission, to adjust the hull and turret. This made it possible to reduce the area of ​​the frontal surface of the tank and reduce the risk of hitting it in front.

In the 40s, Poland, and behind it Czechoslovakia, also decided to organize the production of T-34 tanks. Received technical documentation, detailed technology and specialists from manufacturers. The first production tanks appeared here in 1951. They were the same dimensions, but the shape of the turret was changed, the engine was adapted for various types of fuel, and had an easier start in winter. Additional fuel tanks have increased the cruising range to 650 km. Installed night vision devices for the driver. New radio stations, TPU-47 intercoms, special observation devices for the commander were used. Increased the speed at which the turret rotates.

2 November 1943. At 20.00, the commanders of tanks, platoons and companies were summoned to the dugout of the battalion commander, Captain Chumachenko, Dmitry Alexandrovich. In the dugout, the commanders were greeted cordially, greeted everyone by the hand. The head of the political department of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Molokanov, said that the whole world is currently looking at us. Then he congratulated us on the upcoming assault and wished us success. Then the battalion commander Chumachenko also briefly set the task. At the end of his speech, he announced the start time of the assault and asked to check the clocks - the time turned out to be the same for everyone (we had a tank clock - commander's, and they went with high accuracy). With the beginning of the artillery preparation, we had to start the engines and warm them up, and then withdraw the tanks from the trenches and line up in a battle line. At the signal of three green missiles, we had to slowly, moving forward, approach the front edge of our infantry forces in the first trench, and then - at the signal of three red missiles - together with the arrows, attack the front edge of the enemy's defenses. Destroying the fascists in the forest, by the end of the day, go to the southern edge, that is, to the "Bolshevik" state farm, and begin a direct assault on Kiev. The head of the political department told us that the communists and Komsomol members, the soldiers of our entire 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps, at their short meetings and in letters, swear: "On November 7, the Red Banner - the symbol of October, will fly over Kiev!"

Excited, they dispersed, discussing the details of interaction in battle and ways of destroying the "tigers" by group fire of platoons and self-propelled guns, if they find themselves in our way.

Arriving at my dugout, I brought to the attention of the crew the task assigned to us.

I must say that the crew of the tank, which I received a few days before the offensive, greeted me coldly - unshaven, with cigarettes in their hands. And this was understandable: an unknown youth, an eighteen-year-old lieutenant, and also an employee of the brigade headquarters, was sent to them.

- Lieutenant Fadin! - putting my hand to the cap, I introduced myself. - I have heard a lot of good things about your commander who died, but the crew is somewhat different from him.

My decisive look and confidence worked: I see, the grin faded from their faces.

I ask:
- Is the car working properly?
- Yes! - answered the driver-mechanic Vasily Semiletov. - But the electric motor for turning the tower is knocking.
- We will fight on this one, since you, an experienced driver-mechanic, took a faulty tank out of repair. Our failures will be on your conscience. You probably have a family, and we have relatives, - I added.
- I have no one! If there is anyone left, then in Odessa, - the radio operator Fedor Voznyuk said.
- By cars! - I give the command.

It was fulfilled. Climbing into the tank, he said that we were going to our place, to the battle formation, to the company of senior lieutenant Avetisyan.

Taking out the map and orienting myself on it, I clearly began to give commands, directing the tank to the village of Valki. And then I discovered that my experience of two months of work at the headquarters of our 22nd Guards Tank Brigade gave me a lot. I confidently navigated the map both in the forest and in the open.

When we reached the northern outskirts of Novi Petrivtsi, the enemy, hearing the noise of the engine of our tank, began to fire artillery, sending two or three shells forward and then in pursuit. I ordered the mechanic to put the tank behind a stone wall of a building that was dilapidated from the bombing and wait for some kind of distracting bombing or darkness.

When the tank got behind the wall and the engine was turned off, I explained to the crew where we should arrive and the purpose of my maneuver. And here the loader Golubenko remarked:
- Yes, you know your way around the map, Lieutenant!
“Apparently, he understands tactics,” said Fyodor Voznyuk.

Only Vasily Semiletov was silent. But I realized that the cold reception was left behind. They believed in me.

As soon as it began to darken, we moved again and soon, pursued by enemy artillery and mortar fire, arrived at the scene.

The tank had to be placed in the garden of one of the outer houses in the expectation that the trees would be some kind of protection from a direct hit from an artillery shell. Here I was received by friends: platoon commanders Lieutenants Vanyusha Abashin and Kostya Grozdev. A little later, the company commander himself, senior lieutenant Avetisyan, approached.

He showed me where my tank was in the company’s battle formation. I will never forget this place. It was chosen under a large apple tree a hundred meters southwest of the last house in the village of Valki. To my left, two hundred meters away, there was a sharp bend in the highway leading from the village to Vyshgorod. And surprisingly, during our preparation for the assault on Kiev, which lasted two weeks, this house, despite the enemy's artillery raids, hardly suffered, except for the fact that one of the shells recaptured a corner near the side wall. The owner - a man of 65-70 years old - did not leave his house and after each raid he crawled out from somewhere, surveyed the house with a master's gaze, shook his head reproachfully, looking towards the enemy.

This place - it was closest to the enemy - was the edge of the corner of the company’s order of battle. We needed to equip a trench for the tank, and such that it would allow the car to be fully accommodated, at the same time, it made it possible to fire at the enemy from a cannon and a machine gun.

Throughout the entire October night, we dug such a trench in pairs, replacing each other, with two shovels. However, it turned out to be not so easy to put a tank in it. Apparently, the Nazis very closely followed the preparation of our troops for decisive actions and kept their fire weapons on duty at the ready. As soon as the driver-mechanic Semiletov started the engine and began to lead the tank to our trench, heavy artillery fire fell on us. And only the darkness that had not yet cleared did not allow them to fire aimed fire ...

The preparation of our troops for the storming of Kiev these days was in full swing. Much was said about the imminent offensive. And the fact that for two days people were taken to the rear of the brigade, where they washed in equipped baths, received new winter uniforms. And the issuance of fresh food safety stock in tanks. And we were reinforced with a battery of 152 mm self-propelled artillery mounts. We knew that a shell fired from such a self-propelled gun tore off the turret even of a T-6 "typhus" tank. Therefore, their appearance in our battle formation made us very happy.

The time for great events was approaching. Apparently, the Nazis also felt this, for they periodically carried out powerful fire raids on our positions.

On the night of November 3, everyone, with the exception of the observers on duty, slept soundly. At 6:30 we were called to get breakfast. And here, as happens sometimes, our crew made a mistake. Having received breakfast, we decided to eat it not in the dugout, but in the fresh air. We settled down not far from our battalion kitchen, over which thick steam rose in the cold air. This, apparently, could not fail to notice the enemy.

As soon as we raised the spoons to our mouths, the enemy opened artillery fire at our position. I only managed to shout: "Lie down!" I think that this was the only case during the war when one of the shells fell behind us about seven to ten meters away and did not touch any of us with its fragments. Another shell struck about ten meters from us to our right and, without exploding, tumbling like a wheel, swept away a gaping soldier in its path, then hitting the wheel of the kitchen, tore it off, knocked the kitchen over on its back along with the cook, who was distributing food.

Throwing off our daze, we rushed into the dugout. Firing a few more shells, the enemy calmed down. Then we had no time for breakfast. Having collected our belongings, we got over to the tank in anticipation of the assault.

And soon the powerful artillery and then aviation cannonade merged into a continuous roar. I gave the command. "Start". For some reason, the tank did not start right away. It did not start the second time. I got nervous and shouted an insulting word to the mechanic Semiletov, fortunately, he did not hear him, because I didn’t have the intercom. Apparently, the shock received at breakfast was still affecting. When we drove out of the trench, I saw that other tanks had long since emerged from their hiding places. Three green rockets soared into the air. I give the command:
- Forward!
- Where to go? - shouts in response the driver Vasily Semiletov.

I realized that due to poor visibility I would have to control the tank, observing from an open hatch, otherwise we would lose our infantry, and you could crash into a neighboring tank. The state is uncertain, in front of a kilometer there is continuous smoke and flashes from artillery shells. Explosions are also visible from the return fire of the fascists.

Tanks from our battle line have already begun to fire. I understood: my nerves could not stand it, because this is a fire going nowhere. Then I saw the trench and the faces of the shooters who were waiting for our approach. The tank jerked violently, and I felt that I was coming to my senses, we passed the first trench. Suddenly I found our fighters on the move to the right and left of me. I looked up, no red rockets were visible. Apparently I looked through them. Tanks moving to the right and left are firing on the move. I go down to the sight, I do not see any enemy, except for the piled trees. I give the command to the loader:
- Load the shrapnel!
- There are shrapnel, - Golubenko answered clearly.

I make the first shot at the piled logs, guessing that this is the first trench of the enemy. I watch my gap, I calm down completely: like on a training ground, when you shoot at targets. And here are the running mouse figures, firing a cannon at the Nazis. I am fond of fire, I give the command:
- Increase your speed!

Here is the forest. Semiletov sharply slowed down.
- Don't stop! I shout.
- Where to go? Semiletov asks.

I answer:
- Forward, and only forward!

We crush one tree, another ... The old engine wheezes, but the tank goes. I looked around - to my right is the tank of Vanyusha Abashin, my platoon commander, he also breaks a tree, moves forward. I looked out of the hatch: in front of me was a small clearing, going into the depths of the forest. I direct the tank over it. Ahead, on the left, strong fire from tank guns and the return yapping fire of the Nazis' anti-tank guns can be heard.

On the right, only the noise of tank engines is heard, but the tanks themselves are not visible. I think, do not yawn, and give alternately along the clearing fire from a cannon and a machine gun. In the forest it becomes brighter, and suddenly - a clearing, and on it the rushing Nazis. I give a shot. And then I saw that at the edge of the clearing there was a strong machine-gun and submachine gun fire. A group of people flashed between the hills - and a flash. Got it: it's an anti-tank gun. He fired a long burst from a machine gun and shouted to the loader:
- Load the shrapnel!

And then he felt a blow, and the tank, as if running into a serious obstacle, stopped for a moment and went forward again, sharply surrendering to the left. And here I again, as at a training ground, found a group of fascists scurrying around the gun, now they were all clearly visible, and fired a shot at them. I heard the loud voice of Fedya Voznyuk, a radio operator-gunner:
- There is a direct hit, and the weapon and its servant were scattered to pieces.
- Commander, we have killed the left track, - the mechanic Semiletov reports.
- Get out of the tank with Voznyuk through the hatch in the bottom! I ordered. “Golubenka and I will cover you with cannon and machine gun fire.

At that moment I saw several tanks of our battalion, they were going along other clearings. Our arrows jumped out to the edge and went forward in a chain.

It took about an hour to repair the track. But, as they say, trouble does not come alone: ​​when the tank rotated on one track, it was sucked into the swampy soil, and in front of about ten meters there was a minefield set up by the Nazis on a large dry section of the clearing. Therefore, the tank had to get out only back. And it took a lot of time. In the future, I had to catch up with my own on the trail of our tanks, and at the same time destroy the retreating Nazis.

They managed to get to their battalion only after dark. The Nazis, using forest debris and mine-explosive obstacles, stopped our units in front of the second defensive line. During the night from 3 to 4 November, we refueled our vehicles with fuel and lubricants, ammunition and had a little rest. At dawn on November 4, the battalion commander, having gathered us, the commanders of tanks, platoons, companies and self-propelled officers, led us to the first line of our riflemen. And he showed:
- You see, in front of us, three hundred meters away, there are solid forest heaps of logs? The enemy sits behind these rubble, he does not allow our riflemen to rise.

I am still surprised why the Nazis did not fire at us then, because we were standing at full height, dressed in tank uniforms ...

I looked back at my comrades and then only noticed that there were 9 out of 13 commanders of us left, from those who were gathering on November 2 in the battalion commander's dugout before the offensive. This means that there are 9 tanks left. But there were still three self-propelled guns.

Chumachenko continued:
- Now move to this clearing, turn into a line and attack the enemy.

This formulation of tasks during the war years was practiced often, and it often justified itself, we clearly saw the enemy and mastered the task well.

We went to the edge, the Nazis let us turn around calmly, and then opened frantic fire from behind the logs. We, on the other hand, began to shoot at the blockage with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells with fire from a place, with short stops. Of course, we, the tank commanders, had to orient ourselves in this situation of the forest battle, protruding from the commander's hatch. At one of these moments, in front of my eyes, my comrade from the 2nd Gorky Tank School, Lieutenant Vasily Smirnov, was seriously wounded in the head from a burst of an enemy shell.

In the cadet company, and not only in the company, but throughout the entire school, I was the youngest in age. Vasily Smirnov already worked as a director for two years before the war. high school... Therefore, I have always listened carefully to his advice. In the heat of the battle, I did not see how he was taken out of the tank and how he was taken away, but we considered him dead.

To my great joy, in January 1952, at the Yaroslavl station, in the military hall, I saw an elderly officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, very familiar to me. He stopped, peered, recognized and called out to him: "Vasya!" He turned to me and we kissed ...

And on that day, we still managed to scatter the logs in the defense of the Nazis and, pursuing them through glades and forest thickets, still before dark went to the edge of the forest to the "Vinogradar" state farm. And then things got worse. The enemy unleashed heavy artillery fire on our battle formation and, under its cover, deploying up to 30-35 tanks into battle formation, threw them into a counterattack. The forces were unequal. Having spent a tense forest battle and being the first to break free to the edge of the forest, from where we could see the northern outskirts of Kiev - Priorka, we, firing back, using the advantageous terrain and woodland, retreated into the depths of the forest and organized a perimeter defense.

The enemy, approaching the forest, pushed forward security units, consisting of three medium tanks, and with the main forces, lining up in two marching columns, moved into the forest.

I was ordered to block off the central clearing with my tank. Vanyusha Abashin's tank stood on the right and slightly behind, and the ISU-152 self-propelled gun was already covering me on the left. It began to darken quickly. The main forces of the Nazis were approaching. From the noise of the engines it was clear that a heavy tank "Tiger" was ahead.

I heard the voice of the company commander, Senior Lieutenant Avetisyan: "Fire on enemy tanks!" I order Semiletov:
- Vasya, give it a little ahead at low revs, otherwise the tree bothers me.
- There is a little forward on small! - answered Semiletov.

During the day of the battle, the crew and I finally worked together, and he understood me perfectly. Having improved my position, I immediately saw the enemy column approaching me. This time, the Nazis changed their principle and moved without light, making backlights from the rear cars.

Without waiting for the driver to finally install the tank, I fired the first shot at the head tank, which was already fifty meters away from me. An instant flash on the frontal part of a fascist tank: it caught fire, illuminating the entire column.
- The sub-caliber is ready! - reports the loader Golubenko without my command for this.

With the second shot at point-blank range, we shot the second one coming out from behind the first burning tank. He also flared up. The forest became as bright as day. And at this time I hear the shots of Vanyusha Abashin's tank. On the left is a deaf and long shot of our self-propelled gun. And we already have several sheaves of burning tanks in sight. I shout to the mechanic Semiletov to come closer. The Nazis began to retreat, backing away. Coming almost close to the first burning tank, I see the next live target behind its starboard side (as it turned out later, it was the enemy's large-caliber self-propelled cannon "Ferdinand"). I take aim and give a shot - and at once a burning torch. We pursue the enemy and take possession of the "Vinogradar" state farm. It was getting light quickly. The enemy intensified fire from positions set up north of the Priorka area.

We needed to put ourselves in order and prepare directly for the assault on the city. We have already seen its outskirts and the domes of churches in the center. Captain Ivan Gerasimovich Eliseev, acting political officer of the battalion, who drove up after us, told us that in the night battle we destroyed seven Nazi tanks and three self-propelled guns. And he added that the fascists, seized by panic, left on forest roads many killed and also wounded ...

Here, at the state farm, we refueled in preparation for the decisive assault. I could see in the scope how our infantry riflemen were slowly but persistently advancing towards the northern outskirts of the city. Here I saw for the first time the volunteer soldiers of the Czechoslovak brigade with their commander, then Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda, who had come out on the right. They went on three T-34 tanks and two light T-70s.

At 11.00 on November 5, 1943, the brigade commander, Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Koshelev, and the head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Molokanov, arrived at our location. We were quickly assembled. I missed two more tank commanders. All the self-propelled guns were still with us.

