Who were the Bolsheviks? Who are the Bolsheviks and what did they stand for

the former (until Nov. 1952) name is theoretical. and politic. journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Communist".

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

Bolsheviks

the most radical faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. According to V.I. Lenin, Bolshevism as a trend of political thought and as a political party emerged in 1903 at the Second Congress of the RSDLP. Disputes on ideological, theoretical, tactical and organizational issues split the party. The majority of congress delegates in the election of the central organs of the party supported V.I. Lenin. His supporters began to be called Bolsheviks, and opponents - Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks insisted that the struggle for the implementation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is the party’s immediate task (minimum program) and that the real transformation of Russia is possible only if the socialist revolution is won (maximum program). The Mensheviks believed that Russia was not ready for a socialist revolution, that at least 100-200 years should pass before the forces capable of carrying out socialist transformations matured in the country. The Bolsheviks considered the most important condition for building socialism to be the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the most progressive, in their opinion, class capable of protecting the interests of the whole society and directing revolutionary forces to build socialism. Their opponents pointed out that the establishment of a dictatorship of one class is contrary to democratic principles, while referring to the experience of the "old" European Social Democratic parties, whose programs did not mention the dictatorship of the working class. The Bolsheviks believed that the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is possible only with the union of the proletariat with the peasantry. Therefore, they insisted that the main demands of the peasants be included in the party program. The leaders of the Mensheviks, referring to the experience of revolutionary populism, exaggerated the conservatism of the peasantry (see “going to the people”), argued that the main ally interested in the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution would be the liberal bourgeoisie, capable of taking power and governing the country. Therefore, they were against including the demands of the peasantry in the program and were ready to cooperate with the liberal part of the bourgeoisie. The special position of the Bolsheviks was also manifested in the discussion on organizational issues. The Bolshevik concept of the party as an illegal, centralized organization of professional revolutionaries, shackled by iron discipline, the Mensheviks contrasted their vision of an organization in which there was a place for everyone who shared social democratic ideas and was ready to support the party in different ways. This also traced the line of cooperation with liberal forces, but the Bolsheviks recognized as party members only those who directly and personally participated in revolutionary work. The split of the party impeded the revolutionary movement. In the interests of its development, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks often joined forces, acted in the same organizations, coordinating their speeches. The IV Unity Congress of the RSDLP (1906) called for this. However, joint activities in the combined organizations did not last long. In the conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge (1910-1919), each of the factions wanted to use party financial and propaganda tools (press) as efficiently and for their own purposes. The final split occurred at the VI All-Russian (Prague) Conference of the RSDLP (January 1912), after which the Bolsheviks designated their separation from the Mensheviks by the letter “b”, which appears in brackets after the abbreviated name of the party — RSDLP (b).

Bolsheviks, the faction along with the Mensheviks as part of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP); then a political party. Name The "Bolsheviks" (originally the "majority") reflected the results of the election of the governing bodies of the RSDLP at its 2nd Congress (1903).

IN AND. Lenin considered 1903 the time of the emergence of Bolshevism “as a current of political thought and as a political party,” but his works, which formed the ideological basis of Bolshevism (first of all, “What to do?”, 1902), appeared earlier. Contrary to the opinion adopted among Russian social democrats at that time, the Bolsheviks assigned a priority place among the forces interacting in society to the subjective factor, mainly the proletarian party - the “vanguard of the working class”. The Bolsheviks continued the radical trend in the Russian revolutionary movement: while remaining on the soil of Marxism, Bolshevism at the same time absorbed elements of the ideology and practice of revolutionaries of the second half of the 19th century (N. G. Chernyshevsky, P. N. Tkachev, S. G. Nechaev).

The Bolsheviks used (following the ideas of K. Kautsky and G. V. Plekhanov) the experience of the French Revolution of the 18th century, primarily the period of the Jacobin dictatorship (V. I. Lenin opposed the Bolsheviks-"Jacobins" to the Mensheviks-"Girondins"). During the formation of Bolshevism, the special position of the Bolsheviks was manifested mainly in discussions on the organizational question. At the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, Lenin proposed that personal participation in the work of one of the party organizations be considered a condition for membership in the party. The position of Lenin was based on the concept of the party as an illegal centralized organization of professional revolutionaries, suitable for conspiratorial activities and seizing power. She corresponded to the exceptional authority of Lenin, the leader and chief ideologist of the Bolsheviks. The composition of the leadership of the Bolsheviks changed, initially the close circle of V. I. Lenin included A. A. Bogdanov, V. V. Borovsky, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, L. B. Krasin, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. S. Olminsky and etc.; almost all of them at different times were declared insufficiently consistent by the Bolsheviks or “conciliators”.

At the end of 1904, the Bolsheviks began publishing their first factional newspaper, Vperyod (opposed the Menshevik newspaper Iskra in 1903) and created a factional center, the Bureau of Majority Committees. In the beginning of the Revolution of 1905-07, according to the Bolsheviks, the place of the main driving force belonged to the proletariat, which opposed both the autocracy and the "liberal bourgeoisie"; his victory would make it possible to fully implement the minimum program of the RSDLP and move on to the socialist revolution. The practical conclusions from this were the Bolsheviks' support of the peasant demands for confiscation of all landlord, state and monastic lands (which meant the rejection of the programmatic provision of the RSDLP on returning only “sections” to the peasants), military-technical preparation of the uprising, and the course towards establishing a “dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry”. During the upsurge of the revolution, the Bolsheviks acted together with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Mensheviks and other revolutionary organizations that used violent methods of struggle, including during the preparation and conduct of the December armed uprisings of 1905. Relying on the armed overthrow of the autocracy, the Bolsheviks boycotted the elections to the 1st State Duma.

In 1907–10, the Bolshevik Center (consisting of members of the expanded editorial board of the proletarian factional newspaper) was the factional governing body. In 1907, the Bolsheviks admitted the fallacy of the boycott of the State Duma, adhered to the tactics of the "left bloc" in the elections to the 2nd State Duma.

The number of Bolsheviks increased from 14 thousand (summer of 1905) to 60 thousand members (spring of 1907), after the Revolution of 1905-07 it sharply decreased. Many Bolsheviks were forced to emigrate; a number of prominent Bolsheviks ceased political activity. Some Bolsheviks were excluded from the faction because of their differences of opinion with V.I. Lenin, among them a group of otzovists, headed by A.A. Bogdanov (they demanded the withdrawal of Social Democratic deputies from the State Duma, and considered the use of only illegal means justified struggle). A group of "Bolshevik Party members" stood out from the faction (they sought to cooperate with those Mensheviks who defended the need to preserve the illegal party). In 1907-14, the main subject of disagreement between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was the question of the degree of bourgeois changes in Russia: the Bolsheviks considered a close bourgeois revolution inevitable. Lenin refused to seek compromises with other currents in the RSDLP and went to the final split with them. At the Prague Conference of the RSDLP (1912; its delegates were mainly Bolsheviks), the ликвид liquidators ’(oriented toward building a legal party) were expelled from the party, all other (Bolshevik) movements were declared opponents of the party; thereby the Bolsheviks actually turned into an independent party. Since 1912, the Pravda newspaper became the most massive organ of the Bolsheviks (it was published legally in St. Petersburg). In 1913, the Bolshevik deputies of the State Duma left the Social Democratic faction of the Duma and formed an independent faction led by R. V. Malinovsky (since 1914 with G. I. Petrovsky). Since the beginning of World War I, the Bolsheviks rejected the slogan “defending the Fatherland”, adopted by most Russian social democrats, and opposed him with the slogan “turning the imperialist war into a civil war”; members of the Bolshevik faction of the State Duma arrested.