And now thirty minutes later, having lined up in a battle line, our tankers rushed to the attack. We very quickly captured the southern outskirts of Pushcha-Voditsa, crossed railroad, going from Kiev to Korosten, and then the highway Kiev - Zhitomir. Here on the highway I saw a billboard on which was written in large letters in German - Kiev. My heart ached involuntarily. It was evident that our rifle units had already started fighting on the outskirts of the city from the west. The enemy responded from the suburbs with heavy artillery fire.

Short stop. The battalion commander is arranging us into a marching column. On the lead tank, he puts a group of scouts, among whom I remember sergeants Georges Ivanovsky, Mugalim Tarubaev and the recently appointed (instead of the deceased junior lieutenant Sebyanin) reconnaissance platoon commander Petty Officer Nikifor Nikitovich Sholudenko. The scouts were followed by the tank of Lieutenant Ivan Abashin, then the crew of the company commander Senior Lieutenant Avetisyan, we continued in the sequence of platoons. I remember that in the convoy behind us were the tanks of Lieutenants Grozdev, Pankin, Golubev ... We understood that we were bypassing the city from the west. We crossed the big ditch. But my tank got stuck in it. To increase the tractive effort, I ordered the mechanic Semiletov to overcome the ditch in reverse. And so it happened. The battalion commander, Captain Dmitry Chumachenko, ran up to me and asked: "What's the matter?" And having figured it out, he said: “Well done, right! Don't lag behind. " Soon, having overtaken our infantry riflemen, we burst into Borschagovskaya Street. The city was on fire, and especially its center. The Nazis fired indiscriminately from behind houses, from courtyards. Leaning out of the commander's hatch, I fired, periodically lowering myself to the drive pedal of a tank gun or machine gun. And here is the T-junction. I see how the lead tank, two hundred meters ahead of us with the scouts, reached this intersection and suddenly, enveloped in a burst of flame, turned to the right and crashed into one of the corner houses. The scouts on it were dropped from the tank. Lieutenant Abashin and I opened fire on the rapidly fleeing enemy SPG.

Darkness deepened. The battalion commander who ran up to us appoints Lieutenant Abashin's head tank, the rest of the column remained in the same order. Abashin, Avetisyan and me, as the first, he gave one person each, a guide who knew the city, and ordered, with the headlights on, turning on the sirens, with maximum fire, to quickly go to the city center and take possession of the square (now the square named after M.I. Kalinin ).

At the signal, we moved decisively, turned into Krasnoarmeyskaya Street and, on a swift march, firing at the retreating Nazis in disorder, went to Khreshchatyk. This street made me feel bitter. Not a single surviving building. Solid ruins and debris. Moreover, these ruins did not even burn. The nearby streets were on fire. It was they who illuminated the dead wreckage of Khreshchatyk. Soon a small square opened in front of us with a dilapidated old building in the center. Seven straight streets diverged from it, like radii. The tank of the company commander, Avetisyan, stopped in the square, and we each with our tank left to occupy these streets.

The share of our crew went to Kalinin Street. Stopping at the beginning of the alignment of the street, we looked around. The enemy is not visible. I open my hatch. I see, timidly peering at us, two women come out of the entrances, go to our tank. Others followed them, and soon we were surrounded by many people. A car approached, from which the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Captain Ivan Gerasimovich Eliseev, got out (by the way, he still lives in Kiev). He congratulated us and all the gathered people of Kiev on the victory. And then Eliseev told us that Sergeant Major Nikifor Sholudenko, who was with a group of scouts on the lead tank, died heroically when turning to Krasnoarmeyskaya Street. Later we learned that he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

The tanks of our Guards Corps, rifle units of the 38th Army gradually approached ...

In the morning we received the order to leave the city and go towards a large enemy tank group.

Alexander Fadin, participant in the liberation of Kiev, colonel, candidate of military sciences

Early production T-34 tanks were equipped with a 76-mm gun mod. 1938/39 L-11 with a barrel length of 30.5 caliber and an initial velocity of an armor-piercing projectile - 612 m / s. Vertical guidance - from –5 ° to + 25 °. The practical rate of fire in a tank is 1-2 rounds / min. The gun had a vertical wedge semiautomatic breechblock with a device for disabling semiautomatic devices, since in the pre-war years the GABTU leadership believed that semiautomatic devices should not be in tank guns (due to the gas contamination of the fighting compartment). A feature of the L-11 cannon was the original recoil devices, in which the fluid in the recoil brake through a small hole directly contacted atmospheric air... The main drawback of this weapon was also associated with this circumstance: if it was necessary to alternately conduct rapid fire at different elevation angles of the barrel (which was not uncommon in a tank), the hole was blocked, and the liquid boiled up when fired, breaking the brake cylinder. In order to eliminate this drawback, a reserve hole with a valve was made in the L-11 rollback brake for communication with air when firing with a declination angle. The L-11 cannon, in addition, was very complex and expensive to manufacture. It required a wide range of alloy steels and non-ferrous metals, the manufacture of most of the parts required milling work of high precision and cleanliness.

Cannon L-11:

1– barrel; 2 - mask installation; 3 - pin; 4 - stopper of the stowed position of the gun; 5 - toothed sector of the lifting mechanism; 6 - sight forehead; 7 - pillow; 8 - sleeve catcher; 9 - DT machine gun

A relatively small number of T-34 tanks were fired with the L-11 cannon - according to various sources, from 452 to 458. In addition, they were armed with several vehicles during repairs in blockaded Leningrad and 11 tanks in Nizhny Tagil in January 1942. For the latter, guns were used from among those taken out from Kharkov during the evacuation. Since the L-11 gun did not become a mass tank gun of the Great Patriotic War, and the T-34 tanks on which it was installed were mostly lost in its first month, it makes no sense to dwell on its combat characteristics in detail. So let's move on to the most massive (about 37 thousand guns produced) domestic F-34 tank gun.

76-mm cannon mod. 1940 F-34 with a barrel length of 41.5 caliber was installed on the T-34 from March 1941. The mass of the gun is 1155 kg. Maximum rollback length 390 mm, vertical guidance from –5 ° 30 "to + 26 ° 48". The shutter is wedge, with a semiautomatic mechanical copying type. The recoil device of the gun consisted of hydraulic recoil brakes and a recoil mechanism and were located under the barrel. A cannon shot was fired using foot and manual mechanical triggers.

The F-34 cannon was upgraded twice. In the course of the first improvement, the shutter and semiautomatic devices with a copying device, triggers were changed, the compensator in the recoil brake, the fuse for locking the shutter in a stowed manner and the bracket with the buffer were abolished. In the second case, instead of a barrel with a free pipe, a monoblock barrel with a breech connected to the pipe by means of a coupling was installed.

For firing from the L-11 and F-34 cannons, unitary cartridges from divisional guns mod. 1902/30 and arr. 1939 and from the regimental gun mod. 1927:

- with a high-explosive long-range grenade (steel OF-350 and steel cast iron OF-350A) and a KTM-1 fuse;

- with an old Russian high-explosive grenade (F-354) and fuses KT-3, KTM-3 or 3GT;

- with an armor-piercing tracer projectile (BR-350A, BR-350B, R-350SP) and an MD-5 fuse;

- with an armor-burning projectile (BP-353A) and a BM fuse;

- with bullet shrapnel (Sh-354 and Sh-354T) and Hartz shrapnel (Sh-354G), with tubes - 22-second or T-6;

- with rod shrapnel (Sh-361) and T-3G tube;

- with buckshot (Ш-350).

In October 1943, it was put into service and began to be included in the ammunition of the T-34 tank. unitary cartridge with a subcaliber armor-piercing tracer projectile (BR-354P).

From the data in the table, it can be seen that the 76-mm F-34 cannon installed in the T-34 tank at a distance of up to 1500 m was guaranteed to hit the armor of all German tanks of 1941-1942, without exception, including the Pz.III and Pz.IV. As for the new German heavy tanks, it could penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger and Panther tanks from a distance of no more than 200 m, and the side armor of the Tiger, Panther and the Ferdinand self-propelled guns from a distance of no more than 400 m.

In practice, however, the situation was somewhat different. So, for example, in a memorandum on the results of tests by shelling a Pz.VI tank, sent to Stalin on May 4, 1943, it was said:

“The shelling of the 82-mm side armor of the T-VI tank from the 76-mm F-34 tank gun from a distance of 200 meters showed that the armor-piercing shells of this gun are weak and when they meet the tank's armor they are destroyed without piercing the armor.

The subcaliber 76-mm shells also do not penetrate the 100-mm frontal armor of the T-VI tank from a distance of 500 m. "

As for the Panther tanks, based on the results of the battles at the Kursk Bulge, it was concluded that they were hit by a 76-mm armor-piercing projectile, with the exception of the frontal part. After the end of the fighting, one "Panther" was subjected to trial fire from the 76-mm cannon of the T-34 tank. In total, 30 shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 100 m, of which 20 shots were fired at the upper and 10 at the lower frontal plates of the hull. The top sheet had no holes - all the shells ricocheted, the bottom sheet had only one hole.

Thus, it can be stated that in 1943, with the increase in the thickness of the armor of German tanks, the effective firing range at them sharply decreased and did not exceed 500 m even for a sub-caliber projectile. At the same time, 75- and 88-mm long-barreled German guns could hit the T-34 at distances of 900 and 1500 m, respectively. And we are talking here not only about "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The swinging part of the F-34 cannon with a telescopic sight:

1 - a cup; 2 - sight; 3 - telescope holders; 4 - ruler of the rollback indicator; 5 - frontal support; 6 - eyecup; 7 - handwheel of lateral corrections; 8 - handwheel of aiming angles; 9 - release lever; 10 - sector of the lifting mechanism; 11 - handwheel handle of the lifting mechanism

The most massive German tanks - Pz.III and Pz.IV. have undergone significant changes. Moreover, this happened not in 1943, but in the spring of 1942. It was just that in the spring and summer of 1943, Soviet tankers had to face a large number of modernized tanks of these two types.

Medium tanks Pz.III of modifications L, M and N interested Soviet specialists from the People's Commissariat of ammunition primarily in the design of the frontal armor of the hull and turret. They quite reasonably suggested that it would be a serious obstacle for domestic armor-piercing shells, since “... the front plate of high hardness armor, about 20 mm thick, is installed with a significant gap relative to the main armor, 52 mm thick… Thus, the front plate will act as a“ cocking armor ”, from the impact of which the head of the armor-piercing projectile will be partially destroyed and the bottom fuse will be cocked so that the explosive can be triggered even before the main armor of the turret platform is penetrated ... Thus, with the total thickness of the frontal armor of the turret platform of the T-3 tank being 70–75 mm, this two-layer barrier can be impenetrable for most armor-piercing chamber ammunition equipped with an MD fuse -2 ".

This assumption was confirmed during tests at the Sverdlovsk proving ground, when none of the three shells fired from the 85-mm 52K anti-aircraft gun and the two fired from the 122-mm A-19 corps gun, the frontal armor of the German Pz.III tank did not penetrate. In this case, either the detonation of the charge occurred even before the armor of the turret platform was pierced, or when it hit the main armor after passing through the screen, the projectile was destroyed. Note - we are talking about 85- and 122-mm shells. What can we say about 76-mm!

In connection with the strengthening of the armor protection of the Pz.IV tank, it was noted:

“The T-4 medium tank has undergone a modernization of its armor by thickening the forehead of the turret platform to 80-85mm, in some cases by imposing an additional armor plate 25-30mm thick. However, tanks were also encountered carrying a monolithic sheet of frontal armor 82 mm thick, which suggests that a new modification of this tank has been adopted in the production of the German industry ... Thus, the thickness of the frontal armor of the T-4 and Artshturm-75 tanks ( assault gun StuG III. - Approx. author) is currently 82-85 mm and is virtually invulnerable to the most massive in the Red Army armor-piercing shells of 45 mm and 76 mm caliber ... "

Analyzing the results of the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General tank troops P.A.Rotmistrov in his letter sent on August 20, 1943 to the first deputy people's commissar Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, wrote:

“Having commanded tank units from the first days of World War II, I am forced to report to you that today our tanks have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire accuracy of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, the great saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully use the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices in German tanks puts our tanks at a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure increases.

The Germans, opposing our T-34 and KB tanks with their T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, no longer experience their former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to engage in a tank battle, since they are more than easily destroyed by the fire of German tanks.

Tank T-34 with 76-mm cannon F-34 during tests at the Gorokhovets test site. November 1940

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank equipment, except for the introduction of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns into service, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings on the tanks of the first release, such as the imperfection of the transmission group ( main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven turret rotation, extremely poor visibility and crew accommodation are not completely eliminated today.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War has been steadily moving forward in terms of its tactical and technical data, providing more and more more advanced aircraft, then, unfortunately, this cannot be said about our tanks ...

Now the T-34 and KB tanks have lost the first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the belligerent countries in the first days of the war.

And indeed, if you remember our tank battles 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other types of troops, and if they did, then with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942 ...

As an ardent patriot of tank forces, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and to raise with all urgency the issue of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and constructive clearance now existing types German tanks ... "

Reading this letter, it is difficult to disagree on the whole with the opinion of P. A. Rotmistrov. Indeed, by the summer of 1943 and even earlier, our tanks had lost their advantage over the Germans. At the same time, the design of the T-34 tank was improved rather sluggishly. And if you can still recall some innovations with regard to armor protection and the engine-transmission unit, then this cannot be said with regard to weapons. Since March 1940, it has remained unchanged - the F-34 cannon. So the reproach against the designers is quite fair. It is completely incomprehensible why the same V.G. Grabin did not even try to improve the ballistic characteristics of this gun. Why it was not possible, for example, to bring them to the level of the F-22 cannon by extending the F-34 barrel to 55 calibers. Such a weapon, with the same shell, could penetrate 82-mm armor from a distance of 1000 m! This would equalize the chances of success in a duel between the T-34 and the Pz.IV, for example, and would significantly increase them when meeting the Tiger or Panther.

Serial T-34 tank with a 76-mm F-34 cannon and a cast turret. 1941 year

For some reason, some authors blame P.A.Rotmistrov for writing this letter. Like, he wanted to make excuses for the failure at Prokhorovka and blamed all the blame on the designers. You might think that P.A.Rotmistrov single-handedly made the decision to attack the 2nd SS Panzer Corps head-on! This decision was made by the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin with the participation of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters A.M. Vasilevsky. The headquarters, represented by JV Stalin, approved this decision, which did not correspond to the situation. So, what are the questions for Rotmistrov? However, back to the T-34.

Tank T-34 produced in 1941. The turret hatch cover no longer contains an all-round vision device

As you know, the maneuverability of the fire of any tank is determined by the angular velocity of the turret. The turret of the T-34 tank rotated around its vertical axis using a turning mechanism located on the left side of the gun. The turret turning mechanism was a reduction worm gear. An electromechanical drive was used to quickly transfer fire from one target to another, and a manual drive was used to accurately aim the gun at the target. The electric drive of the turret rotation mechanism had three rotation speeds. The electric motor was controlled by turning the rheostat (controller) handwheel mounted on it. To turn the tower to the right, the handwheel turned to the right, to turn to the left - to the left. The handwheel of the rheostat, when turning, had three positions in each direction, corresponding to three speeds of rotation of the tower, which had the following values: 1st speed - 2.1 rpm, 2nd - 3.61 rpm, 3rd - 4, 2 rpm Thus, the time for a complete revolution of the tower at maximum speed was a record 12 s! In neutral position (manual drive), the handwheel is locked with a button. Everything seems to be fine. But then it is not entirely clear what P. A. Rotmistrov had in mind when he spoke of the "extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower." The fact is that the mechanism for turning the turret of the T-34 tank had an extremely unsuccessful design with spaced control drives.

Imagine a tank gunner in battle. His face is pressed to the forehead of the sight, that is, he does not look around and manipulates the aiming organs of the gun blindly. Right hand lies on the vertical guidance flywheel, the left one - on the flywheel of the manual turret rotation drive. According to the recollections of some tankers, they crossed their arms, rotating the right handwheel of the turret turning mechanism. Perhaps it was more convenient that way. To switch to an electric drive, the gunner had to stretch out his hand (it was difficult to do it with his left or right) and grop it for a small handwheel of the controller, located on the swing mechanism from above. In doing so, it was necessary not to forget to switch from manual to electromechanical by pressing the small button next to the handwheel. As the saying goes, "everything is clear to the court" - none normal person in the heat of battle, he will not do all this. Therefore, the T-34 gunners mainly used only the manual turret rotation drive. To a large extent, their choice was facilitated by the fact that on the tanks produced in the winter of 1941/42, for example, there was no electric turret rotation drive at all - the factories did not receive electric motors.

For firing from the L-11 cannon, the TOD-6 telescopic sight and the PT-6 panoramic periscope sight were used; for firing the F-34 cannon - the TOD-7 telescopic sight and the PT-7 panoramic periscope sight, subsequently replaced by the TMFD-7 telescopic sight and the PT-4-7 panoramic periscope sight. On some of the tanks, in addition to the standard periscopic sight, the PT-K command panorama was installed.

Turret turning mechanism

Telescopic sight TMFD-7 had a 2.5-fold magnification and a field of view of 15 °. It provided greater guidance accuracy, but working with it was inconvenient, since the eyepiece moved with the gun, which means that the gunner had to either slide off his seat, giving the gun barrel an elevation angle, or stand up from it, giving the declination angle. The periscopic sight, in contrast to the telescopic sight, was not mounted on the gun, but in the roof of the tower. It provided an all-round view with a fixed eyepiece. The head prism of the sight was connected to the gun by a parallelogram drive. The PT-4 sight had a lower aiming accuracy due to errors introduced by the parallelogram traction device and the differential mechanism. From September 1943, T-34 tanks began to be equipped with PT-9 periscope sights without a circular view mechanism.

In 1940-1942 tanks, the ammunition load consisted of 77 rounds, which were stored on the floor of the fighting compartment and on its walls. On the floor of the tank, 20 high (for 3 shots) and 4 low (for 2 shots) suitcases were installed - a total of 68 shells. On the walls of the fighting compartment, 9 shots were placed: on the right side - 3, in a common horizontal stowage, and on the left - 6, in two horizontal stowages, 3 shots each.

In 1942-1944 tanks with an "improved" turret, the ammunition load consisted of 100 rounds (armor-piercing - 21, high-explosive fragmentation - 75, subcaliber - 4). For stowing shots on the floor of the fighting compartment, 8 boxes for 86 shots were equipped. The remaining 14 shots were placed as follows: 2 armor-piercing tracer - in cassettes on the lid of the box in the rear right corner of the fighting compartment, 8 high-explosive fragmentation - on the left side of the fighting compartment and 4 subcaliber - in cassettes on the starboard side.

Thus, in the "fenders of the first shots" of the T-34 tank of early releases with the "pie" turret, there were 9 shots, and with the "improved" turret - 14. For the rest, the loader had to climb into suitcases or boxes. With the former it was more difficult, since their design provided access to only one upper shot. In the boxes, the shots were placed horizontally, and with the lid open, access to several shots was provided at once.

In addition to the design features of the gun, such an important parameter as the rate of fire depends to a large extent on the convenience of the loader. And here German medium tanks had a noticeable advantage over their opponents, primarily over Soviet tanks, mainly due to the use of a forward-mounted transmission arrangement. This arrangement, thanks to the combination of the control and transmission compartments, made it possible to take a part of the hull under the fighting compartment more than with the aft transmission.

From the data in the table, it can be understood that the smallest volume of the fighting compartment and control compartment of the T-34 among all the compared tanks is due to the sequential uncombined arrangement of the engine and transmission compartments, which occupied 47.7% of its length.

View of the inside of the turret of the T-34 tank through the turret hatch. To the left of the breech of the F-34 cannon, the tube of the TMFD-7 telescopic sight is clearly visible, above it is the forehead and eyepiece of the PT-4-7 periscope sight and the flywheel of the turret swing mechanism. Above the latter is the vehicle # 1 of the tank commander's TPU. To the left and below the TPU apparatus, the frame of the on-board viewing device is visible, which, judging by the picture, was very difficult for the tank commander

A very important parameter that directly affects both the accuracy of fire and its rate of fire is the width at the shoulders of the gunner's and loader's workplaces. Unfortunately, the author does not have accurate data on this subject for the T-34 tank. However, it is quite obvious that this width of our vehicle, given the volume of the fighting compartment, is noticeably smaller than that of the German Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks, cannot be greater. Moreover, the diameter of the turret ring in the light, or, as it is sometimes called, the service circle, was 1420 mm for the T-34, 1530 for the Pz.III, and 1600 mm for the Pz.IV! The width of the gunner's workplaces for both German tanks was 500 mm. In the T-34, due to the above, it could not exceed this value, but most likely was somewhere in the range of 460–480 mm. The gunner, willy-nilly, had to sit with his face in the direction of the tank, and his workplace, after all, was determined by the width of the shoulders of a man of average height. It was worse for the loader. Apparently, it was believed that within the volume allotted to him, he could relatively freely position his body. Based on the dimensions of the tower, one can calculate the width at the shoulders of the loader's workplace, which was somewhere in the range of 480x600 mm (for the Pz.III - 600x900 mm, for the Pz.IV - 500x750). Considering that the length of the 76-mm shot is about 600 mm, it becomes generally unclear how the loader could fulfill his duties in the T-34 turret. The appearance in 1942 of a new turret of the so-called "improved shape" (improved in terms of manufacturing technology) with a lower inclination of the walls, most likely made it possible to somewhat expand the jobs of the gunner and loader. But not by much - the diameter of the turret ring remained the same.

Security

The shaping of the hull and turret of the T-34 tank was based on the solutions used in the creation of the experimental light tank BT-SV-2 "Turtle", the concept is based on the idea of ​​anti-cannon armor. Strictly speaking, both were used as the basis for the design of the still light tank A-20, and then migrated by inheritance to the T-34. Without going into the details of the structure of the hull and turret of the thirty-four, let's try to figure out how its armor protection met its purpose.

The first known to the author shelling tests of the tank took place at the NIBT Polygon in Kubinka at the end of March 1940. The tank A-34 No. 2 was tested. The shelling of the sides of the hull and turret of this tank from a distance of 100 m from domestic (four shots) and British (two shots) 37-mm guns with sharp-headed armor-piercing shells did not make any impact on the tank - the shells bounced off the armor, leaving only dents 10–15 mm deep. When the tower was fired from a 45-mm cannon with two armor-piercing shells from the same distance, the glasses and mirrors of the on-board observation device of the tower were destroyed, the forehead on the sight was torn off, and the welds along the contour of the armor of the viewing device and at the bottom of the tower niche were broken. As a result of the deformation of the shoulder strap during the rotation of the tower, jamming was observed. At the same time, the dummy planted in the tank remained intact, and the engine, which was wound up in the tank before the shelling, continued to work steadily. After the shelling, the tank crossed an area with deep snow and an ice-free swampy stream. Based on the results of the shelling, it was decided to increase the thickness of the turret niche bottom from 15 to 20 mm and to strengthen the aft hatch bolts.

Comparative sizes of T-34 and KV-1

The level of armor protection of serial tanks, which began to leave the factory workshops after a little over a year, was, in principle, the same as that of the prototypes. Neither the thickness of the armor plates nor their relative position have changed significantly. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War was encouraging - it turned out that the T-34 tanks in standard combat situations were practically not hit by the fire of the standard anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. In any case, such a picture took place in the initial period of the war. It was also confirmed by the tests carried out in Stalingrad on September 19, 1941 at the training ground, where the 4th tank brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov was formed. The incentive for carrying out these tests was the development at STZ of the process of simplified heat treatment of armor parts. The first hull, made according to the new process technology, was fired upon from 45-mm anti-tank and 76-mm tank guns.

“During the tests, the armored hull was subjected to the following shelling pattern:

a. seven 45-mm armor-piercing and one 76-mm high-explosive projectile were fired into the starboard side;

b. eight 45 mm armor-piercing shells were fired into the right wing liner;

v. three 45 mm armor-piercing shells were fired into the upper stern sheet;

g. three armor-piercing and one high-explosive 76-mm shells were fired into the top sheet of the nose.

The shelling from a 45-mm anti-tank gun was carried out from a distance of 50 m. The sides and wing flaps were fired at an angle of 50 ° and 12 ° to the normal, the bow and stern - along the normal to the natural position of the hull. Tests found that the overall structural strength of the hull when it was fired with 45 mm armor-piercing projectiles was generally preserved completely and only partial destruction of the seams was observed when shells hit them, and only the hit of 76-mm armor-piercing shells caused minor damage to the seams and small chipping. " ...

In general, everything is clear, there is nothing to comment on. However, one should not exaggerate the invulnerability of the armor protection of the T-34 tank. Usually, in favor of this very invulnerability, the adversary's comments about collisions with T-34 tanks in the summer of 1941 are cited. However, these reviews (we will get to know some of them below) should be treated with a certain amount of criticism. On the one hand, because of their somewhat excessive emotionality, and on the other, because in most cases in the Soviet press they were cited incompletely, that is, without end. And the end, as a rule, was the same - the Soviet T-34 (or KB) tank was knocked out. If anti-tank artillery could not do this, then divisional or anti-aircraft artillery did. In order to be convinced of this, it is enough to look at the data of the report on the damage of Soviet destroyed tanks received by the repair enterprises during the battle for Moscow in the period from October 9, 1941 to March 15, 1942.

Note: the final figure does not coincide with the number of defeats due to the presence of more than 1 defeat in many tanks (especially medium and heavy types).

The total number of hits exceeds the number of defeats by an average of 1.6-1.7 times. "

103 Tank hull:

1 - final drive housing; 2 - striker fist of the caterpillar fingers; 3 - stand of the balancer limiter; 4 - support arm of the balancer; 5 - cutout for the balancer trunnion; 6 - hole for the axis of the balancer; 7 - guide wheel crank bracket; 8 - armor plug over the worm shank of the track tensioning mechanism; 9 - beam of the bow of the hull; 10 - towing hook; 11 - tow hook latch; 12 - links for attaching spare tracks; 13, 16 - protective strips; 14 - machine gun armor protection; 15 - driver's hatch cover; 17 - headlight bracket; 18 - signal bracket; 19 - handrail; 20 - saw arm; 21 - brackets of an external fuel tank

In the future, as the number of medium and heavy tanks increased in number, the excess of the number of hits over the number of defeats became even greater. So, for example, to defeat one T-34 tank at real combat ranges in the summer of 1942, it was required to hit it with five 50-mm armor-piercing sub-caliber shells.

It should be noted that most of the holes and dents from shells occurred on the sides and stern of the hulls and turrets of Soviet tanks. On the frontal armor, the marks from hits were practically absent, which indicated the reluctance of the German artillerymen and tankers to fire on Soviet tanks from frontal angles. At the same time, it was especially noted that, despite the 40 ° inclination of the T-34's side armor plates, they were penetrated by shells from 47-mm Czech and 50-mm German anti-tank guns: “Despite the large angle of inclination of the sliding traces, relatively few were found on the armor. Most of the holes (14 out of 22) are normalized to one degree or another. "

Cleaning of welded seams on the hull of the T-34 tank

Some clarifications are needed here. The fact is that already in 1941, the Germans began to actively use armor-piercing shells with armor-piercing tips. For 50-mm shells, a head made of high-hardness steel was additionally welded, and 37-mm shells were unevenly hardened during manufacture. The use of an armor-piercing tip allowed the projectile, upon contact with the armor, to turn in the direction of the tilt - to normalize, due to which its path in the armor was shortened. Such shells of 50 mm caliber also penetrated the frontal armor of the T-34, while the channel of the hole was inclined, as if the fire was fired at the tank from an elevation. It will be useful to recall that the production of such shells was mastered in the USSR only after the war. However, back to the report.

Most of the holes of unknown caliber were “small-diameter holes with an annular bead, produced by the so-called. "Subcaliber" ammunition. Moreover, it was found that this type of ammunition is equipped with 28/20-mm anti-tank guns, 37-mm anti-tank guns, 47-mm anti-tank Czechoslovak guns, 50-mm anti-tank, casemate and tank guns. "

The report also noted the use by the Germans of new shells, called "cumulative", the traces of which were holes with melted edges.

In some publications you can find information that since 1942 "thirty-fours" were produced with 60-mm frontal armor of the hull. In fact, this is not the case. Indeed, at the GKO meeting on December 25, 1941, Resolution No. 1062 was adopted, which ordered, starting February 15, 1942, to produce T-34s with 60 mm thick frontal armor. This decision, apparently, can be explained by the use by the Germans in an ever-increasing number of 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns with a barrel length of 60 calibers, armor-piercing (with an armor-piercing tip) and armor-piercing-subcaliber projectiles which pierced the frontal armor of the T-34 on distances up to 1000 m, as well as the use of sub-caliber shells for 50-mm L / 42 tank guns of Pz.III tanks, which achieved a similar result from a distance of up to 500 m.

Since metallurgical plants could not quickly issue the required amount of 60-mm armored products, tank factories were ordered to screen the frontal parts of the hull and turret with 10-15-mm armor plates used at plant No. 264 in the production of armored hulls for T-60 tanks. However, already on February 23, 1942, the State Defense Committee canceled its decision, partly due to difficulties with the manufacture of a 60-mm armor plate, and partly due to the rather rare use of subcaliber shells by the Germans. Nevertheless, tanks with shielded hulls and turrets were produced at STZ and Plant No. 112 until the beginning of March 1942, until their reserve was used up. At the Krasnoye Sormovo plant, eight towers with 75-mm armor were cast and installed on the tanks.

Armoring scheme of the T-34 tank

The same plant, in addition, in the fall of 1942 produced 68 T-34 tanks, the hulls and turret of which were equipped with bulwarks. They were supposed to protect tanks from German HEAT shells. However, it was not possible to verify this - in the very first battle, almost all the combat vehicles shielded in this way were knocked out by ordinary armor-piercing shells of the enemy's 75-mm anti-tank guns. Soon, work on the protection of tanks from cumulative ammunition was discontinued, since the Germans used them extremely rarely.

In 1942, the security situation of the thirty-four became somewhat complicated. The Wehrmacht in ever-increasing numbers began to receive medium tanks Pz.III with a 50-mm cannon with a barrel length of 60 calibers and Pz.IV with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 43, and then 48 calibers. The latter pierced the frontal parts of the turret of the T-34 tank at a distance of up to 1000 m, and the forehead of the hull at a distance of up to 500 m. and an angle of inclination of 60 °, in terms of projectile resistance, it was equivalent to a vertically located armor plate with a thickness of 75–80 mm.

To analyze the resistance of the armor of the T-34 tank, a group of employees of the Moscow Central Research Institute No. 48 assessed their damageability and the reasons for the failure.

As the initial data for assessing the damageability of T-34 tanks by the group's workers, information was taken from repair bases No. 1 and No. 2 located in Moscow, as well as materials from the GABTU obtained from the repair base at plant No. 112. In total, information was collected about 154 tanks that were damaged by armor protection. As the analysis showed, the largest number of defeats - 432 (81%) - fell on the tank hull. 102 losses (19%) fell on the tower. Moreover, more than half (54%) of the defeats of the hulls and turrets of T-34 tanks were safe (potholes, dents).

The group's report noted that “The main means of fighting the T-34 tank was the enemy's artillery with a caliber of 50 mm or more. Out of 154 vehicles, there were 109 injuries in the upper frontal part, of which 89% were safe, and dangerous injuries fell on a caliber of more than 75 mm. The share of dangerous defeats from 50 mm guns was 11%. The high armor resistance of the upper frontal part was obtained, among other things, due to its inclined position.

On the lower frontal part, only 12 lesions (2.25%) were found, that is, the number is very small, and 66% of the lesions are safe. The sides of the corps had the largest number defeats - 270 (50.5% of the total), of which 157 (58%) accounted for the front part of the hull sides (control compartment and fighting compartment) and 42% - 113 defeats - on the aft side. The most popular were calibers 50mm and above - 75, 88, 105mm. All hits from large-caliber shells and 61.5% of hits from 50-mm shells turned out to be dangerous. "

The data obtained on the damageability of the main parts of the hull and turret made it possible to assess the quality of the armor. The percentage of large defeats (breaks, breaks with cracks, spalls and splits) was very small - 3.9%, and the quality of the armor was considered quite satisfactory in terms of the nature of the defeats.

The sides of the hull (50.5%), the front of the hull (22.65%) and the turret (19.14%) were most exposed to shelling.

General form welded turret of the T-34 tank produced in 1940-1941

Well, how did the German tankers assess the security of the T-34? Information about this can be gleaned from the "Report on the tactical use of German and Soviet tank units in practice," drawn up in 1942 based on the experience of combat operations of the 23rd Panzer Division during Operation Blau. Regarding the T-34, it noted:

“Penetration of shells of a long-barreled tank gun 5 cm KwK L / 60.