The beginning of the February Revolution of 1917 was unexpected for the Bolsheviks, as well as for other Russian political parties. The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, composed of Bolsheviks, put forward the slogan of creating the Provisional Government on the basis of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and bringing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the end. The leaders of the Petrograd and Moscow Bolsheviks, as well as the editorial board of the Pravda newspaper (L. B. Kamenev, I. V. Stalin, M. K. Muranov) considered it possible to conditionally support the Provisional Government with constant pressure on it, which was consistent with the tactics of the Mensheviks; a significant number of united organizations of the RSDLP remained, the Bolsheviks discussed the question of restoring its unity. A complete reorientation of the strategy and tactics of the Bolsheviks occurred with the return of V.I. Lenin from emigration to Russia in April 1917. He stated (“April Theses”) that Russia had already begun the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist one, and since without an “overthrow of capital” neither the end of the “imperialist war” nor the solution of general democratic tasks was possible, all state power should go to the Soviets . Lenin demanded to renounce the support of the Provisional Government, to explain to the masses the "deceit" of his promises, to fight against "revolutionary defense", that is, with the opinion that the nature of the war changed after the overthrow of the autocracy. Thus, the Bolsheviks entered into confrontation with all the supporters of cooperation with the government (“Compromisers”), the April Bolshevik Conference completed the organizational and ideological separation of the Bolsheviks into an independent political party: Lenin’s proposals were mainly supported at it, it was decided to prepare a new party program on their basis, and also add the word "Bolsheviks" to the name of the RSDLP. During the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks came to power. In March 1918, after the representatives of the left socialists-revolutionaries of the party left the SNK, the Bolsheviks became the only ruling party. In the future, the name of the Bolshevik party repeatedly changed, the word "Bolsheviks" continued to be present in it (since 1952 it was called the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

Source: Leninsky collection of materials: B 40 t. M .; L., 1924-1985; CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenary sessions of the Central Committee. 1898-1954. M., 1954. Part 1; Lenin V.I. Sobr. Op .: 55 vol. 5th ed. M., 1958-1965; Bolsheviks. Documents on the history of Bolshevism from 1903 to 1916 of the former Moscow Security Department. 3rd ed. M., 1990.

Lit .: Dan F.I. The origin of Bolshevism. New York, 1946; Berdyaev N.A. Sources and meaning of Russian communism. M., 1990; Ponomareva I.A. Theoretical differences in the RSDLP (1907-1910). M., 1990; Rosenthal I.S. Bolsheviks // Political History of Russia in Parties and Persons. M., 1994; Kheimson L. Menshevism and Bolshevism (1903-1917): the formation of mentality and political culture // Mensheviks in 1917 M., 1994. T. 1; Tyutyukin S.V., Shelokhaev V.V. Marxists and the Russian Revolution. M., 1996; Martov Yu. O. Favorites. SPb., 2000; Potresov A. N. Favorites. M., 2002.

The Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party convened in July and August 1903 mainly as a result of preparatory work carried out by a group of Iskra-ists, and was chaired by Plekhanov, first in Brussels (from where they had to leave because of police harassment), and then in London . It was a real constituent congress of the party; but during his work there was also a famous split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, which expanded and deepened, and finally after 1912 led to the final formal demarcation.

Representatives of 25 recognized social democratic organizations attended the congress. Each of them had 2 votes, with the exception of the Bund, the organization of Jewish workers, which had 3 votes due to its special status as an autonomous organization of the party, established at the First Congress. Since some organizations sent only one delegate, the congress was actually attended by 43 delegates with the right to vote, with a total of 51 votes. In addition, there were 14 delegates from various organizations with an advisory vote at the congress. Among the plenipotentiary delegates to the congress, over 30 were open supporters of the Iskra, so the Iskra-ists made up the majority. While the Iskra-ists were a single whole, only the Bund delegates (who were almost exclusively interested in the rights of national minorities and maintaining their autonomous status in the party structure), as well as two delegates of an "economic" sense, Akimov and Martynov, representing the Union of Russians Social Democrats abroad. " The resolution recognizing Iskra as the Party’s Central Organ was adopted at an early stage of the congress with only two votes against.

The main task of the congress was the adoption of the Program and Party Charter. Plekhanov in the 80s and Lenin in the 90s were already trying to draw up a draft Program, and as the Iskraists unified, the need to develop a Party program began to increase, along with the need to convene a new party congress. The discussions that took place in early 1902 ended with

that Lenin, with his characteristic youthful enthusiasm and uncompromising attitude, opposed Plekhanov, who preferred traditional methods and caution even on the path to revolution. The first draft of Plekhanov, Lenin criticized severely, believing that "this is not a program of a practically fighting party, but the Prinzipienerkla" rung, it is rather a program for students, "and developed his own project. A commission was created, which included other Iskra supporters, and she was entrusted with combining both projects, to everyone’s surprise, she succeeded. Plekhanov’s authority was still enormous, and Lenin, who was just over 30, was ready — perhaps for the last time in his life — to compromise on a theoretical issue. adopted less sharp compared to his own wording that the development of capitalism in Russia would inevitably end in a social revolution, but he managed to include a moderate program of agrarian reform, which was not in the Plekhanov project. As for the draft Program published in Iskra on June 1, 1902. and submitted to the party congress next year, the first, or theoretical, part of it was mainly presented on the basis of Plekhanov’s project and only in some places was supported by Lenin’s remarks, and the second, or practical, part of the Prog. Amma was developed by Lenin and only in certain places was mitigated by Plekhanov's formulations.

The theoretical part of the Program began with the orthodox Marxist thesis that industrial relations have now reached such a level of development when bourgeois capitalism has become a brake on the path of further progress. With the growing contradictions of capitalism, "... the number and solidarity of the proletarians grows and their struggle against their exploiters intensifies." Thus, technological development “faster and faster creates the material possibility of replacing capitalist production relations with socialist relations,” that is, the possibility of a social revolution that “destroys the division of society into classes” and “puts an end to all forms of exploitation of one part of society by another.” The dictatorship of the proletariat, which was defined as "the conquest by the proletariat ... of political power", was "a necessary condition for this social revolution." For the first time in history, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat was formally included in the Party Program.

In the practical and specifically Russian part of the Program, the immediate goals of the revolution were considered, which, as stated in the "Communist Manifesto", would naturally be determined by the specific conditions of each individual country. These goals were divided into three groups: political requirements (including equal and universal suffrage, freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly and association, election of judges, separation of church and state, free and universal education), economic requirements

workers' loyalty (including an 8-hour working day, the prohibition of the use of child labor, the restriction of women's labor, state old-age pensions and disabilities, the prohibition of fines and payments in kind) and the economic demands of the peasants (especially the return to the peasants of land that was unfairly taken from them during the period of liberation ) Obviously, the drafters of the Program believed that these were the maximum requirements that the radical bourgeoisie could support at the first stage of the revolution.

The Program did not address the issue of the relationship between immediate goals and the ultimate goal - the creation of a classless society. At the end of the program, the party offered support to "any opposition and revolutionary movement directed against the existing social and political order in Russia." And the first step towards the implementation of these tasks was proclaimed "the overthrow of the autocracy and the convening of a Constituent Assembly, freely chosen by the whole people." The program was discussed in detail at the congress, and minor amendments were made to it. In the end, only Akimov opposed its formal adoption. It remained unchanged until 1919.

When discussing the first paragraph of the Party Charter related to the determination of party membership, difficulties arose immediately. In the commission that prepared the draft Program, disagreements arose on a fundamental issue and two alternative formulations were proposed, one for Lenin and the other for Martov. Lenin introduced the following definition of party membership:

"Anyone who recognizes its program and supports the party both by material means and personal participation in one of the party organizations is considered a member of the party."