Panzergranate 38 (armor-piercing projectile model 38) versus T-34:

side of the tower and turret platform - up to 400 m;

the forehead of the tower - up to 400 m;

the forehead of the hull is not effective, in some cases it can break through the driver's hatch.

Penetration of the Panzergranate 39 shell of the long-barreled 7.5-cm gun KwK 40 L / 43 against the T-34:

The T-34 can be hit from any angle to any projection if the fire is fired from a distance of no more than 1.2 km. "

By the end of 1942, the share of 75-mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns in the Wehrmacht's range of anti-tank weapons had sharply increased (up to 30%). frequently used ranges of anti-tank combat did not represent a serious obstacle for him. By the summer of 1943, Pak 40 cannons became the backbone of the Wehrmacht's tactical anti-tank defense zone.

This, as well as the appearance on the Eastern Front of new German heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" led to the fact that, according to the figurative expression of the veteran of the 3rd Guards Tank Army M. Mishin, our tankers "suddenly began to feel completely naked ..." ... As noted in the reports on the combat actions of Soviet tanks on the Kursk Bulge, the armor-piercing subcaliber shell of the 75-mm gun of the Panther tank, which had initial speed 1120 m / s, pierced the frontal armor of the T-34 tank at a distance of up to 2000 m, and the armor-piercing shell of the 88-mm gun of the Tiger tank, which had an initial speed of 890 m / s, pierced the frontal armor of the T-34 tank from a distance of 1500 m.

T-34 tank with an L-11 cannon Three holes are clearly visible on the side of the turret

This can be seen from the "Report on tests of the armor protection of the T-34 tank by shelling from an 88-mm German tank gun", compiled by the staff of the NIBT Polygon in May 1943:

“Shelling of the T-34 hull from a distance of 1500 m.

1) Armor-piercing projectile. Frontal leaf. Thickness - 45 mm, tilt angle - 40 degrees, meeting angle - 70 degrees.

Breach in the armor. The driver's hatch was torn off. Cracks in the armor are 160–170 mm. The shell ricocheted.

2) Armor-piercing projectile. Nose bar. Thickness 140 mm, tilt angle - 0 degrees, meeting angle - 75 degrees.

Through hole, inlet with a diameter of 90 mm, outlet - 200x100 mm, cracks in the welded seam 210–220 mm.

3) High-explosive fragmentation projectile. Frontal leaf. Thickness - 45 mm, tilt angle - 40 degrees, meeting angle - 70 degrees.

Minor pothole. The entire left side of the front plate attachment with the side plates collapsed.

Installed: An 88 mm tank gun penetrates the hull's nose. When it hits the frontal part, the projectile ricochets, but due to the low quality of the armor, it forms a breach in the armor. The body armor has a low viscosity - spalling, delamination, cracks. The welded seams of the hull are destroyed when shells hit the sheets.

Conclusions: An 88-mm German tank gun from 1500 m penetrates the frontal part of the T-34 tank hull ...

To increase the armor resistance of the T-34 armored hull, it is necessary to improve the quality of the armor and welds. "

For the first time since the beginning of the war, the level of armor protection of the T-34 tank, which was still the dominant component of its combat survivability, has lost its superiority over the level of armor penetration of the main anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. In such a situation, the question of increasing the security of our medium tanks could not but arise.

"Thirty-four" equipped with additional frontal armor at STZ. Kalinin Front, 1942

In principle, there were still opportunities for enhancing the T-34's reservation at that time. Achievements in the field of armor protection and unused at that time weight reserves in the design of the vehicle (about 4 tons) made it possible to increase the level of projectile resistance of its main parts. So, the transition from steel 8C to high-hardness steel FD made it possible to significantly reduce the range of through penetration of the frontal part of the T-34 hull with an armor-piercing projectile of a 75-mm Pak 40 cannon. There were other options for enhancing armor protection, however, the effect achieved by implementing any of these options would be proportional to the time required for the corresponding restructuring of production. As a result, until the end of 1943, nothing radical was done to improve the armor of the T-34 tank.

The turret of this tank was torn apart by an internal explosion. The ammunition load of 76 mm rounds, unfortunately, detonated quite often. Spring 1942

From the point of view of security, the side-by-side arrangement of the fuel tanks cannot be considered successful, and even in the fighting compartment and without partitions. Not because of a good life, the tankers tried to fill the tanks to capacity before the battle - diesel vapors explode no worse than gasoline ones, diesel fuel itself never. And if the T-34s with their turrets torn off, depicted in numerous photographs, are a consequence of an explosion of ammunition, then tanks with their sides torn off by welding are the result of an explosion of diesel vapors.

During the Great Patriotic War, automatic fire extinguishing systems were not used on domestic tanks. T-34 tanks were equipped with manual tetrachloride fire extinguishers RAV, which did not justify themselves due to the insufficient number and high toxicity of the fire extinguishing composition, as well as the inability to use them by the crew in case of a fire in the engine compartment without leaving the tank.

Mobility

As you know, the mobility of the tank is provided by the engine, transmission and chassis used on it. The design of the controls and the convenience of the driver's work are also of great importance. Let's try to figure out how these issues were resolved at the thirty-four.

The T-34 tank was equipped with a V-2-34 12-cylinder four-stroke compressorless diesel engine. The rated power of the engine is 450 HP. at 1750 rpm, operating - 400 hp at 1700 rpm, maximum - 500 hp at 1800 rpm. The cylinders were V-shaped at an angle of 60 °.

The use of a diesel engine on the T-34 tank was an important and indisputable advantage. Soviet designers were indeed the first in the world to create and bring to mass production a powerful high-speed tank diesel engine. One of the most important incentives for its creation was, of course, higher efficiency in comparison with gasoline engines. Increased fire safety is rather a formal reason, since this parameter is provided not so much by the type of fuel as by the location of the fuel tanks and the efficiency of the fire extinguishing system. The latter statement is supported by the fact that 70% of the T-34 tanks irretrievably lost during the war years burned down.

It should be emphasized that the V-2 diesel was an outstanding model in terms of design, so successful that it was used in various modifications on dozens of combat and special vehicles in the post-war years. Its significantly improved version of the B-92 is installed on the most modern Russian T-90 tank. At the same time, the V-2 engine had a number of disadvantages. Moreover, they were not at all connected with the design of the engine as such, but rather with the inability, or with a very limited ability, of the domestic industry of those years to "digest" such a complex unit.

One of the disadvantages of the T-34 tank layout is the placement of fuel tanks on the sides of the fighting compartment. The explosion of diesel fuel vapor was so strong (only empty tanks exploded) that it turned out to be fatal for this tank.This vehicle, which had additional armor for the hull and turret, tore off the entire left upper side hull sheet by welding

In 1941, virtually no engine unit worked reliably. With great difficulty, it was possible to achieve that the engines worked 100-120 operating hours with the guaranteed operating time required by the GABTU of 150 operating hours. And we are talking about the engine hours worked at the stand, in almost ideal conditions. Under the conditions of real front-line operation, the engines did not work out even half of this resource. As you know, the engine in the tank operates in an extremely overstressed mode, especially in terms of air supply and air cleaning. The design of the air cleaner used on the V-2 engine until the fall of 1942 did not provide either one or the other.

More or less acceptable reliability was achieved only at the end of 1942 after the installation of the Cyclone air cleaner. Thanks to the use of modern British and American machines obtained under Lend-Lease, the quality of parts manufacturing has also increased. As a result, the engine life increased, although Plant No. 76 still guaranteed a resource of only 150 operating hours.

The most important indicator of a tank's power plant is its power density. For the T-34 tank, this value was variable. For cars produced in 1940-1941, which had a mass of 26.8 tons, it was 18.65 hp / t, and for tanks produced in 1943 and weighed 30.9 tons, it was 16.2 hp / t. Is it a lot or a little? Suffice it to say that in this indicator the T-34 was superior to all German tanks without exception. For Pz.III modifications E, F and G, with which Germany began the war against the Soviet Union, this figure ranged from 14.7 to 15.3 hp / t, and for the last modifications L, M and N in 1943 year, the specific power was 13.2 hp / t. A similar picture was observed with the Pz.IV tank. Modification E in 1941 had a specific power of 13.4 hp / t, and variants G and H in 1943, respectively, 12, 7 and 12 hp / t. The Panther averaged 15.5 hp / t, while the Tiger averaged 11.4 hp / t. However, it is not entirely correct to compare the T-34 with the latter two - these are vehicles of a different class. The "thirty-four" and practically all the tanks of the allies were superior. Only the British cruiser tanks "Crusader" (18.9 hp / t) and "Cromwell" (20 hp / t) and the American light tank "Stuart" (19.2 hp / t) had a high specific power. ...

The high specific power provided the T-34 tank and a high maximum speed of 55 km / h versus 40 km / h on average for the Pz.III and Pz.IV. However, the average speeds on the highway for all these cars were approximately the same and did not exceed 30 km / h. This is explained by the fact that the average speed is determined not so much by the specific power as by the order of movement of the column on the march and the endurance of the chassis. As for the average speed of movement over the terrain, almost all tanks, regardless of their mass and type of power plant, it ranges from 16 to 24 km / h and is limited by the crew endurance limit.

A few words must be said about such an indicator as a power reserve. Many people perceive it literally - as a certain distance from point A to point B, which a tank can travel at one gas station. In fact, the power reserve is important indicator the autonomy of the tank and, rather, is the path that the tank is able to go from refueling to refueling. It depends on the capacity of the fuel tanks and fuel consumption. The T-34 produced in 1940-1943 had a cruising range of 300 km on a highway and 220-250 km on a country road. Fuel consumption, respectively, 160 liters and 200 liters per 100 km.

Early production T-34 tanks had six internal fuel tanks with a total capacity of 460 liters and four external ones with a total capacity of 134 liters. By the end of the summer of 1943, the number of fuel tanks was increased to eight, and their capacity increased to 545 liters. Instead of four side tanks, they began to install two rectangular feed tanks, and since 1943 - two cylindrical tanks with a capacity of 90 liters from each side. External fuel tanks were not connected to the engine power system.

Engine V-2

In terms of power reserve and fuel consumption, the T-34 was noticeably superior to its opponents. For example, the capacity of three gas tanks of the average German tank Pz.IV was 420 liters. Fuel consumption per 100 km when driving on the highway - 330 liters, off-road - 500 liters. The cruising range on the highway did not exceed 210 km, on the ground - 130 km. And only the tanks of the latest modification J did it reach the thirty-four level. But for this it was necessary to install another gas tank with a capacity of 189 liters, while eliminating power unit electric turret rotation!

The disadvantages of a diesel engine include difficult starting in winter. For example, in the winter of 1941, during the Battle of Moscow, when the air temperature sometimes dropped to -40 ° C, in order to ensure constant combat readiness of the vehicles, an order was given not to jam on long time engines on medium and heavy tanks. It goes without saying that such a measure led to an even greater expenditure of the already limited engine life.

No matter how powerful the engine is on the tank, mobility is provided not only by it, but also by the transmission working with it. And if the latter is not very successful, then this largely negates all the advantages of the engine. So it happened with the "thirty-four".

The transmission of the T-34 tank consisted of a multi-plate main dry friction clutch (steel on steel), a gearbox, side clutches, brakes and final drives.

The gearbox is three-way, four-speed with sliding gears. Onboard clutches, multi-disc, dry (steel on steel); floating brakes, band brakes, with ferrodo lining. Single-stage final drives.

The four-speed gearbox of the T-34 tank had an extremely poor design. In it, to engage the required pair of gears of the driving and driven shafts, the gears moved relative to each other. It was difficult to turn on the right gear while driving. The teeth of the gears that collided during shifting broke, even ruptures of the gearbox housing were noted. After joint tests of domestic, captured and lend-lease equipment in 1942, this gearbox earned the following assessment from the officers of the NIBT Polygon:

“The gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, do not fully meet the requirements for modern combat vehicles, yielding to the gearboxes of both allied tanks and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology ".

From March 1943, a five-speed gearbox with constant gearing began to be installed on the T-34. Here, not the gears were already moving, but special carriages that moved along the shaft on splines and included the required pair of gears already in engagement. The appearance of this box greatly facilitated gear shifting and had a positive effect on the dynamic characteristics of the tank.

View of the T-34 tank engine from the side of the tower. Behind the "pancake" of the air cleaner, a filler tee with a steam-air valve is visible, designed for filling water into the cooling system. On the sides, between the suspension shafts, oil tanks are visible

The main clutch also created its share of problems. Due to rapid wear, as well as due to an unsuccessful design, it almost never turned off completely, it was "led", and it was difficult to change gear in such conditions. When the main clutch was not switched off, only very experienced driver-mechanics were able to "stick" the required gear. The rest did a simpler thing: before the attack, the 2nd gear was switched on (starting for the T-34), and the rev limiter was removed from the engine. In motion, the diesel engine was spun up to 2300 rpm, while the tank, accordingly, accelerated to 20-25 km / h. The change in speed was carried out by changing the number of revolutions, but simply by dumping the "gas". There is no need to explain that such a soldier's cunning reduced the already small engine life. However, a rare tank lived up to the development of even half of this resource by its "heart".

In 1943, the design of the main clutch was improved. In addition, they introduced a servo mechanism for the pedal of the main clutch, which significantly facilitated the work of the driver, which already required considerable physical effort. During the long march, the driver lost several kilograms in weight.

The maneuverability of the tank is significantly influenced by the ratio of the length of the supporting surface to the track width - L / B. For the T-34, it was 1.5 and was close to optimal. Medium German tanks had less: for the Pz.III - 1.2, for the Pz.IV - 1.43. This means that their agility was better. Better this indicator was at the "Tiger". As for the Panther, its L / B ratio was the same as that of the T-34.

View of the transmission of the T-34 tank. An electric starter is installed on top of the gearbox, on the sides - onboard clutches

The undercarriage of the tank, applied to one side, consisted of five double road wheels with a diameter of 830 mm. Track rollers produced by different factories and different time, differed significantly in design and appearance: cast or stamped, with rubber tires or with internal depreciation (in the summer of 1942, STZ produced rollers without depreciation at all).

The absence of rubber tires on the road wheels contributed to the noise of the unmasking tank. Its main source was the caterpillars, the ridges of which had to fit exactly between the rollers on the drive wheel. But when the caterpillar stretched, the distance between the ridges increased, and the ridges hit the rollers. The lack of a silencer on the T-34 also added to the roar.

An organic drawback of the T-34 was the Christie-type spring suspension, which imparted strong vibrations to the car while driving. In addition, the suspension shafts "ate" a significant part of the booked volume.

* * *

Concluding the conversation about the design and operation features of the T-34 tank, it is necessary to dwell on one more question. The fact is that the parameters discussed above often complement each other, and, in addition, they are largely influenced by other factors. So, for example, it is impossible to consider weapons and security without taking into account the means of observation and communication.

As early as 1940, such a significant drawback of the tank was noted as the poor placement of observation devices and their low quality. So, for example, an all-round observation device was installed to the right of the rear of the tank commander in the turret hatch cover. Access to the device was extremely difficult, and observation is possible in a limited sector: horizon view to the right up to 120 °; dead space 15 m. The limited field of view, the complete impossibility of observation in the rest of the sector, as well as the uncomfortable position of the head during observation made the viewing device completely unusable. For this reason, this device was withdrawn in the fall of 1941. As a result, only the PT-4-7 periscope sight could be used for circular observation, but it allowed observation in a very narrow sector - 26 °.

Welded tower manufactured by STZ. The details are clearly visible - the plug-cap of the embrasure for firing from personal weapons, the armor of the on-board observation device, the PT-4-7 sight in the firing position (the armor cover is folded back)

The observation devices on the sides of the tower were also inconveniently located. In order to use them in a cramped tower, it was necessary to be able to dodge. In addition, up to 1942, these devices (and the driver's too) were mirrored, with mirrors made of polished steel. The image quality was still that. In 1942, they were replaced with prismatic ones, and the "improved" tower already had viewing slots with triplex glass blocks.

In the frontal sheet of the hull, on both sides of the driver's hatch at an angle of 60 ° to the longitudinal axis of the tank, there were two mirrored viewing devices. In the upper part of the hatch cover, a central mirrored periscopic viewing device was installed. From the beginning of 1942, a driver's hatch of a simpler form with two prismatic viewing devices appeared. To protect against bullets and shell fragments, the prisms were closed from the outside with folding armored covers, the so-called "cilia".