Martov proposed the following alternative:

"Anyone accepting its program, supporting the party with material means and rendering regular personal assistance to it under the leadership of one of the organizations is considered to be a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party."

The formal discrepancy between the two projects was insignificant, but in a more precise wording, on which Lenin insisted, his thought, already set forth in the work “What to do?”, About a small party consisting of organized and disciplined professional revolutionaries. Passions were heated, and the disagreements that arose during the discussion between the “hard” and “soft” Iskrists laid the foundation for irreconcilable hostility between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Martov and Axelrod emphasized the difference between "organization" and "party." Recognizing the need for conspiratorial

organizations, they believed that its creation could only make sense if it became the core of a large party of sympathizers. Lenin replied that a distinction should be made between the "chatters" and the "workers": Martov’s project equally opened the door to the party for both of them. Plekhanov sided with Lenin. Other members of the Iskra editorial board, Potresov and Zasulich, did not speak out, but shared the views of Axelrod and Martov. Trotsky unexpectedly came out in support of Martov. After a long and intense debate, the Lenin draft was rejected by 28 votes to 23, and Martov's draft was adopted by 28 votes to 22.

The remaining clauses of the Charter were adopted without disagreement. The rather cumbersome central organization of the party included the editorial board of the Central Authority (Iskra) as the custodian of the purity of party teaching, the Central Committee for managing party work through local organizations and the Party Council of five, which consisted of two candidates from the above bodies and a chairman appointed party congress. The Council was the highest governing body, reporting only to a biennial congress.

The results of the decisive vote on the first paragraph of the Charter were very paradoxical. The majority were “soft” Iskra-ists and Bund delegates, as well as representatives of other, extraneous organizations that were never associated with Iskra. Inside the Iskra group, Lenin still enjoyed the support of the majority. The discussion of the Party Charter also included the question of the Bund's attitude to the party. The decision of the overwhelming majority of the congress participants to reject the Bund’s claim that “the representative of the Jewish proletariat in the party is exclusively the Bund” prompted the Bund delegates to indignantly leave the congress after the 27th meeting (there were 37 meetings in total). At the next meeting, the decision to recognize in the Charter only one "foreign" party organization - the "Foreign League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democracy", closely associated with Iskra (Lenin was its delegate at the congress) - and deprive the Union of Russian Social - Electoral Rights Democrats abroad "led to the departure of Martynov and Akimov from the congress.

In making these decisions, the Iskra-ists held together. However, with the departure of 7 delegates who supported the so-called “soft” Iskras on the issue of determining party membership, the ratio of votes changed in favor of “hard” ones. It became clear that Lenin would win the majority at the congress on the most important issue on the agenda — elections to party organs — and that he would use his influence to strengthen the victory of his course. This circumstance, rather than any other external event at the congress, caused an unexpected change in its entire atmosphere.

Starting from the 30th meeting, all further work of the congress took place in an atmosphere of intense struggle. Obviously, the issue was discussed vitally. It should be added, however, that the clauses of the Party’s Charter, formulated and put forward for consideration by the whole Iskra group, provided for almost unlimited control of the central leadership over local party bodies, and the outrage that Lenin’s concept of a centralized and disciplined party provoked was rather a consequence than the source of hostility. As revealed in the dispute between Martov and Lenin at the congress, the draft proposed by Lenin, according to which the number of members of the Iskra editorial board should be reduced from a new distribution of duties from six to three and limit the number of members of the Central Committee of the party to three, was discussed among the members of the editorial board before convocation Congress and did not raise "fundamental objections. Only when this project was submitted to the Congress in the form of a specific proposal: to appoint Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov (two t) members of the Iskra editorial board Verdi and one “soft” Spark) and elect two minor members to the Central Committee, so that the editorial board would have full control over the party — the opposition became irreconcilable. And it was at the congress that Martov first condemned the "state of siege" within the party and "exceptional laws against particular groups" that played such an important role in the ensuing dispute.

The remaining meetings of the congress were reduced to voting and protests. The decision to select three members of the Iskra editorial board was made by a majority of 25 votes, with 2 against and 17 abstentions. Then this majority proceeded to the election of Plekhanov, Martov and Lenin. Martov did not accept the proposed post in the editorial board, and a minority of participants refused to continue participating in the elections. The Central Committee consisted solely of “solid” Iskrists, and Plekhanov was appointed chairman of the Party Council. Based on these results, the majority winners were called "Bolsheviks", their opponents - "Mensheviks". These names were destined to go down in history forever.

However, the events are not over yet. Throughout the confusion of the congress, Plekhanov firmly supported Lenin. When one of the delegates tried to point out the difference between the views of Lenin and his own, Plekhanov somewhat arrogantly replied that while Napoleon forced his marshals to divorce his wives, no one would be able to force him to divorce Lenin. However, the debate over the Party Program has already shown that a conflict is possible between the moderate position of the older Plekhanov and the ruthless approach of the younger Lenin. Plekhanov was soon shocked by the uncompromising sequence with which Lenin intended to use the victory. Among the Mensheviks,

whom Lenin intended to expel from the party, there were many old friends and associates of Plekhanov. In principle, Plekhanov once approved the need for strict party discipline, which Lenin called for, but when it came to coercive measures, he remained faithful to the more moderate principles of political organization that he unwittingly accepted during his long stay in the West. Plekhanov began to defend a policy of reconciliation with ideological opponents. For Lenin, this was unthinkable. At the end of 1903, Lenin left the Iskra editorial board. Plekhanov introduced her former members, expelled by the congress. All of them were Mensheviks. The Iskra became the organ of the Mensheviks, and Lenin, who was removed from the party apparatus, which was controlled by the will of the congress, had to organize an independent faction of the Bolsheviks.

In the next 12 months, a series of sharp articles directed against Lenin came out from the pen of Plekhanov and other former associates of Lenin on Iskra. Plekhanov quickly overcame some confusion caused by the fact that throughout the Second Congress he supported Lenin, citing his excuse that he did not agree with some aspects of the work “What to do?” When he read it for the first time, but thought that Lenin changed his views. Lenin was now accused of propagating the "sectarian spirit of exclusivity." In an article entitled “Centralism or Bonapartism?”, Lenin was charged with “confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the proletariat”, and in propagating “Bonapartism, if not the absolute monarchy of the old, pre-revolutionary“ manner. ”His thoughts on attitude professional revolutionaries to the masses allegedly corresponded to the views of Bakunin, not Marx.

Martov, returning to the idea that he expressed at the congress, wrote a pamphlet entitled "Fighting the" Siege in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party ". Vera Zasulich wrote that Lenin had the same idea of \u200b\u200bthe party as Louis XIV of the state. The party press, now led by the Mensheviks, published Trotsky’s brilliantly written, revealing pamphlet entitled “Our Political Tasks”. The Menshevik mood of the author was clearly manifested in the dedication: "To dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod." Leninist methods were criticized as "a flat caricature of the tragic intolerance of Jacobinism," and the author of the pamphlet predicted a situation in which the "party organization" replaces "the Party, Ts. K. replaces the party organization, and, finally, the" dictator "replaces Ts . K. ". The last chapter was entitled "Dictatorship of the proletariat." After some time, Plekhanov wrote in the Diary of the Social Democrat that

if the Bolshevik concept had triumphed, it would be reduced to the following: "In the end, everything revolves around one person who ex providentia majorum combines all the powers in himself."

The echoes of this split soon began to be heard in the German Social Democratic Party, which had its own problems associated with the split introduced by the revisionists. The obvious unity of almost all the prominent figures of the Russian party — after all, Lenin’s supporters were rank-and-file members of the party, hardly a famous name among them — led to the general support of the Mensheviks. Kautsky not only refused to publish Lenin's article in the German Social Democratic magazine Neue Zeit, in which the Bolsheviks defended his views, but also submitted a copy of the letter for publication in Iskra, which condemned Lenin's position.