View of the upper frontal sheet of the hull with the ball mount of the course machine gun and the driver's hatch

The quality of the prisms, made of yellowish or greenish plexiglass, was ugly in observation devices. It was almost impossible to see anything through them, and even in a moving, swinging tank. Therefore, driver mechanics, for example, often opened their hatch in the palm of their hand, which allowed them to somehow orient themselves. The driver's sighting devices, moreover, were very quickly clogged with dirt. The appearance of a hatch with "cilia" made it possible to somehow slow down this process. In motion, one "eyelash" was closed, and the driver monitored through the other. When it got dirty, it opened closed.

Perhaps the reader will ask: "Well, what does the armament and security have to do with it?" Yes, just in battle, an insufficient number, poor location and low quality of observation devices led to the loss of visual communication between the machines and untimely detection of the enemy. In the fall of 1942, the NII-48 report, made on the basis of an analysis of damage to armor protection, noted:

“A significant percentage of dangerous defeats of T-34 tanks on side parts, and not on frontal ones, can be explained either by poor knowledge of the tank teams with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection, or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot find the firing point in time and make a turn of the tank. in a position least dangerous for breaking through his armor. "

T-34 produced by STZ with a cast turret manufactured at plant No. 264. Summer 1942. To the right of the fan hood, the loader's periscope observation device, borrowed from the T-60 tank, is visible.

The situation with the visibility of the T-34 tank slightly improved only in 1943 after the installation of the commander's cupola. It had viewing slots around the perimeter and an MK-4 observation device in the flap of the rotating cover. However, the tank commander practically could not conduct observation through it in battle, since, being at the same time a gunner, he was "chained" to the sight. In addition, many tankers preferred to keep the hatch open in order to have time to jump out of the tank in the event of an enemy shell hit. Much more sense was from the MK-4 device, which the loader received. Thanks to this, the view from the right side of the tank has really improved.

Another Achilles' heel of the T-34 tank was communication, or rather, its absence. For some reason, it is believed that all "thirty-fours" from the very beginning of their production were equipped with radio stations. This is not true. Of the 832 tanks of this type available in the border military districts on June 1, 1941, only 221 vehicles were equipped with radio stations. Moreover, 71-TK-Z are capricious and difficult to set up.

Things were no better in the future. So, for example, from January to July 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant shipped 2,140 T-34 tanks to the active army, of which only 360 with radio stations. This is something like 17%. Roughly the same picture was observed at other factories. In this regard, the references of some historians to the fact that the degree of radioification of the Wehrmacht is greatly exaggerated look rather strange. In confirmation of this, the fact is cited that not all German tanks were equipped with transmitting and receiving radio stations, most of them only had receivers. It is claimed that “In the Red Army, there was essentially a similar concept of“ radium ”and“ linear ”tanks. The crews of "line" tanks had to act, observing the commander's maneuvers, or receive orders from flags "... Interesting business! The concept may be one, but the embodiment is different. Comparing radio command transmission to flag signaling is like comparing a cycle rickshaw to a taxi. The concept is also the same, but everything else ...

Control department of the T-34 tank. Position of the radio operator. Above in the center - a ball mount of a course machine gun. On the right is a radio station

Most of the German tanks had at least transmitters on which they could receive orders in battle. Most of the Soviets had nothing, and the unit commander had to protrude from the top hatch in battle and wave flags without any hope that someone would see him. Therefore, the order was given before the attack: "Do as I do!" True, it is not entirely clear what had to be done if the tank that had given such an order was knocked out?

As a result, according to the testimony of the Germans, Russian tanks often attacked in a "herd", moving in a straight line, as if afraid to get lost on the road. They delayed opening return fire, especially when firing from the flanks, and sometimes they did not open it at all, and did not determine who was firing at them and from where.

Internal communication also left much to be desired, especially on tanks produced in 1941-1942. Therefore, the main means of transmitting commands to the driver was the commander's legs, placed on his shoulders. If the commander pressed on the left shoulder, the mechanic turned to the left and vice versa. If a fist was shown to the loader, it means that you need to charge with armor-piercing, if the spread palm - with fragmentation.

The situation improved somewhat only in 1943, when fairly modern 9P radio stations and TPU-3bis intercoms began to be installed on 100% of the tanks.

Germany, 1945. In the American occupation zone, the interrogation of the Wehrmacht prisoners of war proceeded sluggishly. Suddenly, the attention of the interrogators was attracted by a long, eerie story about an insane Russian tank that killed everything in its path. The events of that fateful day from the summer of 1941 were so strongly imprinted in the memory of the German officer that they could not be erased over the next four years of the terrible war. He remembered that Russian tank forever.

June 28, 1941, Belarus. German troops rush into Minsk. Soviet units are retreating along the Mogilev highway, one of the columns is closed by the only remaining T-28 tank, led by Senior Sergeant Dmitry Malko. The tank has a problem with the engine, but a full supply of fuels and lubricants and ammunition.
During an air raid in the area of ​​n. p. Berezino, from close explosions of bombs T-28 hopelessly stalls. Malko receives an order to blow up the tank and continue to follow to Mogilev in the back of one of the trucks with other soldiers of the mixed composition. Malko asks for permission under his responsibility to postpone the execution of the order - he will try to repair the T-28, the tank is completely new and did not receive significant damage in hostilities. Permission received, the column leaves. Within a day, Malko really manages to bring the engine into working condition.

Shielding of the T-28 tank, 1940

Further, an element of randomness is included in the plot. The major and four cadets unexpectedly come out to the parking place of the tank. Major - tanker, cadets, artillerymen. This is how the full crew of the T-28 tank is suddenly formed. All night long, they ponder a plan to get out of the encirclement. The Mogilev highway was probably cut by the Germans, we need to look for another way.
... The original proposal to change the route is expressed aloud by cadet Nikolai Pedan. The daring design is unanimously supported by the newly formed crew. Instead of following to the location of the assembly point of the retreating units, the tank will rush in the opposite direction - to the West. They will break through the captured Minsk and break out of the encirclement along the Moscow highway to the location of their troops. The unique combat capabilities of the T-28 will help them implement such a plan.
The fuel tanks are almost full to the caps, the ammunition load - although not full, but Senior Sergeant Malko knows the location of the abandoned ammunition depot. The radio does not work in the tank, the commander, the gunners and the driver mechanic stipulate in advance a set of conditional signals: the commander's leg on the driver's right shoulder - right turn, on the left - left; one push in the back - first gear, two - second; foot on the head - stop. The three-tower bulk of the T-28 is moving forward along a new route in order to brutally punish the Nazis.

The layout of the ammunition in the T-28 tank

In an abandoned warehouse, they replenish ammunition in excess of the norm. When all the cassettes are full, the soldiers heap the shells directly onto the floor of the fighting compartment. Here our amateurs make a small mistake - about twenty shells did not fit the 76 mm short-barreled L-10 tank gun: despite the coincidence of calibers, these ammunition was intended for divisional artillery. 7000 cartridges for machine guns in the side machine gun turrets were loaded into the chase. After a hearty breakfast, the invincible army moved towards the capital of the Byelorussian SSR, where the Fritzes had been in charge for several days.

2 hours before immortality

On a free track, the T-28 rushes towards Minsk at full speed. Ahead, in the gray haze, the outlines of the city appeared, the chimneys of the thermal power station, factory buildings towered, a little further the silhouette of the Government House, the dome of the cathedral could be seen. Closer, closer and more irreversible ... The soldiers looked ahead, anxiously awaiting the main battle of their lives.
Not stopped by anyone, the "Trojan horse" passed the first German cordons and entered the city limits - as expected, the Nazis took the T-28 for captured armored vehicles and did not pay any attention to the lone tank.
Although agreed before last opportunity to keep secrecy, still could not resist. The first unwitting victim of the raid was a German cyclist, who cheerfully pedaled in front of the tank. His flickering figure in the viewing slot took out the driver. The tank roared with its engine and rolled the hapless cyclist into the asphalt.
The tankers passed the railway crossing, the paths of the tram ring and ended up on Voroshilov Street. Here, at the distillery, a group of Germans met on the way of the tank: the Wehrmacht soldiers were carefully loading boxes with bottles of alcohol into the truck. When Alcoholics Anonymous was about fifty meters away, the right turret of the tank started working. The Nazis, like pins, fell from the car. After a couple of seconds, the tank pushed the truck, turning it upside down with its wheels. From the broken body, the savory smell of celebration began to spread around the area.
Not meeting resistance and alarms from the panic-scattered enemy, the Soviet in "stealth" mode went deep into the city's borders. In the area of ​​the city market, the tank turned onto the street. Lenin, where he met a column of motorcyclists.
The first car with a sidecar drove under the tank's armor on its own, where it was crushed along with the crew. The deadly ride has begun. Only for a moment, the faces of the Germans, twisted with horror, appeared in the driver's viewing slot, then disappearing under the tracks of the steel monster. Motorcycles in the tail of the column tried to turn around and escape from the approaching death, alas, came under fire from tower machine guns.

Having reeled on the tracks of the hapless bikers, the tank moved on, driving along the street. Soviet, tankers planted a fragmentation shell at a group of German soldiers standing at the theater. And then there was a slight hitch - when turning to Proletarskaya Street, the tankers unexpectedly discovered that the main street of the city was packed full of enemy manpower and equipment. Opening fire from all barrels, practically without aiming, the three-turret monster rushed forward, sweeping away all obstacles into a bloody vinaigrette.
Panic began among the Germans, which arose in connection with the emergency situation on the road created by the tank, as well as the general effect of surprise and illogicality of the appearance of heavy armored vehicles of the Red Army in the rear of the German troops, where nothing foreshadowed such an attack ...
The front part of the T-28 tank is equipped with three 7.62 DT machine guns (two turret, one course) and a short-barreled 76.2mm gun. The rate of fire of the latter is up to four rounds per minute. The rate of fire of machine guns is 600v / min.
Leaving traces of a military disaster behind it, the car drove all the way to the park, where it was greeted by a shot from the PaK 35/36 anti-tank 37-mm cannon.

It seems that this part of the city the Soviet tank first encountered more or less serious resistance. The shell carved sparks from the frontal armor. The Fritzes did not have time to shoot the second time - the tankers noticed an openly standing cannon in time and immediately reacted to the threat - a flurry of fire fell on the Pak 35/36, turning the gun and crew into a shapeless heap of scrap metal.
As a result of an unprecedented raid, the Nazis suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, but the main striking effect was to raise the resistance spirit of the inhabitants of Minsk, which contributed to maintaining the authority of the Red Army at the proper level. This factor was especially important in that initial period of the war, during serious defeats. among the surrounding population.
And our T-28 tank was leaving the Fritzes' lair along Moskovsky Prospekt. However, the disciplined Germans came out of a state of shock, overcame fear and tried to provide organized resistance to the Soviet tank that had broken through to their rear. In the area of ​​the old cemetery, the T-28 came under flanking fire from an artillery battery. The first salvo broke through the 20 mm side armor in the area of ​​the engine compartment. Someone screamed in pain, someone swore angrily. The burning tank continued to move until the last opportunity, all the while receiving new portions of German shells. The major ordered to leave the dying combat vehicle.

Senior Sergeant Malko climbed out through the driver's hatch in front of the tank and saw a wounded major emerge from the commander's hatch, firing from a service pistol. The sergeant managed to crawl to the fence when the remaining ammunition in the tank detonated. The turret of the tank was thrown into the air and it fell to its original place. In the commotion that arose and taking advantage of the significant smoke, Senior Sergeant Dmitry Malko managed to hide in the gardens.

Malko in the fall of the same year managed to return to the cadre formation of the combat units of the Red Army in his former military specialty. He managed to survive and go through the entire war. Surprisingly, in 1944, he drove into the liberated Minsk on a T-34 along the same Moskovsky Prospekt, along which he tried to escape from it in 41. Surprisingly, he saw his first tank, which he refused to abandon and destroy at Berezin, and which then with such difficulty the Wehrmacht soldiers were able to destroy. The tank stood in the same place where it was hit, the neat and orderly Germans for some reason did not begin to remove it from the road. They were good soldiers and knew how to value military prowess.

T-34: tank and tankers

Against the T-34, the German cars were shit.

Captain A. V. Maryevsky

“I could. I held out. Destroyed five buried tanks. They could not do anything because they were T-III, T-IV tanks, and I was in a thirty-four, the frontal armor of which their shells did not penetrate. "

Few tankers of the countries participating in World War II could repeat these words of the commander of the T-34 tank, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar, regarding their combat vehicles. The Soviet T-34 tank became a legend primarily because those people who sat at the levers and to sighting devices his cannons and machine guns. In the memoirs of the tankers, one can trace the thought expressed by the famous Russian military theorist A. A. Svechin: "If the importance of material resources in a war is very relative, then faith in them is of great importance."

Svechin passed as an infantry officer The great war 1914-1918, saw the debut on the battlefield of heavy artillery, airplanes and armored vehicles, and he knew what he was talking about. If soldiers and officers have faith in the equipment entrusted to them, then they will act bolder and more decisively, paving their way to victory. On the contrary, distrust, the willingness to give up mentally or a really weak weapon will lead to defeat. Of course, we are not talking about blind faith based on propaganda or speculation. Confidence in people was instilled by the design features that strikingly distinguished the T-34 from a number of combat vehicles of that time: the inclined arrangement of armor plates and the V-2 diesel engine.

The principle of increasing the effectiveness of the tank's protection due to the inclined arrangement of the armor sheets was understandable to anyone who studied geometry at school. “The T-34 had thinner armor than the Panthers and Tigers. Total thickness approx. 45 mm. But since it was located at an angle, the leg was about 90 mm, which made it difficult to break through, ”recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Alexander Sergeevich Burtsev. The use of geometric constructions in the defense system instead of the brute force of a simple increase in the thickness of the armor plates gave in the eyes of the T-34 crews an undeniable advantage to their tank over the enemy. “The arrangement of the armor plates for the Germans was worse, mostly vertical. This is, of course, a big minus. Our tanks had them at an angle, ”recalls the battalion commander, Captain Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov.

Of course, all these theses had not only theoretical but also practical substantiation. German anti-tank and tank guns with a caliber of up to 50 mm in most cases did not penetrate the upper frontal part of the T-34 tank. Moreover, even the sub-caliber shells of the 50-mm PAK-38 anti-tank gun and the 50-mm T-III tank gun with a barrel length of 60 calibers, which, according to trigonometric calculations, should have pierced the T-34's forehead, in reality ricocheted from the sloped armor of high hardness without causing any damage to the tank. Conducted in September-October 1942 by the Research Institute-48, a statistical study of combat damage to T-34 tanks that were being repaired at repair bases No. 1 and 2 in Moscow showed that out of 109 hits in the upper frontal part of the tank, 89% were safe, and dangerous accounted for guns with a caliber of 75 mm and above. Of course, with the advent of the Germans a large number 75-mm anti-tank and tank guns, the situation became more complicated. 75-mm shells were normalized (deployed at right angles to the armor upon impact), piercing the sloped armor of the T-34 hull's forehead already at a distance of 1200 m. 88-mm shells were just as insensitive to the slope of the armor anti-aircraft guns and cumulative ammunition... However, the share of 50-mm guns in the Wehrmacht until the battle at the Kursk Bulge was significant, and the belief in the sloped armor of the "thirty-four" was largely justified.

Any noticeable advantages over the T-34 armor were noted by tankmen only in the armor protection of British tanks, “... if the blank penetrated the turret, then the commander of the British tank and the gunner could remain alive, since practically no fragments were formed, and in the T-34 the armor crumbled, and those in the tower had little chance of surviving, ”recalls V. P. Bryukhov.

This was due to the exceptionally high nickel content in the armor of the British Matilda and Valentine tanks. If the Soviet 45-mm high-hardness armor contained 1.0-1.5% nickel, then the medium-hard armor of British tanks contained 3.0-3.5% nickel, which provided a slightly higher viscosity of the latter. At the same time, no modifications were made to the protection of T-34 tanks by the crews in the units. Just before the Berlin operation, according to Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Petrovich Schwebig, former deputy the commander of the brigade of the 12th Guards Tank Corps for the technical part, screens of metal bed nets were welded onto the tanks to protect them from faust cartridges. The well-known cases of shielding "thirty-fours" are the fruit of the creativity of repair shops and manufacturing plants. The same can be said for the painting of tanks. The tanks came from the factory painted in green color inside and outside. When preparing the tank for winter, the task of the deputy commanders of tank units for the technical part included painting the tanks with whitewash. The exception was the winter of 1944/45, when the war was raging across Europe. None of the veterans remembers wearing camouflage on tanks.