The most powerful attacks on Lenin were contained in an article by Rosa Luxemburg published in Noah Zeit in July 1904, which condemned his policy of "ultracentralism" as bureaucratic and undemocratic. Seeing the specifically Russian character in the Leninist project, she bitterly spoke of "the human person who is crushed and trampled upon by Russian absolutism" and who is now again in the "guise of a Russian revolutionary," who easily proclaims himself the new powerful arbiter of history. " In her criticism of the unlimited powers of Lenin’s party leadership, she put forward a new argument, saying that this could "dangerously strengthen the conservatism inherent in every such body." Finally, Bebel, a veteran of the German party, proposed to refer the matter to the arbitration court, which was hastily accepted by the Mensheviks and resolutely rejected by Lenin.

Lenin clearly remained unshakable, despite all these attacks. He was inspired by the example and authority of Marx, who, in response to criticism of his actions against other German revolutionaries, wrote in his journal:

"Our task is merciless criticism, and, moreover, criticism directed more at imaginary friends than against open enemies; adhering to this our position, we willingly refuse cheap popularity among democrats."

In reply to Martov at the congress, Lenin ardently defended his uncompromising position:

"And I am not at all frightened by the terrible words about the" state of siege in the party ", about the" exceptional laws against individuals and groups ", etc. In relation to the unstable and shaky elements, we not only can, we are obliged to create a" state of siege ", and our entire party charter, our entire centralism, which was henceforth confirmed by the congress, is nothing but a" state of siege "for so many sources

political vagueness. Against vagueness, it is precisely what special, even exceptional laws are needed, and the step taken by the congress correctly outlined the political direction, creating a solid basis for such laws and such measures. "

In the lengthy pamphlet Step Up, Two Steps Back, published next year in Geneva with the subtitle Crisis in Our Party, Lenin showed that he would not be intimidated by accusations of "Jacobinism."

"The Jacobin, inextricably linked with the organization of the proletariat, recognizing its class interests, this is a revolutionary Social Democrat."

Analyzing the protocols of the congress, Lenin noted that the “soft” Iskarians constantly found themselves in strange alliance with delegates (for example, the Bund) who were opposed to both the Iskra and any strong centralized party organization, and revealed their spiritual kinship with the “lordly” anarchism, "which preceded populism in all its forms, including nihilism:

"This lordly anarchism is especially characteristic of the Russian nihilist. The party organization seems to him a monstrous" factory ", submission of part to whole and minority to the majority seems to him to be" enslavement "... the division of labor under the leadership of the center causes tragicomic cries on his part against turning people into wheels and cogs. "

Lenin was not worried when the Mensheviks accused him of supporting the bureaucratic principle against the democratic one. If the bureaucracy implied centralism, and democracy - "autonomy", then the revolutionary Social Democrats advocated the first principle, contrasting it with the second. If the views of the Mensheviks were based on any principle, then this was the "principle of anarchism."

The idea of \u200b\u200ba centralized and disciplined party as an instrument of revolution occupied a decisive place in Leninist theory. She inspired the creation of Iskra as the central organ of such a party. She also inspired him to write the work “What to do?”, Where the doctrine of the party leadership of the masses was first set forth. Subsequently, Lenin called the system of party discipline, for which he advocated, "democratic centralism." This definition could easily have been perverted, sarcastically stating that it was more important to have “centralism” in the form of control by the leadership than “democracy” in the sense of control by the ordinary masses. However, it is incorrect to consider the tendencies of centralism as a feature of only the Russian party, and within the party as a feature characteristic of Lenin. Throughout that period, the growth of a large-scale organization was observed; everywhere, in the interests of efficiency and power, it seemed that a concentration of power was required. In any large country, political parties could not but perceive these tendencies.

dencies. They were especially characteristic of proletarian parties: it was here that one could quite often hear that party members were obliged to submit to their elected leaders themselves and that the enthusiasm for criticism was incompatible with party loyalty. Plekhanov, who had now become the sworn enemy of Lenin, once spoke in the same spirit.

"When they say that social democracy must ensure its members complete freedom of opinion, they forget that a political party is not an academy of sciences at all ... Freedom of opinion in a party can and should be limited precisely because the party is an alliance freely composed of like-minded people "as soon as unanimity disappears, discrepancy becomes inevitable."

Lenin argued that it was not the proletariat, but the bourgeoisie that shied away from this necessary and useful restriction. The Mensheviks displayed "bourgeois-intellectual individualism," and the Bolsheviks demonstrated "proletarian organization and discipline."

Lenin’s reaction to criticism of the Mensheviks was not limited to words. Bravely and steadfastly enduring the isolation in which he found himself after breaking up with Iskra, remaining unshakable in the face of opposition and apostasy, Lenin convened a meeting of the 22 most dedicated Bolsheviks in Geneva in August 1904, where the Bureau of the Committee of the majority was created, which became the new central the organization of the Bolsheviks. At the end of the year, instead of changing Iskra, he founded a new newspaper, Forward. Lenin was most worried about preventing hasty reconciliation, which would jeopardize the purity and independence of the Bolshevik theory by introducing a heresy of Menshevism into it. In the party correspondence of that time, he demanded "everywhere and in the most decisive manner split, split and split." It is better to split the party and exclude ideological opponents from its ranks than to jeopardize unity, even in small particulars — such was the principle that Lenin adhered to and bequeathed to his followers. This was a consequence of deep ideological conviction and was fully consistent with the authority of his nature and his confidence in his abilities. He returned to this again and again, even in those moments when it seemed that he was ready to give in for reconciliation. Indeed, it was not for nothing that his tactics in the struggle against the Mensheviks after 1903 became a model for the party in times of internal crisis, and the meaning of the word "Menshevism" expanded: this word was later branded as any ideological adversary in the party.

In April 1905, in defiance of the old central organs of the party, now exclusively Menshevik, a new party congress was convened in London. It was attended exclusively by the Bolsheviks, and the Mensheviks, who carried out their

own conference in Geneva, boycotted his work. The split was approaching a denouement.

Many had the impression that the initial split at the Second Congress concerned the question of the organization of the party, and not the essence of its Program, since both party wings voted for the Program and dispersed only during the discussion of the Charter. If this was so at the very beginning, then subsequently the split began to expand rapidly and deepen.

The teachings of Marx, set forth in his works, starting with the “Communist Manifesto,” along with evolutionary, scientific, objective elements, contained revolutionary, propaganda, subjective elements. Marxism was both a statement of the laws of social and economic development and a guide to the application of both violent and non-violent methods of struggle to enforce these laws. Both aspects of Marxism were united by the point of view that human activity is subject to a process of continuous evolution, which, however, cannot do without separate revolutions interrupting it, which form an essential part of the whole process. Nevertheless, this apparent contradiction led to a shift in emphasis between two opposing views on historical development, which also happened in the works of Marx himself.

In the dispute that led to a split in the Russian followers of Marx, the Mensheviks accused the Bolsheviks of stepping over the steps provided for by the Marxist theory of evolution, trying to conspiratorially organize the proletarian revolution, for which objective conditions were not ripe for the modern, bourgeois stage of the development of Russia.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, accused the Mensheviks of considering the revolution as a "process of historical development," and not as an act deliberately organized according to a plan that had been developed in advance.

The Mensheviks, analyzing the course of the revolution and being sure that conscious actions could not change or accelerate this move, acted primarily as theorists. According to Bolshevik terminology, they were resonators, "archival assessors", and "party intelligentsia."