An even more obvious and inspiring design detail for the T-34 was the diesel engine. Most of those who were trained as a driver, radio operator or even a commander of a T-34 tank in civilian life in one way or another faced with fuel, at least with gasoline. They knew very well from personal experience that gasoline is volatile, flammable and burns with a bright flame. The quite obvious experiments with gasoline were used by the engineers who created the T-34. “In the midst of the dispute, the designer Nikolai Kucherenko used not the most scientific, but a clear example of the advantages of the new fuel at the factory yard. He took a lighted torch and brought it to a bucket of gasoline - the bucket instantly engulfed the flame. Then the same torch was lowered into a bucket of diesel fuel - the flame was extinguished like in water ... ”This experiment was projected on the effect of a shell hitting a tank that could set fire to fuel or even its vapors inside the car. Accordingly, the crew members of the T-34 were somewhat condescending to enemy tanks. “They were with a gasoline engine. This is also a big drawback, ”recalls senior sergeant-gunner Pyotr Ilyich Kirichenko. The same attitude was towards tanks supplied under Lend-Lease (“A lot of people died because a bullet hit him, and there was a petrol engine and nonsense armor there,” recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Yuri Maksovich Polyanovsky), and Soviet tanks and a self-propelled gun equipped with a carburetor engine (“Once the SU-76 came to our battalion. They were with gasoline engines - a real lighter… They all burned out in the first battles…” - VP Bryukhov recalls). The presence of a diesel engine in the engine compartment of the tank instilled in the crews the confidence that they had much less chances of accepting a terrible death from fire than the enemy, whose tanks were fueled with hundreds of liters of volatile and flammable gasoline. The neighborhood with large volumes of fuel (the number of buckets of which the tankers had to estimate every time the tank was refueled) was concealed by the thought that it would be more difficult for anti-tank cannon shells to set it on fire, and in the event of a fire, the tankers would have enough time to jump out of the tank.

However, in this case, the direct projection of the experiments with the bucket onto the tanks was not entirely justified. Moreover, statistically, tanks with diesel engines did not have advantages in fire safety in relation to cars with carburetor engines. According to statistics from October 1942, diesel T-34s burned even slightly more often than T-70 tanks fueled with aviation gasoline (23% versus 19%). Engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that is exactly the opposite of a household assessment of the possibilities of ignition. different types fuel. “The use by the Germans on a new tank, released in 1942, of a carburetor engine, rather than a diesel engine, can be explained by: [...] a very significant percentage of tank fires in combat conditions with diesel engines and their lack of significant advantages over carburetor engines in this respect, especially with the competent design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers. " Bringing the torch to a bucket of gasoline, the designer Kucherenko set fire to a vapor of volatile fuel. There were no vapors in the bucket over the diesel oil layer that were favorable for ignition by a torch. But this fact did not mean that diesel fuel would not ignite from a much more powerful means of ignition - a projectile hit. Therefore, the placement of fuel tanks in the fighting compartment of the T-34 tank did not at all increase the fire safety of the thirty-four in comparison with their peers, whose tanks were located in the rear of the hull and were much less likely to be hit. VP Bryukhov confirms what has been said: “When does the tank catch fire? When a projectile hits the fuel tank. And it burns when there is a lot of fuel. And by the end of the fighting there is no fuel, and the tank hardly burns. "

The tankers believed that the only advantage of the engines of German tanks over the T-34 engine was less noise. “The petrol engine is flammable on the one hand and quiet on the other. T-34, it not only roars, but also clicks its tracks, ”recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Arsentiy Konstantinovich Rodkin.

The power plant of the T-34 tank did not initially provide for the installation of mufflers on the exhaust pipes. They were brought to the stern of the tank without any sound-absorbing devices, roaring with the exhaust of a 12-cylinder engine. In addition to the noise, the powerful engine of the tank raised dust with its exhaust, devoid of a muffler. “The T-34 raises a terrible dust, because the exhaust pipes are directed downward,” recalls A. K. Rodkin.

The designers of the T-34 tank gave their brainchild two features that set it apart from the combat vehicles of allies and opponents. These features of the tank added confidence to the crew in their weapons. People went into battle with pride for the equipment entrusted to them. This was much more important than the actual effect of the slope of the armor or the real fire hazard of a tank with a diesel engine.

Tanks appeared as a means of protecting crews of machine guns and guns from enemy fire. The balance between tank protection and anti-tank artillery capabilities is rather shaky, artillery is constantly being improved, and the newest tank cannot feel safe on the battlefield. The powerful anti-aircraft and hull guns make this balance even more precarious. Therefore, sooner or later a situation arises when a shell hitting a tank penetrates the armor and turns the steel box into hell.

Good tanks solved this problem even after death, having received one or more hits, opening the way to salvation for people inside themselves. Unusual for tanks in other countries, the driver's hatch in the upper frontal part of the T-34 hull turned out to be quite convenient in practice for leaving the vehicle in critical situations. Driver-mechanic Sergeant Semyon Lvovich Aria recalls:

“The hatch was smooth, with rounded edges, and getting in and out of it was easy. Moreover, when you got up from the driver's seat, you already leaned out almost waist-deep. " Another advantage of the driver's hatch of the T-34 tank was the ability to fix it in several intermediate relatively "open" and "closed" positions. The hatch mechanism was quite simple. To facilitate opening, the heavy cast hatch (60 mm thick) was supported by a spring, the rod of which was a toothed rack. By moving the stopper from a tooth to a rack tooth, it was possible to rigidly fix the hatch without fear of breaking it on bumps in the road or battlefield. The driver-mechanics used this mechanism willingly and preferred to keep the hatch ajar. “Whenever possible, it is always better with an open hatch,” recalls V. P. Bryukhov. His words are confirmed by the company commander Senior Lieutenant Arkady Vasilyevich Maryevsky: "The mechanic's hatch is always open on the palm, firstly, everything is visible, and secondly, the air flow when the upper hatch is open ventilates the fighting compartment." Thus, a good overview was provided and the ability to quickly leave the car when a shell hit it. In general, the mechanic was, according to the tankers, in the most advantageous position. “The mechanic had the greatest chance of surviving. He sat low, there was sloping armor in front of him, ”recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar; according to PI Kirichenko: “The lower part of the building, as a rule, is hidden behind the folds of the terrain, it is difficult to get into it. And this one rises above the ground. Mostly they got into it. And perished more people who sit in the tower than those below. " It should be noted here that we are talking about hits that are dangerous for the tank. Statistically, in the initial period of the war, most of the hits fell on the hull of the tank. According to the above-mentioned NII-48 report, the hull accounted for 81% of the hits, and the turret 19%. However, more than half of the total number of hits were safe (blind): 89% of hits on the upper frontal part, 66% of hits on the lower frontal part and about 40% of hits on the side did not lead to through holes. Moreover, of the hits on the side, 42% of their total number fell on the engine and transmission compartments, the defeat of which was safe for the crew. The tower, on the other hand, was relatively easy to break through. The less durable cast armor of the turret weakly resisted even 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft cannon shells. The situation was worsened by the fact that the T-34's turret was hit by heavy guns with a high line of fire, for example, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as hits from long-barreled 75-mm and 50-mm guns of German tanks. The terrain screen, which the tankman was talking about, in the European theater of operations was about one meter. Half of this meter falls on the ground clearance, the rest covers about a third of the height of the T-34 tank hull. Most of the upper frontal part of the case is no longer covered by the terrain screen.

If the driver's hatch is unanimously assessed by veterans as convenient, then tankers are equally unanimous in their negative assessment of the turret hatch of early T-34 tanks with an oval turret, nicknamed the "pie" for its characteristic shape. VP Bryukhov says about him: “The big hatch is bad. It is very heavy, and it is difficult to open it. If it gets stuck, then that's it, no one will jump out. " The tank commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Evdokimovich Glukhov, echoes him: “The large hatch is very inconvenient. Very heavy". Combining hatches into one for two crew members sitting side by side, the gunner and the loader, was uncharacteristic for the world of tank building. Its appearance on the T-34 was caused not by tactical, but by technological considerations associated with the installation of a powerful gun in the tank. The turret of the predecessor of the T-34 on the conveyor of the Kharkov plant - the BT-7 tank - was equipped with two hatches, one for each of the crew members located in the turret. For a characteristic appearance with the hatches open, the BT-7 was nicknamed "Mickey Mouse" by the Germans. "Thirty-fours" inherited a lot from BT, but instead of a 45-mm cannon, the tank received a 76-mm gun, and the design of the tanks in the fighting compartment of the hull was changed. The need to dismantle the tanks and the massive cradle of the 76-mm gun during repairs forced the designers to combine the two turret hatches into one. The body of the T-34 gun with recoil devices was removed through a bolt-on lid in the turret aft niche, and the cradle with a toothed vertical guidance sector was retrieved through the turret hatch. Through the same hatch, the fuel tanks were also taken out, fixed in the fenders of the T-34 tank hull. All these difficulties were caused by the side walls of the turret sloped to the cannon mask. The cradle of the T-34 gun was wider and higher than the embrasure in the frontal part of the turret and could only be pulled back. The Germans removed the guns of their tanks along with his mask (in width almost equal to the width of the tower) forward. It must be said here that the designers of the T-34 paid much attention to the possibility of repairing the tank by the crew. Even ... ports for firing personal weapons on the sides and stern of the tower were adapted for this task. The port plugs were removed, and a small assembly crane was installed in the holes in the 45-mm armor to dismantle the engine or transmission. The Germans had devices on the tower for mounting such a "pocket" crane - "pilze" - appeared only in the final period of the war.

One should not think that, when installing the large hatch, the designers of the T-34 did not take into account the needs of the crew at all. In the USSR, before the war, it was believed that a large hatch would facilitate the evacuation of wounded crew members from a tank. However, combat experience, complaints from tankers about the heavy turret hatch forced the team of A.A. Morozov to switch to two turret hatches during the next modernization of the tank. The hexagonal tower, nicknamed the "nut", again received "Mickey Mouse ears" - two round hatches. Such towers were installed on T-34 tanks produced in the Urals (ChTZ in Chelyabinsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and UVZ in Nizhny Tagil) since the fall of 1942. The Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky continued to produce tanks with a “pie” until the spring of 1943. The task of removing the tanks on tanks with a "nut" was solved using a removable armored bulkhead between the hatches of the commander and gunner. The gun began to be removed according to the method proposed in order to simplify the production of the cast turret back in 1942 at the plant number 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" - the rear part of the turret was lifted with hoists from the shoulder strap, and the gun was pushed into the gap formed between the hull and the turret.

The tankers, in order not to get into the situation "I was looking for the latch with my hands without skin," preferred not to lock the hatch, securing it ... with a trouser belt. A. V. Bodnar recalls: “When I went into the attack, the hatch was closed, but not with the latch. I hooked one end of the trouser belt to the latch of the hatch, and the other - a couple of times wrapped around the hook that held the ammunition on the tower, so that if something - hit your head, the belt will come off and you will jump out. The same techniques were used by the commanders of the T-34 tanks with the commander's cupola. “On the commander's cupola there was a double-leaf hatch, which was locked with two latches on springs. Even a healthy person could hardly open them, but a wounded one would definitely not be able to. We removed these springs, leaving the latches. In general, we tried to keep the hatch open - it’s easier to jump out, ”recalls A. S. Burtsev. Note that not a single design bureau, either before or after the war, used the achievements of the soldier's ingenuity in one form or another. Tanks were still equipped with hatch latches in the turret and hull, which crews preferred to keep open in battle.

The daily crew of the thirty-four was replete with situations when the crew members were under the same load and each of them performed simple, but monotonous operations, not much different from the actions of a neighbor, such as digging a trench or refueling a tank with fuel and shells. However, the battle and the march were immediately distinguished from those under construction in front of the tank on the command "To the car!" people in overalls of two crew members, who had the main responsibility for the tank. The first was the commander of the vehicle, who, in addition to controlling the battle on the early T-34s, acted as the gunner of the gun: “If you are the commander of a T-34-76 tank, then you shoot yourself, command the radio yourself, do everything yourself” (V.P. Bryukhov).

The second person in the crew, on whom the lion's share of the responsibility for the tank, and therefore for the lives of his comrades in battle, fell, was the driver. The commanders of tanks and tank subunits rated the driver very highly in battle. “… An experienced driver-mechanic is half the success,” recalls N. Ye. Glukhov.

There were no exceptions to this rule. “The driver-mechanic Grigory Ivanovich Kryukov was 10 years older than me. Before the war he worked as a driver and had already managed to fight near Leningrad. Was injured. He felt the tank perfectly. I believe that only thanks to him we survived in the first battles, ”recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Georgy Nikolaevich Krivov.

The special position of the driver-mechanic in the "thirty-four" was due to the relatively complex controls that require experience and physical strength. To the greatest extent, this applied to the T-34 tanks of the first half of the war, on which there was a four-speed gearbox, which required the gears to move relative to each other with the engagement of the required pair of gears of the drive and driven shafts. Changing speeds in such a box was very difficult and required great physical strength. A. V. Maryevsky recalls: "You cannot turn on the gearshift lever with one hand, you had to help yourself with your knee." To facilitate gear shifting, gearboxes were developed with permanently meshed gears. The change in the gear ratio was no longer carried out by moving the gears, but by moving the small cam couplings sitting on the shafts. They moved along the shaft on splines and coupled with it the required pair of gears that were already in engagement from the moment the gearbox was assembled. A gearbox of this type had, for example, the pre-war Soviet motorcycles L-300 and AM-600, as well as the M-72 motorcycle produced since 1941, a licensed copy of the German BMW R71. The next step in the direction of improving the transmission was the introduction of synchronizers into the gearbox. These are devices that equalize the speeds of the cam clutches and gears with which they meshed when a particular gear was engaged. Shortly before engaging a low or high gear, the clutch entered into a friction clutch with a gear. So it gradually began to rotate at the same speed with the selected gear, and when the gear was switched on, the clutch between them was carried out silently and without impacts. An example of a gearbox with synchronizers is the Maybach-type gearbox of the German T-III and T-IV tanks. Even more advanced were the so-called planetary gearboxes of Czech-made tanks and Matilda tanks. It is not surprising that Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, on November 6, 1940, based on the results of tests of the first T-34s, sent a letter to the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars, which, to prepare for serial production the planetary transmission for the T-34 and KV. This will increase the average speed of the tanks and facilitate control. " They did not manage to do anything of this before the war, and in the first years of the war, the T-34 fought with the least perfect gearbox that existed at that time. "Thirty-fours" with a four-speed gearbox required very good training of driver mechanics. “If the driver is not trained, then instead of the first gear he can stick the fourth, because it is also back, or instead of the second - the third, which will lead to a breakdown of the gearbox. It is necessary to bring the switching skill to automatism so that he can switch with his eyes closed, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. In addition to the difficulty in shifting gears, the four-speed gearbox was characterized as weak and unreliable, often failing. The teeth of the gears that collided when shifting broke, even breaks in the crankcase were noted. The engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka, in a lengthy 1942 report on joint tests of domestic, captured and lend-leased equipment, gave the T-34 gearbox of the early series simply a derogatory assessment: “The gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, are not fully satisfy the requirements for modern combat vehicles, yielding to gearboxes of both allied tanks and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology. " As a result of these and other reports on the shortcomings of the "thirty-four", a GKO decree of June 5, 1942 "On improving the quality of T-34 tanks" was issued. As part of the implementation of this decree, by the beginning of 1943, the design department of plant No. 183 (the Kharkov plant evacuated to the Urals) developed a five-speed gearbox with constant gear engagement, which the tankers who fought on the T-34 say with such respect.

The constant engagement of the gears and the introduction of another gear greatly facilitated the control of the tank, and the radio operator no longer had to pick up and pull the lever together with the driver to change gear.

Another element of the T-34 transmission that made the combat vehicle dependent on the training of the driver was the main clutch, which connected the gearbox to the engine. This is how A.V. Bodnar describes the situation, after being wounded, he trained driver mechanics on the T-34: starts to move. The last third of the pedal must be released slowly so as not to tear, because if it tears, the car will slip and the friction clutch will warp. " The main part of the main dry friction clutch of the T-34 tank was a package of 8 driving and 10 driven discs (later, as part of improving the tank's transmission, it received 11 driving and 11 driven discs), pressed against each other by springs. Incorrect shutdown of the clutch with friction of the discs against each other, their heating and warping could lead to the failure of the tank. Such a breakdown was called "burn the clutch", although formally there were no flammable objects in it. Being ahead of other countries in the implementation in practice of solutions such as a 76-mm long-barreled gun and an inclined arrangement of armor, the T-34 tank still lagged noticeably behind Germany and other countries in the design of the transmission and steering mechanisms. On German tanks, which were the same age as the T-34, the main clutch was equipped with discs running in oil. This made it possible to more efficiently remove heat from the rubbing discs and greatly facilitated turning on and off the clutch. The situation was somewhat improved by a servomechanism, which was equipped with the pedal for turning off the main clutch according to the experience of the combat use of the T-34 in the initial period of the war. The design of the mechanism, despite the servo prefix that inspires some degree of reverence, was quite simple. The clutch pedal was held by a spring, which, in the process of pressing the pedal, passed the dead center and changed the direction of the force. When the tanker just pressed the pedal, the spring resisted pressing. At a certain moment, on the contrary, she began to help and pulled the pedal towards herself, providing the required speed of the wings. Before the introduction of these simple but necessary elements, the work of the second in the hierarchy of the crew, the tanker, was very difficult. “The driver-mechanic lost two or three kilograms in weight during the long march. I was all exhausted. It was, of course, very difficult, ”recalls PI Kirichenko. If on the march the driver's mistakes could lead to a delay on the way due to repairs of one duration or another, in extreme cases to the abandonment of the tank by the crew, then in battle the failure of the T-34 transmission due to driver errors could lead to fatal consequences. On the contrary, the skill of the driver and vigorous maneuvering could ensure the survival of the crew under heavy fire.

The development of the design of the T-34 tank during the war went primarily in the direction of improving the transmission. In the above-cited report of the engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1942, there were the following words: “In recent times in connection with the strengthening of anti-tank equipment, maneuverability is at least no less a guarantee of the invulnerability of a vehicle than powerful armor. The combination of good armor on the vehicle and the speed of its maneuver is the main means of protecting a modern combat vehicle from anti-tank artillery fire. " The advantage in armor protection, lost by the final period of the war, was compensated by the improvement of the thirty-four's driving performance. The tank began to move faster both on the march and on the battlefield, it was better to maneuver. To the two features that the tankers believed in (the slope of the armor and the diesel engine), a third was added - speed. A.K. Rodkin, who fought on the T-34-85 tank at the end of the war, put it this way: “The tankers had this saying: 'Armor is bullshit, but our tanks are fast.' We had an advantage in speed. The Germans had petrol tanks, but their speed was not very high. "

The first task of the 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun was "the destruction of tanks and other motorized means of the enemy." Veteran tankers unanimously call German tanks the main and most serious enemy. In the initial period of the war, the crews of the T-34 confidently went to a duel with any German tanks, rightly believing that a powerful cannon and reliable armor protection will ensure success in battle. The appearance on the battlefield of "Tigers" and "Panthers" changed the situation to the opposite. Now German tanks received a "long arm" that allows them to fight without worrying about camouflage. “Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can take their armor head-on only from 500 meters, they stood in an open place,” recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznoe. Even sub-caliber shells for the 76-mm cannon did not give advantages in a duel of this kind, since they pierced only 90 mm of homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, while the frontal armor of the T-VIH "Tiger" had a thickness of 102 mm. The transition to the 85-mm cannon immediately changed the situation, allowing Soviet tankers to fight new German tanks at distances of over a kilometer. “Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one here,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. The powerful 85-mm gun allowed the T-34 crews to fight their old acquaintances T-IV at a distance of 1200 - 1300 m. An example of such a battle on the Sandomierz bridgehead in the summer of 1944 can be found in the memoirs of N. Ya. Zheleznov. The first T-34 tanks with the 85mm D-5T cannon left the assembly line at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant # 112 in January 1944. The start of mass production of the T-34-85 already with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon was laid in March 1944, when tanks of a new type were built on the flagship of the Soviet tank building during the war, factory number 183 in Nizhny Tagil. Despite a certain haste in re-equipping the tank with an 85-mm gun, the 85-mm gun, which entered the mass production, was considered reliable by the crews and did not cause any complaints.

Vertical guidance of the T-34 gun was carried out manually, and an electric drive was introduced to rotate the turret from the very beginning of the tank's production. However, tankers in battle preferred to rotate the turret manually. “Hands lie with a cross on the mechanisms for turning the turret and aiming the gun. The tower could be turned by an electric motor, but in battle you forget about it. You twist it with the handle, ”recalls G. N. Krivov. This is easy to explain. On the T-34-85, which G. N. Krivov talks about, the handle for turning the turret manually simultaneously served as a lever for the electric drive. To switch from manual to electric drive, it was necessary to turn the turret rotation handle vertically and move it back and forth, forcing the engine to rotate the turret in the desired direction. In the heat of battle, this was forgotten, and the handle was used only for manual rotation. In addition, as VP Bryukhov recalls: "You have to be able to use the electric turn, otherwise you will jerk, and then you have to turn it over."

The only inconvenience that caused the introduction of the 85-mm cannon was the need to carefully monitor so that the long barrel did not touch the ground on bumps in the road or battlefield. “The T-34-85 has a barrel length of four meters or more. In the slightest ditch, the tank can peck and grab the ground with its barrel. If you shoot after that, the trunk opens with petals in different directions, like a flower, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. The full barrel length of the 85-mm tank gun of the 1944 model was more than four meters, 4645 mm. The appearance of an 85-mm gun and new shots to it also led to the fact that the tank stopped exploding with the breakdown of the turret, “... they (shells. -A.M.) do not detonate, but explode in turn. On the T-34-76, if one shell exploded, then the entire ammunition rack detonates, ”says A. K. Rodkin. This to some extent increased the chances of the T-34's crew members for survival, and from the photos and newsreels of the war, the picture, sometimes flickering in the frames of 1941-1943, disappeared from the T-34 with the turret lying next to the tank or turned over after falling back onto the tank. ...

If German tanks were the most dangerous enemy of the T-34s, then the T-34s themselves were effective remedy defeat not only armored vehicles, but also the guns and manpower of the enemy, interfering with the advancement of their infantry. Most of the tankers, whose memories are given in the book, have, at best, several units of enemy armored vehicles to their credit, but at the same time, the number of enemy infantrymen shot from a cannon and machine gun is estimated at tens and hundreds of people. The ammunition load of the T-34 tanks consisted mainly of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Standard ammunition "thirty-four" with a turret "nut" in 1942 - 1944. consisted of 100 shots, including 75 high-explosive fragmentation and 25 armor-piercing (of which 4 subcaliber ones since 1943). The standard ammunition load of the T-34-85 tank included 36 high-explosive fragmentation rounds, 14 armor-piercing and 5 subcaliber rounds. The balance between armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation projectiles largely reflects the conditions in which the T-34 fought during the attack. Under heavy artillery fire, tankers in most cases had little time for aimed fire and fired on the move and short stops, counting on suppressing the enemy with a mass of shots or hitting the target with several shells. G. N. Krivov recalls: “Experienced guys who have already been in battles tell us: 'Never stop. Hit on the move. Heaven and earth, where the projectile is flying - hit, press. " You asked how many shells I fired in the first battle? Half of the ammunition. Hit, hit ... "

As is often the case, practice suggested techniques that were not provided for by any statutes and methodological manuals. A typical example is the use of the clanking of a closing bolt as an internal alarm in a tank. VP Bryukhov says: "When the crew is well-coordinated, the mechanic is strong, he hears himself which projectile is driven, the click of the bolt wedge, which is also heavy, more than two poods ..." The guns installed on the T-34 tank were equipped with a semi-automatic opening shutter. This system worked as follows. When fired, the gun rolled back, after absorbing the recoil energy, the recoil pad returned the body of the gun to its original position. Just before returning, the shutter mechanism lever ran onto the copier on the gun carriage, and the wedge went down, the ejector legs associated with it knocked out an empty shell sleeve from the breech. The loader sent the next projectile, knocking down with its mass the bolt wedge held on the legs of the ejector. A heavy part, under the influence of powerful springs, abruptly returning to its original position, produced a rather harsh sound that overlapped the roar of the engine, the clanking of the chassis and the sounds of battle. Hearing the clang of the closing bolt, the driver, without waiting for the command "Short!", Chose a fairly flat area of ​​the terrain for a short stop and an aimed shot. The location of the ammunition in the tank did not cause any inconvenience to the loaders. The shells could be taken both from the stowage in the turret and from the "suitcases" on the floor of the fighting compartment.

The target that did not always appear in the crosshair of the sight was worthy of a shot from a gun. The commander of the T-34-76 or the gunner of the T-34-85 fired at the German infantrymen who were running or found themselves in the open space from a machine gun paired with a cannon. The course machine gun installed in the hull could only be effectively used in close combat, when the tank immobilized for one reason or another was surrounded by enemy infantry with grenades and Molotov cocktails. “This is a melee weapon when the tank was hit and it stopped. The Germans are coming up and you can mow them, be healthy, ”recalls V. P. Bryukhov. On the move, it was almost impossible to shoot from a course machine gun, since the telescopic sight of the machine gun provided insignificant opportunities for observation and aiming. “Actually, I didn't have any scope. I have such a hole there, you can't see a damn thing in it, ”recalls PI Kirichenko. Perhaps the most effective course machine gun was used when removed from a ball mount and used for firing from a bipod outside the tank. “And it began. They pulled out a frontal machine gun - they came at us from the rear. The tower was deployed. The submachine gunner is with me. We put a machine gun on the parapet, we are firing, ”recalls Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuzmichev. In fact, the tank received a machine gun that could be used by the crew as the most effective personal weapon.

The installation of the radio on the T-34-85 tank in the tower next to the tank commander was supposed to finally turn the radio operator into the most useless member of the tank's crew, the "passenger". The ammunition load of the machine guns of the T-34-85 tank has more than halved compared to the earlier production tanks, to 31 discs. However, the realities of the final period of the war, when the German infantry had faust cartridges, on the contrary, increased the usefulness of the gunner of the course machine gun. “By the end of the war, he became needed, protecting from the 'faustics', clearing the way. So what, what is hard to see, sometimes the mechanic would tell him. If you want to see, you will see, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin.

In such a situation, the space freed up after moving the radio into the tower was used to accommodate the ammunition. Most (27 out of 31) disks for the DT machine gun in the T-34-85 were placed in the control compartment, next to the shooter, who became the main consumer of machine gun cartridges.

In general, the appearance of faust patrons increased the role small arms"Thirty-fours". They even began to practice shooting at "Faustniks" from a pistol with the hatch open. The regular personal weapons of the crews were TT pistols, revolvers, captured pistols and one PPSh submachine gun, for which a place was provided for stowing equipment in the tank. The submachine gun was used by crews when leaving the tank and in battle in the city, when the angle of elevation of the cannon and machine guns was not enough.

As the German anti-tank artillery strengthened, visibility became an increasingly important component of a tank's survivability. The difficulties that the commander and driver of the T-34 tank experienced in their combat work were largely associated with the meager capabilities of monitoring the battlefield. The first "thirty-fours" had mirrored periscopes at the driver and in the turret of the tank. Such a device was a box with mirrors installed at an angle at the top and bottom, and the mirrors were not glass (they could crack from the impact of shells), but made of polished steel. The image quality in such a periscope is not hard to imagine. The same mirrors were in the periscopes on the sides of the turret, which were one of the main means of observing the battlefield for the tank commander. In the letter from SK Timoshenko, cited above, dated November 6, 1940, there are the following words: "The observation devices of the driver and radio operator should be replaced with more modern ones." The first year of the war, the tankers fought with mirrors, later instead of mirrors they installed prismatic observation devices, that is, a solid glass prism went to the entire height of the periscope. At the same time, the limited visibility, despite the improvement in the characteristics of the periscopes themselves, often forced the driver-mechanics of the T-34 to drive with open hatches. “The triplexes on the driver's hatch were completely ugly. They were made of hideous yellow or green plexiglass, which gave a completely distorted, wavy picture. It was impossible to disassemble anything through such a triplex, especially in a jumping tank. Therefore, the war was fought with hatches ajar on the palm, ”recalls S. L. Aria. AV Marievsky also agrees with him, pointing out that the driver's triplexes were easily splashed with mud.

Specialists of NII-48 in the fall of 1942, based on the results of the analysis of damage to armor protection, made the following conclusion: “A significant percentage of dangerous damage to T-34 tanks on side parts, and not on frontal ones (out of 432 hits into the hull of the examined tanks, 270 were on its sides. - A. I.) can be explained either by the poor acquaintance of the tank teams with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection, or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot detect the firing point in time and turn the tank into a position that is least dangerous for penetrating its armor.

It is necessary to improve the familiarity of tank crews with the tactical characteristics of the armoring of their vehicles and provide the best overview of them(highlighted by me - A. I.) ".

The task of providing a better view was solved in several stages. Polished steel mirrors were also removed from the commander's and loader's observation devices. The periscopes on the cheekbones of the T-34 turret were replaced by slots with glass blocks to protect against shrapnel. This happened during the transition to the "nut" tower in the fall of 1942. New devices allowed the crew to organize all-round observation of the situation: “The driver is watching forward and to the left. You, commander, try to observe around. And the radio operator and the loader are more on the right ”(VP Bryukhov). On the T-34-85, MK-4 observation devices were installed at the gunner and loader. Simultaneous observation of several directions made it possible to timely notice the danger and adequately respond to it with fire or maneuver.

The problem of providing a good view for the tank commander was solved the longest. The clause on the introduction of the commander's cupola on the T-34, which was present in the letter to S.K. Timoshenko in 1940, was completed almost two years after the start of the war. After long experiments with attempts to squeeze the freed tank commander into the "nut" turret, turrets on the T-34 began to be installed only in the summer of 1943. The commander retained the gunner's function, but now he could raise his head from the sight's eyepiece and look around. The main advantage of the turret was its all-round visibility. “The commander's cupola revolved around, the commander saw everything and, without firing, could control the fire of his tank and maintain communication with others,” recalls A. V. Bodnar. To be precise, it was not the turret itself that rotated, but its roof with a periscope observation device. Prior to that, in 1941 - 1942, the tank commander, in addition to a "mirror" on the side of the turret, had a periscope, formally called a periscope sight. By rotating his vernier, the commander could provide himself with a view of the battlefield, but very limited. “In the spring of 1942, there was a commander's panorama on KB and on the thirty-fours. I could rotate it and see everything around, but still it is a very small sector, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. The commander of the T-34-85 tank with the ZIS-S-53 cannon, freed from the gunner's duties, received, in addition to the commander's cupola with slots along the perimeter, his own prismatic periscope rotating in the hatch - MK-4, which made it possible to look even backwards. But among tankers there is also such an opinion: “I did not use the commander's cupola. I always kept the hatch open. Because those who closed them burned down. We didn’t have time to jump out, ”recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.

Without exception, all interviewed tankers admire the sights of German tank guns. As an example, let us cite the memoirs of VP Bryukhov: “We have always noted the high-quality Zeiss optics of sights. And until the end of the war, it was of high quality. We didn't have such optics. The sights themselves were more convenient than ours. We have a reticle in the form of a triangle, and there are risks from it to the right and left. They had these divisions, corrections for the wind, for range, something else. " It must be said here that in terms of information, there was no fundamental difference between the Soviet and German telescopic sights of the gun. The gunner could see the aiming mark and on either side of it "fences" of corrections for the angular velocity. There was a range correction in the Soviet and German sights, only it was introduced in various ways. In the German sight, the gunner rotated the pointer, placing it opposite the radially located distance scale. Each type of projectile had its own sector. Soviet tank builders went through this stage in the 1930s; the sight of the three-turret T-28 tank had a similar design. In "thirty-four" the distance was set by the sight thread moving along the vertically located range scales. So functionally the Soviet and German sights did not differ. The difference was in the quality of the optics itself, especially deteriorated in 1942 in connection with the evacuation of the Izyum optical glass plant. The real disadvantages of telescopic sights of the early "thirty-fours" can be attributed to their alignment with the bore of the gun. Aiming the gun vertically, the tanker was forced to rise or fall in his place, keeping his eyes at the eyepiece of the sight moving with the gun. Later, on the T-34-85, a "breaking" sight, characteristic of German tanks, was introduced, the eyepiece of which was fixed, and the lens followed the gun barrel due to a hinge on the same axis with the cannon trunnions.