The Bolsheviks were people of action: they were busy organizing the revolution with the help of legal and illegal methods. Lenin, the representative and founder of Bolshevism, - unlike the Mensheviks, from the very beginning was interested not so much in the theory of evolution as in revolutionary practice. No wonder Lenin always insisted that the theory of Marx should be interpreted dialectically and not dogmatically. If theory and practice are a single whole, then a theory made sense only when it found expression in practice under the conditions

wii specific time and place. Lenin, quoting Marx’s famous Theses on Feuerbach, compared the Mensheviks with those philosophers who only “interpreted the world in various ways,” but the Bolsheviks, like real Marxists, sought to change it.

The debate between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, seemingly addressing the obscure moments of Marxist teachings, raised the fundamental problems for the history of the Russian revolution. The Mensheviks, clinging to Marx's original thesis about the sequence of the bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-socialist revolutions, never agreed with Lenin's assumption, as far back as 1898, about the inextricable link between these revolutions. First, a bourgeois revolution was to take place, since capitalism could achieve its full development in Russia only as a result of the bourgeois revolution. Without this development, the Russian proletariat could not get strong enough to begin and carry out the socialist revolution.

Such a formal separation of one revolution from another — however satisfying the theorist — led to conclusions that would have placed the revolutionaries in a more difficult position than the Mensheviks. It was difficult for the Mensheviks, who limited their tasks to a bourgeois revolution, to give their political program a socialist or proletarian orientation. The bourgeois revolution was a necessary and predetermined predecessor of the proletarian revolution, and thus, in the final analysis, it corresponded to the vital interests of the proletariat. But immediately after its holding, power would have passed into the hands of those who were the oppressors of the proletariat and, again, ultimately, their worst enemy. The Mensheviks could turn a blind eye to this problem only by concentrating their efforts on pursuing a policy of temporarily supporting the bourgeoisie in the destruction of the autocracy and ending the bourgeois revolution, as well as exerting pressure on the new revolutionary bourgeois government in order to improve the material situation of the proletariat and provide it with the opportunities it takes working people in developed capitalist countries (recognition of trade unions, 8-hour workday, social insurance, etc.).

Consequently, in essence, as Lenin often pointed out, in the dispute between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks the disagreements with the "legal Marxists" and the "economists" were repeated, against which the whole party had opposed in the past. Disagreements with revisionists in the Social Democratic Party of Germany were also reflected in this dispute. Repeating the stereotyped thesis that Russia stands on the eve of the bourgeois, and not socialist revolution, the Mensheviks followed the “legal Marxists”, who also attached paramount importance to the revolution.

theory of theory and called for deferring revolutionary action to the distant future. The Mensheviks, following the "economists," preferred the economic concept of the class to the political concept of the party. They believed that the only specific goal of workers at this stage could be to improve their economic situation. Following the German revisionists, they believed that it was better to exert pressure on the bourgeois government by parliamentary means to achieve reforms favorable to the workers than to overthrow it with the help of the revolution.

Menshevism was not an isolated or accidental phenomenon. The Mensheviks supported a number of principles that were embodied in the practice of Western European socialists, namely: legal opposition, making progress through reform, not revolution, compromise and cooperation with other parliamentary parties, economic agitation through trade unions. Menshevism had strong roots in Western philosophy and traditions (after all, Marx was also a Western thinker). Russian populists, like Slavophiles, spoke of the distinctive development of Russia; Russia, unlike the West, was destined to avoid the capitalist stage of development. Plekhanov, speaking out against the Narodniks, based his whole theory on the fact that Russia should follow the same path of development as the West. In this sense, he was also a staunch Westerner, and the Mensheviks were followers of Plekhanov. It has always been easier for them than the Bolsheviks to arouse sympathy and understanding on the part of the social democratic leaders of the West. Many years later, Radek ironically remarked that "Western Europe begins with the Mensheviks."

It is symptomatic that when the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, as two factions within the party, began to clearly distinguish between Russia itself (which happened later without the fierce struggle that was observed among the emigrants), the Mensheviks found supporters among the most highly skilled and organized workers, printers, railway workers and workers steel industry - in the advanced industrial centers of the south of the country, and the Bolsheviks were supported mainly by workers of relatively low qualification, employed in large enterprises lagging behind heavy industry district of St. Petersburg, and in the textile factories of St. Petersburg and Moscow. In most trade unions, the Mensheviks dominated. The "economists" argued that while well-trained Western workers are capable of taking political doctrine, the masses of the Russian "factory proletariat" can only accept economic agitation, and Lenin himself apparently believed that the appeal of the "economists" was addressed to "the lower, least developed strata of the proletariat."

However, this diagnosis did not correspond to either the then Russian reality or the experience of the West (where since

The first International, the English trade unions, the most progressive part of the working class, attached the main importance to the economic, not political struggle). The most highly skilled, educated, organized, and privileged Russian workers — those who came close to the organized workers of the West — had difficulty accepting revolutionary ideas; it was easiest to convince them of the possibility of improving their economic situation in the conditions of the bourgeois political system. And the mass of Russian unskilled factory workers, who in all respects stood at a lower level than the lower strata of the working people in Western industry, and who had "nothing ... to lose but their chains," readily accepted the Bolsheviks' call for a political revolution as the only one a way to improve their economic situation.

The defeat of Menshevism, the tragedy and useless defeat, was the result of their separation from Russian reality. The social and political system of Russia did not create the soil on which the bourgeois-democratic regime could flourish.

History is rarely repeated - therefore, the interpretation of Marxism, according to which the successive stages of the revolution everywhere in the world will exactly follow the model established in Western Europe, was deterministic and, therefore, incorrect. In the second half of the 19th century in Germany, it turned out to be impossible to carry out the bourgeois-democratic revolution in a classical form; Germany’s socio-political development went awry and nullified as a result of the failure of the 1848 revolution. In Russia, if the Mensheviks won, the 1905 revolution would be just as untenable as the 1848 revolution in Germany. The point is not only that the German bourgeoisie in 1848 and the Russian bourgeoisie in 1905 were too weak and backward to realize their own revolutionary goals. Their weakness is beyond doubt. But the main reason for their hesitation was that they were already aware of the growing danger to them from the final, proletarian revolution.

One of the reasons why history is so rarely repeated is that the dramatic characters in the re-introduction know the denouement in advance. According to the Marxist theory of revolution, the bourgeoisie must destroy the feudal system, which precedes its overthrow by the proletariat. The disadvantage of this program was that once it penetrated into bourgeois consciousness, it was already impossible to extract it from there. Since bourgeois democracy was seen as the stage of transition to socialism, it could only be carried out by those who believed in socialism. This was the deep truth that Lenin expressed, arguing that only the proletariat could lead the bourgeois revolution.

The problem was not that Russia did not have the conditions for a revolutionary representation on the Western model; the fact was that the performance had already been played in the West and it was impossible to repeat it anywhere else. The Mensheviks, who expected suitable conditions to mature in Russia, were doomed to futile efforts and death.

The Bolshevik concept, although it took into account the specifics of Russian reality to a much greater extent, and therefore avoided the shame of defeat, was also not free from internal contradictions. According to this concept, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, despite the fact that it was carried out by the proletariat with the support of the peasantry, was primarily bourgeois in nature: it was a stage through which it was impossible to skip, but which could not be confused with the subsequent proletarian-socialist revolution . Of course, it was impossible to deny that under these conditions, the revolution could and should have accepted much of what was essentially not socialist, but quite compatible with bourgeois capitalism — for example, the distribution of land between peasants, an 8-hour working day, or separation of the church from the state. These and many similar requirements were included in the minimum program adopted by the party. However, it seems that Lenin never faced difficulties connected with the question of whether such a revolution, boycotted by the bourgeoisie or provoking its active resistance, could lead to that bourgeois freedom and the bourgeois progress that Lenin himself called the only path leading to genuine freedom of the proletariat and peasantry. In speeches and works of a later period, he often exposed "bourgeois freedom" as an unscrupulous deception. He cannot be blamed for inconsistency, since he considered two different periods. While the bourgeoisie was a revolutionary force that opposed the remnants of the Middle Ages and feudalism, bourgeois freedom was real and progressive; as soon as the bourgeoisie, having gathered all its might, opposed the growing forces of socialism and the proletariat, "bourgeois freedom" became reactionary and false. However, the verbal contradiction helped to identify the real problem. The Bolsheviks demanded the establishment of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois democracy in Russia, which they did not and could not have in Russia (since they would have to be established without the support of the bourgeoisie) of social roots, and declared that without this it would be impossible to go to the highest freedom of socialism. The Menshevik plan, according to which the Russian bourgeoisie should have ensured bourgeois freedom, was hardly more utopian than the Bolshevik plan, which envisaged its establishment with the help of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The tragic dilemma of the Russian revolution, which neither the Mensheviks nor the Bolsheviks could completely resolve, was the result of an erroneous forecast of the very original Marxist concept. Marx believed that once established, bourgeois capitalism would eventually achieve full development everywhere, and when, due to its inherent contradictions, its decomposition would begin, then, and only then, would it be overthrown by the socialist revolution. In reality, in those countries where capitalism has reached the most complete and powerful development, an extensive system of property rights enshrined in law has been created on its basis, covering a wide layer of the working class engaged in industry. Thus, even when the process of decay became obvious, capitalism continued for a long time to easily resist the revolutionary forces, while it was precisely the barely born and immature capitalism that easily succumbed to the first onslaught of the revolution. The economic consequences of this deviation from the previously planned plan were obvious: the young revolutionary government, unable to rely on a highly productive industrial organization and the skilled workers of developed capitalism, was forced to create and strengthen a new system, relying on the insufficient resources of a backward country, and the newborn socialism had to endure difficulties and reproaches that he is a regime of universal poverty, and not abundance, as Marxists always assumed. The political consequences were no less complex: under the new system, political power was transferred to the hands of the proletariat, deprived of the political training and experience acquired under the bourgeois constitution on the basis of universal suffrage and participation in the activities of trade unions and workers organizations, as well as into the hands of the peasantry , mostly illiterate and almost completely devoid of political consciousness.

The difficulties of the situation and the resulting disappointment, according to the Mensheviks, were caused by the fact that the Bolsheviks arbitrarily departed from the Marxist scheme of revolution. But this scheme was doomed to failure when the proletarian revolution took place in the most backward capitalist country. Difficulties still lay ahead. But they were inseparable from the fundamental question, around which there were disputes of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Its essence was especially clearly revealed when the first Russian revolution of 1905 began.

"Second Congress of the RSDLP. July-August 1903. Protocols." M., 1959, p. 153-154.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 6, p. 212.

Part of the program, written by Lenin, is given in the b-volume of his works (p. 203-211), and a summary of the entire dispute of interest, see: V.Y. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 6, p. 505-506, note 95.

Martynov proposed at the congress to change this wording as follows: "the number, unity and consciousness of the proletarians" ("Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 116). This was an echo of the debate about spontaneity and consciousness and was accompanied by sharp criticism of Lenin's work “What to do?” on the grounds that it denied the possibility of a spontaneous emergence of socialist aspirations among the proletariat. Plekhanov, Martov and Trotsky stood up for Lenin's defense, and the amendment was rejected.

  "Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 254. For the text of the adopted Program, see ibid., P. 418-425; "The CPSU in resolutions ...", v. 1, p. 37-43.

Lenin later called them "sequential" and "inconsistent" Iskra-ists V. I. Lenin. Full Sobr. op., t. 8, p. 326).

Trotsky came to Lenin in London in October 1902 and soon attracted attention with his literary talent. In the spring of 1903, Lenin twice proposed to co-opt him into the Iskra editorial board, but Plekhanov strongly objected to this (N.K. Krupskaya. Cit. Cit., P. 82). According to Krupskaya, Lenin at the congress "least of all thought that Trotsky would hesitate" (ibid., P. 87).

  "Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 279.

For the text of the Charter, see: "Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 425-427; "The CPSU in resolutions ...", v. 1, p. 45-47.

  "The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 321.

  "The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 371.

  "The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 329.

In the same place, with. 375. After that, the delegates to the congress were divided into two factions, which began to hold meetings separately (VI Lenin. Poln. Sobr. Soch., Vol. 8, p. 15).

  "The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", pp. 136-137.

According to Plekhanov, Lenin tried to find a precedent in modern English politics. “Chamberlain,” he added, “came out of the ministry precisely in order to further strengthen our position, and so did I.” (G.V. Plekhanov. Soch., Vol.

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., T. ХХШ, p. 155-138.

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., T. ХХШ, p. 7.

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., T. ХХШ, p. 90-91.

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., T. ХХШ, p. 185.

L. Trotsky. Our political tasks. Geneva, 1904. First, Trotsky put the letter "N" in front of his pseudonym, then he replaced it with the initial letter of his own name - "L". Lenin also sometimes used the letter "H" instead of his initials.

It should be recalled that Trotsky’s final verdict on this dispute almost 30 years later was: “It is not for nothing that the words in Lenin’s dictionary are so irreconcilable and merciless. Only the highest revolutionary determination, free from all that is basely personal, can justify this kind of personal ruthlessness .. . His behavior seemed to me unacceptable, terrible, outrageous. And meanwhile, it was politically correct and, therefore, organizationally necessary "(L. Trotsky. My life. Berlin, 1930. vol. I, p. 187-188).

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., T. ХХШ, p. 317.

  "Neue Zeit", XXII (Vienne, 1903-1904), II, S. 484-492; 529-535.

Details of this episode can be found in: V.I. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 47, p. 11-12, p. 325, approx. fourteen; The Lenin Collection, vol. V, p. 169-176,182-183.

In her memoirs (p. 94-95), Krupskaya writes that Lenin was deeply worried about the break with Martov, but this did not shake his political views at all.

C. Marx and F. Engels. Op., Vol. 7, p. 315.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 7, p. 307-308.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. op., t. 8, p. 370

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 7, p. 379.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 7, p. 384.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 7, p. 394.

Michels, in his work On the Question of Sociology in the Party (R. Michels. Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens. 2nd ed., 1925, S. 278-280) provides striking examples of such views from German, French and Belgian sources. He also uses the term "democratic centralism" (S. 227), and it can be assumed that this term was often used in the German Social Democratic Party at the beginning of the century.

G.V. Plekhanov. Op., Vol. XXII, p. 455.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. op., t. 8, p. 254.

  The Lenin Collection, vol. V, p. 149.

Lenin's article, “Should we organize a revolution?”, Published in February 1905, is devoted to this controversy (V.I. Lenin. Poln. Sobr. Soch., Vol. 9, p. 264-273).

The last term is indeed given in resolution V of the party conference, held in December 1908 ("CPSU in resolutions ...", v. 1, p. 195). For the rest, see: V.I. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 11, p. 26-29.

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. Op., vol. 11, p. 30-31.

On this basis, the former Menshevik leader Pan claimed that the Bolsheviks express "general democratic and political tendencies of the movement," and the Mensheviks express "his class and socialist tendencies" (F. Dan. The Origin of Bolshevism. New York, 1946, p. 291).