Deficiencies in the design of observation devices adversely affected the habitability of the tank. The need to keep the driver's hatch open forced the latter to sit at the levers, “taking, moreover, on his chest a stream of chilling wind sucked in by the fan turbine roaring behind him” (S. L. Aria). In this case, a "turbine" is a fan on the engine shaft that sucks in air from the crew compartment through a flimsy engine baffle.

A typical complaint to Soviet-made military equipment from both foreign and domestic specialists was the Spartan situation inside the vehicle. “As a disadvantage, one can single out the complete lack of comfort for the crew. I climbed into American and British tanks. There the crew was in more comfortable conditions: the inside of the tanks were painted with light paint, the seats were semi-soft with armrests. There was nothing of this on the T-34, ”recalls S. L. Aria.

There were really no armrests on the crew seats in the T-34-76 and T-34-85 turrets. They were only on the seats of the driver and the gunner-radio operator. However, the armrests themselves on the crew seats were a detail characteristic mainly of American technology. Neither British nor German tanks (with the exception of the "Tiger") had no armrests in the turret.

But there were also real design flaws. One of the problems faced by the tank builders of the 1940s was the penetration of gunpowder gases from guns of ever increasing power into the tank. After the shot, the bolt opened, ejected the sleeve, and gases from the barrel of the gun and the discarded sleeve went into the fighting compartment of the vehicle. “... You shout:“ armor-piercing! ”,“ Fragmentation! ”You look, and he (the loader. -A.M.) lies on the ammo rack. I was burned with gunpowder gases and lost consciousness. When a tough fight, hardly anyone could stand it. All the same, you get drunk, "recalls V. P. Bryukhov.

Electric exhaust fans were used to remove powder gases and ventilate the fighting compartment. The first T-34s inherited one fan in the front of the turret from the BT tank. In a turret with a 45-mm gun, it looked appropriate, since it was located almost above the breech of the gun. In the T-34 turret, the fan was not above the breech, smoking after the shot, but above the gun barrel. Its effectiveness in this regard was questionable. But in 1942, at the peak of the shortage of components, the tank lost even that - T-34s left the factories with empty turrets, there were simply no fans.

During the modernization of the tank with the installation of the "nut" tower, the fan moved to the rear of the tower, closer to the area where the powder gases accumulated. The T-34-85 tank had already received two fans in the rear of the turret; the larger caliber of the gun required intensive ventilation of the fighting compartment. But during the tense battle, the fans did not help. Partially, the problem of protecting the crew from powder gases was solved by blowing the barrel with compressed air ("Panther"), but it was impossible to blow through the sleeve that spreads suffocating smoke. According to the memoirs of G. N. Krivov, experienced tankers advised to immediately throw the cartridge case through the loader's hatch. The problem was radically solved only after the war, when an ejector was introduced into the design of the guns, which “pumped out” gases from the barrel of the gun after the shot, even before the shutter was opened by automatic controls.

The T-34 tank was in many ways a revolutionary design, and like any transitional model, it combined novelties and forced, soon outdated, solutions. One of these solutions was the introduction of a radio operator gunner into the crew. The main function of the tanker sitting at the ineffective course machine gun was the maintenance of the tank radio station. On early "thirty-fours" the radio station was installed on the right side of the control compartment, next to the radio operator gunner. The need to keep a person in the crew engaged in setting up and maintaining the radio's performance was a consequence of the imperfection of communication technology in the first half of the war. The point was not that it was necessary to work with a key: the Soviet tank radio stations on the T-34 did not have a telegraph operating mode, they could not transmit dashes and dots in Morse code. The radio operator was introduced, since the main consumer of information from neighboring vehicles and from higher levels of control, the tank commander, was simply not able to maintain the radio. “The station was unreliable. The radio operator is a specialist, and the commander is not such a great specialist. In addition, when hit on the armor, a wave was lost, the lamps were out of order, ”recalls V. P. Bryukhov. It should be added that the commander of the T-34 with the 76-mm cannon combined the functions of the tank commander and gunner and was too busy to deal with even a simple and convenient radio station. The allocation of a separate person to work with a walkie-talkie was typical for other countries participating in the Second World War. For example, on the French Somua S-35 tank, the commander performed the functions of a gunner, loader and tank commander, but there was a radio operator, even freed from machine gun maintenance.

In the initial period of the war, "thirty-fours" were equipped with radio stations 71-TK-Z, and even then not all machines. The last fact should not be embarrassing, such a situation was common in the Wehrmacht, the radio frequency of which is usually greatly exaggerated. In reality, the commanders of the subunits from the platoon and above had transceivers. In February 1941, in a light tank company, Fu. 5 were installed on three T-IVs and five T-IIIs, and on two T-IVs and twelve T-IIIs, only Fu receivers were installed. 2. In a company of medium tanks, the transceivers had five T-IV and three T-III, and two T-II and nine T-IV - only receivers. On T-I Fu transceivers. 5 were not installed at all, with the exception of the special command kIT-Bef. Wg. l. In the Red Army, there was essentially a similar concept of "radium" and "linear" tanks. The crews of "line" tanks had to act, observing the commander's maneuvers, or receive orders from flags. The place for the radio station on the "linear" tanks was filled with disks for the DT machine gun shops, 77 disks with a capacity of 63 rounds each instead of 46 on the "radio" one. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 671 "line" T-34 tanks and 221 "radio" ones.

But the main problem of communication means of T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942. it was not so much their quantity as the quality of the 71-TK-Z stations themselves. Tankers assessed its capabilities as very moderate. “On the move, she took about 6 kilometers” (PI Kirichenko). The same opinion is expressed by other tankers. “Radio station 71-TK-Z, as I remember now, is a complex, unstable radio station. She very often broke down, and it was very difficult to put her in order, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. At the same time, the radio station to some extent compensated for the information vacuum, since it made it possible to listen to reports broadcast from Moscow, the famous "From the Soviet Information Bureau ..." in the voice of Levitan. A serious deterioration in the situation was observed during the evacuation of radio equipment factories, when from August 1941 the production of tank radio stations was practically stopped until mid-1942.

As the evacuated enterprises returned to service by the middle of the war, there was a tendency towards 100% radioification of tank forces. The crews of the T-34 tanks received a new radio station, developed on the basis of the aircraft RSI-4, -9R, and later its modernized versions, 9RS and 9RM. It was much more stable in operation due to the use of quartz frequency generators in it. The radio station was of English origin and was produced for a long time using components supplied under Lend-Lease. On the T-34-85, the radio station migrated from the control compartment to the fighting compartment, to the left wall of the tower, where the commander, freed from the gunner's duties, now began to maintain it. Nevertheless, the concepts of "linear" and "radio" tank remained.

In addition to communicating with the outside world, each tank had intercom equipment. The reliability of the intercom of the early T-34s was low, the main means of signaling between the commander and the driver were boots mounted on the shoulders. “The intercom worked disgustingly. Therefore, communication was carried out with my feet, that is, I had the boots of the tank commander on my shoulders, he pressed on my left or right shoulder, respectively, I turned the tank left or right, ”recalls S. L. Aria. The commander and the loader could talk, although more often the communication took place with gestures: "He put his fist under the loader's nose, and he already knows that it is necessary to load with an armor-piercing one, and a splayed palm with fragmentation." The intercom TPU-Zbis installed on the later T-34 series worked much better. “The internal tank intercom was mediocre on the T-34-76. There I had to command my boots and hands, but on the T-34-85 it was already excellent, ”recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. Therefore, the commander began to give the driver-mechanic orders by voice over the intercom - the T-34-85 commander no longer had the technical ability to put his boots on his shoulders - the gunner separated him from the control compartment.

Speaking about the communications equipment of the T-34 tank, the following should also be noted. From films to books and back travels the story of the call by the commander of a German tank of our tanker to a duel in broken Russian. This is completely untrue. Since 1937, all Wehrmacht tanks used the 27 - 32 MHz range, none of which overlapped with the radio range of Soviet tank radio stations - 3.75 - 6.0 MHz. Only the command tanks were equipped with a second shortwave radio station. It had a range of 1 - 3 MHz, again incompatible with the range of our tank radio stations.

The commander of a German tank battalion, as a rule, had something to do other than challenges to a duel. In addition, tanks of obsolete types were often commanders, and in the initial period of the war - without weapons at all, with mock-ups of guns in a fixed turret.

The engine and its systems practically did not cause any complaints from the crews, in contrast to the transmission. “I'll tell you frankly, the T-34 is the most reliable tank. Sometimes, he stopped, something like that is not in order. The oil struck. Hose is loose. For this, a thorough inspection of the tanks was always carried out before the march, ”recalls A. S. Burtsev. A massive fan mounted in the same block with the main clutch required caution in engine control. Errors of the driver could lead to the destruction of the fan and the failure of the tank.

Also, some difficulties were caused by the initial period of operation of the resulting tank, getting used to the characteristics of a particular instance of the T-34 tank. “Each vehicle, each tank, each tank gun, each engine had its own unique characteristics. They cannot be recognized in advance, they can only be identified in the course of everyday use. At the front, we ended up in unfamiliar cars. The commander does not know what kind of battle his cannon has. The mechanic does not know what his diesel can and cannot. Of course, at the factories, the guns of the tanks were shot at and a 50-kilometer run was carried out, but this was completely insufficient. Of course, we tried to get to know our vehicles better before the battle, and for this we used every opportunity, "recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.

Tankers faced significant technical difficulties when doing the engine and gearbox docking with the power plant during the repair of the tank in the field. It was. In addition to replacing or repairing the gearbox itself and the engine, the gearbox had to be removed from the tank when dismantling the side clutches. After returning to the site or replacing the engine and gearbox, it was required to install in the tank relative to each other with high accuracy. According to the repair manual for the T-34 tank, the accuracy of the installation was supposed to be 0.8 mm. For the installation of the units, which were moved with the help of 0.75 ton hoists, this precision required an investment of time and effort.

Of the entire complex of components and assemblies of the power plant, only the engine air filter had design flaws that required serious revision. The old type filter, installed on T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942, poorly cleaned the air and interfered with the normal operation of the engine, which led to rapid wear of the V-2. “The old air filters were ineffective, took up a lot of space in the engine compartment, and had a large turbine. They often had to be cleaned, even when not walking on a dusty road. And “Cyclone” was very good, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. Filters "Cyclone" showed themselves excellently in 1944 - 1945, when Soviet tank crews fought hundreds of kilometers. “If the air cleaner was cleaned according to the regulations, the engine was running well. But during battles, it is not always possible to do everything right. If the air cleaner does not clean enough, the oil changes at the wrong time, the gimp is not washed out and allows dust to pass through, then the engine wears out quickly, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. "Cyclones" made it possible, even in the absence of time for maintenance, to undergo a whole operation until the engine failed.

The tankers are invariably positive about the duplicated engine starting system. In addition to the traditional electric starter, the tank had two 10-liter compressed air cylinders. The air start system made it possible to start the engine even if the electric starter failed, which often occurred in battle from the impact of shells.

Track chains were the most frequently repaired element of the T-34 tank. The trucks were a spare part with which the tank even went into battle. The caterpillars sometimes broke on the march, were broken by shell hits. “The caterpillars were torn, even without bullets, without shells. When soil gets between the rollers, the caterpillar, especially when turning, is stretched to such an extent that the fingers and the tracks themselves cannot withstand, ”recalls A. V. Maryevsky. Repair and tensioning of the tracks were inevitable companions of the combat work of the machine. At the same time, the tracks were a serious unmasking factor. “Thirty-four, it not only roars with a diesel engine, it also clicks with caterpillars. If the T-34 is approaching, then you will hear the clatter of the tracks, and then the engine. The fact is that the teeth of the working tracks must exactly fall between the rollers on the drive wheel, which, while rotating, captures them. And when the caterpillar stretched, developed, became longer, the distance between the teeth increased, and the teeth hit the roller, causing a characteristic sound, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. The forced technical solutions of wartime, primarily rollers without rubber tires around the perimeter, contributed to the increase in the noise level of the tank. “... Unfortunately, Stalingrad's thirty-fours came, which had road wheels without bandages. They rumbled terribly, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. These were the so-called rollers with internal shock absorption. The first rollers of this type, sometimes called "locomotive", began to produce the Stalingrad plant (STZ), and even before the really serious interruptions in the supply of rubber began. The early onset of cold weather in the fall of 1941 led to downtime for frozen rivers of barges with rollers, which were sent along the Volga from Stalingrad to the Yaroslavl Tire Plant. The technology provided for the manufacture of a bandage on special equipment already at the finished skating rink. Large parties finished rollers from Yaroslavl got stuck on the way, which forced STZ engineers to look for a replacement for them, which was a solid cast roller with a small shock-absorbing ring inside it, closer to the hub. When the interruptions in the supply of rubber began, other factories took advantage of this experience, and from the winter of 1941 - 1942 until the fall of 1943, T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines, the undercarriage of which consisted entirely or mostly of rollers with internal depreciation. Since the fall of 1943, the problem of the lack of rubber has finally become a thing of the past, and the T-34-76 tanks have completely returned to rollers with rubber tires.

All T-34-85 tanks were produced with rollers with rubber tires. This significantly reduced the noise level of the tank, providing relative comfort to the crew and making it difficult for the enemy to detect the T-34s.

It is especially worth mentioning that during the war years, the role of the T-34 tank in the Red Army has changed. At the beginning of the war, "thirty-fours" with an imperfect transmission, unable to withstand long marches, but well-armored, were ideal tanks for direct support of the infantry. During the war, the tank lost its armor advantage at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. By the fall of 1943 - early 1944, the T-34 tank was a relatively easy target for 75-mm tank and anti-tank guns, it was unambiguously deadly for it to be hit by shells from 88-mm Tigers guns, anti-aircraft guns and PAK-43 anti-tank guns.

But elements that were not given due importance before the war or simply did not have time to bring to an acceptable level were steadily improved and even completely replaced. First of all, this is the power plant and transmission of the tank, from which they achieved stable and trouble-free operation. At the same time, all these elements of the tank retained good maintainability and ease of use. All this allowed the T-34 to do things that were unrealistic for the T-34s of the first year of the war. “For example, from near Jelgava, moving through East Prussia, we covered more than 500 km in three days. The T-34 could withstand such marches normally, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. For T-34 tanks in 1941, a 500-kilometer march would have been almost fatal. In June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of D.I. A. V. Bodnar, who fought in 1941-1942, assesses the T-34 in comparison with German tanks: “From the point of view of operation, German armored vehicles were more perfect, they were out of order less often. For the Germans, it cost nothing to walk 200 km, on the thirty-four you will definitely lose something, something will break. The technological equipment of their machines was stronger, and the combat equipment was worse. "

By the fall of 1943, the Thirty-fours became an ideal tank for independent mechanized formations designed for deep penetrations and detours. They became the main fighting vehicle of tank armies - the main tools for offensive operations colossal proportions. In these operations, the main type of action for the T-34 was marches with open hatches of driver mechanics, and often with headlights on. The tanks traveled hundreds of kilometers, intercepting the escape routes of the encircled German divisions and corps.

In fact, in 1944-1945, the situation of the "blitzkrieg" of 1941 was mirrored, when the Wehrmacht reached Moscow and Leningrad on tanks with not the best at that time characteristics of armor and weapons, but mechanically very reliable. Likewise, in the final period of the war, the T-34-85 covered hundreds of kilometers with deep sweeps and detours, and the Tigers and Panthers trying to stop them massively failed due to breakdowns and were thrown by their crews due to lack of fuel. The symmetry of the picture was broken, perhaps, only by the weapons. In contrast to the German tankmen of the "blitzkrieg" period, the crews of the "thirty-fours" had an adequate means of dealing with enemy tanks superior in armor protection - an 85-mm cannon. Moreover, each commander of the T-34-85 tank received a reliable radio station, which was quite perfect for that time, which made it possible to play against German "cats" as a team.

The T-34s, which entered the battle in the early days of the war near the border, and the T-34s, which burst into the streets of Berlin in April 1945, although they had the same name, were significantly different both externally and internally. But both in the initial period of the war, and at its final stage, the tankers saw in the "thirty-four" a machine in which they could believe. At first, these were the slope of armor that reflected enemy shells, a diesel engine that was resistant to fire, and an all-crushing weapon. In the period of victories, this is high speed, reliability, stable communication and a cannon that allows itself to stand up for itself.