Modern official history claims that the Mensheviks "wanted to have the same party in Russia as, say, the German or French Social Democratic Party," and they "therefore fought the Bolsheviks because they sensed something new, unusual, excellent in them from Social Democracy of the West "(" History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ". M., 1938, p. 135). It should also be recalled that in 1903 in Russia there were no Western-type political parties; such parties arose only after 1905

This argument was used in Kuskova's Credo (see chapter 1).

IN AND. Lenin. Full Sobr. op., t. 4., p. 267.

Trotsky brilliantly characterized the German bourgeoisie of 1848: "She was stupidly wise with the experience of the French bourgeoisie" (L. Trotsky. Prospects for the Russian Revolution. Berlin, 1917, p. 27).

At that time, Lenin bitterly wrote: “The European bourgeois first fought on the barricades for the republic, then lived in exile, finally betrayed freedom, betrayed the revolution and went to serve the constitutional monarchs. The Russian bourgeois want to“ learn from history ”and“ shorten the stages development ": they want to immediately betray the revolution, immediately turn out to be traitors to freedom. In intimate conversations they repeat one another the words of Christ to Judas: what do you do, do it faster!" (V.I. Lenin. Complete. Sobr. Soch., Vol. 10, p. 300). But why was the bourgeoisie fighting in the barricades, knowing that, having won, it would itself be overthrown by the proletariat?

The difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks is simple.. (They are all Social Democrats) The Bolsheviks  kept the course the unfolding of the revolution, the overthrow of tsarism by means of armed insurrection, the hegemony of the working class, the isolation of the cadet bourgeoisie, the alliance with the peasantry, the creation of an interim revolutionary government from representatives of workers and peasants, and bringing the revolution to a victorious end. Mensheviks-to curtail the revolution.  Instead of overthrowing tsarism by rebellion, they proposed its reform and "Improvement" , instead of the hegemony of the proletariat - hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie, instead of an alliance with the peasantry -   union with the cadet bourgeoisie, instead of the provisional revolutionary government - State Duma as a center "Revolutionary forces"  countries. This cent of the country's revolutionary forces is especially amazing. The mess in the minds is the same if you believe in it. After 1907, Lenin put forward his theory. According to this theory, the main thing is the revolution of the union of workers and peasants, in order to avoid capitalism. For its success there was no need (and no opportunity) to wait for capitalism in Russia to exhaust its potential as an engine in the development of productive forces. And most importantly, in the specific historical conditions of Russia, a sure catastrophe threatened the liberal-bourgeois statehood.  therefore the Bolsheviks headed for the revolution and power of the Soviets.  And is not Lenin right? Give me one criterion for the foundation for the development of capitalism in Russia, at least one. Call me? You, as adults, understand that capitalism is a derivative of Protestantism and a certain mentality created by Protestantism. This, if you will, is a special view of the world, of the role of man in history, of faith, of collectivism, and ...
Let us leave historiosophy alone.
The Bolsheviks generally went so far as to deny patriotism. Here is a populist M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky:-“Socialism is a cosmopolitan doctrine that stands above nationalities: for a socialist, the difference in nationalities disappears, there are only people”. Populist P. L. Lavrov: - "Nationality itself" is not an enemy of socialism as a modern state; it is nothing more than an accidental allowance or an accidental hindrance to the activities of socialism "  Narodnik L. N. Tkachev: - "the socialist ... on the one hand ... should contribute to everything that favors the elimination of the partitions that divide peoples, everything that smoothes and weakens national characteristics; on the other, he must most energetically counteract everything that strengthens and develops these features. And he cannot do otherwise. "
As you see, cosmopolitanism grew and expanded. This cosmopolitanism developed within the framework of socialism (both foreign and domestic) not by chance. He was due the idea of \u200b\u200bthe predominance of the social principle.  And this idea sounds constantly today-OPPORTUNISM BETWEEN OTHER! What is the fact? Different social groups in different countries and different nations are one and the same. Everywhere there is its own aristocracy, its merchants, its wage workers. Differences between them nationally specificwhich is protected by the state. It is the state, rising above social groups with their narrow interests, that is capable of seeing and expressing the general that is inherent in the aristocrat, entrepreneur and worker. This general distinguishes them from aristocrats, employers and workers who belong to a different people. If either the society rises above the state ( socialism), or a group of its individuals ( liberalism), then the peoples cease to notice the difference between social groups in their country and abroad. They will inevitably strive for cosmopolitan mocking. And parties that put forward the idea of \u200b\u200ba predominance of social or personal principles will inevitably act as cosmopolitan parties. Do you understand the process? It is clear why the resistance of nationalities is so strong? And here the very question arises to which the anarchists were looking for the answer, but what is the state then?
Group “Emancipation of labor”, headed by former populist G.V. Plekhanov, the beginning of the RSDLP in Russia. In 1898, the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) takes place. This is the same Plekhanov who knew Marx and Engels by heart, and yet, as he did not seek a meeting with his idol, everything was in vain. The theoretician is still the one forgotten today and deservedly. But, he went down in history as the founder of Marxism in the country. And enough of him. It is from here that those legs of the future Trotskyism-adherents of the present, without cuts, of Marxism, grew. The victory of the socialist revolution is possible only after capitalism has completely exhausted its potentials and turned the majority into the proletariat. (A wonderful mechanism for the protection of capitalism — and when I wrote articles about Marxism, they often answered that it was created precisely for this. I think I refuted such a conviction then) Only after that, the proletarian majority will easily overthrow the bourgeoisie. ( "Right"  wing of the RSDLP, "Mensheviks" G.V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, Yu. O. Martov-the period of development of capitalism should be long enough. For a long time, power should belong to the bourgeoisie, which will overthrow the autocracy with the help of the working class (the Mensheviks did not consider the peasantry to be a revolutionary force) and carry out the necessary liberal-democratic transformations)

And there he was "centrist"-L. D. Trotsky,  who generally did not rely on either the bourgeoisie or the peasantry. He placed his aspirations only on the Western proletariat. Begs in the language of the SR. No way without it. AT 1901-1906 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries is formed (AKP, leaders - V. M. Chernov, N. D. Avksentiev) Unlike the old Narodniks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries recognized that Russia had nevertheless entered the capitalist period of its development. But, at the same time, they believed that capitalism itself affected Russian society very superficially. This is especially true for villages where the community and small-scale peasant farming, for the most part, labor, are preserved. It is in the agrarian sphere that the birth of new socialist relations will take place, which will become possible due to the nationalization of the land, its leveling distribution and subsequent cooperation.  Throughout its existence, various leftists and "rights"  groups, of which there were many (maximalists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, internationalists, people's socialists).
Just now I don’t see stories about how the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were much more left than the Bolsheviks, who, in order to maintain their power, had to strengthen the influence of state mechanisms. These were for weakening the state in favor of public structures. At the same time, the Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks even reproached the Bolsheviks for the revival of autocracy and national isolationism (according to them, the movement towards socialism was possible only as a movement of the entire world proletariat, which has yet to be fully formed). And that’s not all. Their fury was caused by the use in the Red Army of military specialists who began their careers back in tsarist times. In this they “Petrochemical”  Trotsky himself, who (for reasons of pragmatism) was a supporter of the active involvement of specialists. At the meeting All-Russian Central Executive Committee of April 22, 1918  sentence Trotsky  the use of officers and generals of the old army was met with criticism as "Left Communists"so The "right"  Mensheviks. The leaders of the latter - F. Dan and Martov accused the Bolsheviks almost of a bloc with "Counter-revolutionary militarism". BUT Martov  generally suspected Trotsky  in that he clears the way for Kornilova.
Let's open the Menshevik newspaper "Forward"  for April 1918. “The policy of the Soviet government, alien from the very beginning of a truly proletarian character, has lately been more openly embarking on an agreement with the bourgeoisie and is clearly taking on an anti-labor character ... This policy threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main achievements in the economic field and make it a victim of unlimited exploitation by the bourgeoisie .  Oh how!

And now what is socialism according to Soviet.  What did it happen in the USSR? ...

Today, many experts in the field of promoting services and goods quite seriously argue that the leader of the proletarian revolution V.I. Ulyanov was the most talented marketer in the world. His genius consisted in the fact that he was able to "sell" to the broad masses the idea of \u200b\u200buniversal equality, using short, gritty and intelligible slogans. Vladimir Ilyich managed to create concise and expressive symbols (sickle and hammer, five-pointed star) and determine the desired corporate color (red). But the main Leninist achievement was the choice of a brand. The idea that Bolshevism is something large, powerful, inevitable and unshakable has become firmly entrenched in the mass consciousness. But the Mensheviks are a trifle, in general, rubbish.

The creation of the brand of the most powerful political party of the XX century took place in London, in 1903, in the summer.

When the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks appeared

The second party congress was held sequentially in two cities - Brussels and London. Obviously, the organizers were afraid of persecution and sought conspiracy, and therefore went on such an unusual step, like a break and a move. Lenin and Martov argued a lot and often, and the essence of their debate can be reduced to whether it is worth the wait when the apple itself falls, or is it better to pluck it? At least roughly with these words, the future leader of the Bolsheviks described the scheme of the contradictions that arose. One of the oldest members of the RSDLP and a major party theorist Martov didn’t want to eat unripe fruits, he didn’t want to pick the greens from the branches and, moreover, did not want to knock it off with a stick.

Both arguers at that time agreed that the revolution should be global, it will occur in countries with the most advanced industry, and only then it will spread to the backward kingdoms-states, including the Russian Empire. The only question was which methods to give preference to - legal or clandestine. After the vote, which led to the victory of the Leninist line, the party split into two parts. Lenin immediately called his supporters Bolsheviks, adding that Martov’s adherents were Mensheviks. To some extent, this determined the history of the 20th century.

First revolution

Special attention should be paid to the fact that the Bolsheviks did not always secure overwhelming quantitative superiority during party voting at the beginning of the turbulent twentieth century. The line they chose for clandestine terrorist work led to a split in the RSDLP. In the work of the Third Congress, which was also held in London (1905), Martov’s supporters did not want to participate, they perceived the tragic revolutionary events as a movement to the next stage of social development in Russia, that is, to the bourgeois republic, which corresponded nevertheless to armed uprisings representatives of the March wing turned on, they acted on the battleship "Potemkin" and during other unrest. Thus, disagreements raged somewhere in the upper echelons of the party, but at the grassroots level did not play a big role. After the suppression of the disorder, Plekhanov spoke of him as a useless affair that should not have been started. The leader of the Mensheviks, Martov, agreed with this opinion.

War with japan

The Bolsheviks wished for the defeat of tsarist Russia and did everything in order to undermine the country's defense potential. This desire manifested itself most vividly during the German War, but was first formulated earlier - in the years of Japan. One of the reasons why the Mensheviks refused to participate in the Third London Congress of the RSDLP is the fact that they knew of the material support from foreign hostile special services. Condemning the war, the Martians could not allow the thought that freedom would come from abroad, and the Japanese would bring it on their bayonets. Moreover, the Land of the Rising Sun at that time was socially and technically a rather backward state, and the promotion of its victories did not fit into elementary logic. And in general, the ideology of the Mensheviks, like the Bolsheviks, ruled out at that time the possibility of the victory of the revolution in one country.

Together again

In 1906, the leaders of both wings of the RSDLP gathered again for the congress, this time it was held in Stockholm. The parties recognized the need for joint work, and sought to smooth out the contradictions. The disagreements of the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks this time seemed not very significant and concerned only the wording of the first paragraph of the party charter. Martov proposed that the obligation to “assist” be left unchanged, and Lenin insisted on “personal participation” in a particular organization. At first glance, the difference is small, but in fact it turned out that it is of great importance. Lenin strove to create a strict hierarchically built military structure, and Martov was quite satisfied with the usual intellectual talk-shop. The leader of the Mensheviks considered the revolutionary transformations premature, offering to focus on the ideological treatment of the backward population of a vast agricultural country that was not ripe for socialism. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks won one more victory: the Leninist version of the first article of the Charter of the RSBRP (o) was approved.

Interwar contradictions

Formally, after the "unification" of the Stockholm congress, the party gained solidity, but realities revealed the presence of remaining contradictions. The defeat of the revolution forced the Social-Democratic leadership to emigrate, despondency reigned in their ranks. Money was required, but the Bolshevik methods of obtaining it caused an ambiguous reaction of eternal opponents - Martov, his brother Levitsky, Potresov, Axelrod and other Mensheviks. There was a movement of "liquidators" who expressed the opinion that it was necessary to completely curtail illegal work and stop the "exes" (that is, robberies), but it only covered a part of the supporters of milder actions (including Plekhanov), the rest took a wait and see stance, declaring their desire to unity. Trotsky in 1912 published the newspaper Pravda in Vienna, in which frankly anti-Leninist articles were published, and on the basis of the platform set forth by the main party printing organ, a conference was called the Augustow Conference. The bloc formed after it suffered the same Menshevik vice, namely internal friction, and soon collapsed. The general requirements of civil liberties, representation in the IV State Duma of all walks of life, etc., did not suit other participants in the revolutionary movement.

The defeatists and patriots

After the outbreak of World War II, the Menshevik program came into direct conflict with Bolshevik politics. Potresov, Plekhanov and other "defenders" did not consider it right to seek the death of the tsarist regime at the cost of a national tragedy. They condemned the war as such, calling it mutually aggressive, then completely “slipped” to the recognition that the Russian army was only protecting its land. The camp of the RSDLP was divided into two parts: the "internationalists" and the "patriots" were distinguished by their attitude to the possible outcome of the hostilities at the front. The most extreme position was considered to be the goal of ending them and withdrawing the warring parties “without annexations and indemnities”. The defeat and escalation of hostilities into a civil conflict was desired by the Bolshevik wing of the RSDLP. The Mensheviks believed that the conclusion of peace in this situation could lead to a world revolution. They were wrong.

The February revolution actually became the implementation of the "minimum program", previously declared by the RSDLP as the goal for the coming decades.

The main points of Menshevik politics

So how did the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks differ? The party’s program, or rather, its March wing, consisted of the following points:

a) the seizure of power in a country with unstable conditions and prerequisites is useless, only the opposition struggle makes sense;

b) the Russian proletarian revolution does not happen soon, and only after its victory in the countries of Europe and the North American States;

c) the role of the liberal bourgeoisie in the struggle against autocracy is extremely important, and it is necessary to cooperate with it;

d) the peasantry - the class is backward, it should be used as an auxiliary power and ally, but you can not rely on it;

e) the proletariat — the main “locomotive” of the revolution (this point arose under the influence of Bolshevism);

e) preference is given to legal methods of struggle. Terrorism is unacceptable.

February

The Menshevik Party as an independent political force took shape in early 1917. At first glance, everything went according to the approved plan, the bourgeois republic arose on the ruins of the empire, and now it remains only to wait for the people to mature and want a new revolution, this time the proletarian. The trouble was that the dramatic events of February 1917 took the RSDLP leadership by surprise. The Mensheviks, like the Bolsheviks, did not control its progress, did not take part in organizing the overthrow of the tsar, and now they painfully tried to use the situation as efficiently as possible to realize their program goals. The Martovites quickly orientated themselves. It was formed and they delegated their representatives to its composition. There were three Mensheviks in the new power structure (A. M. Nikitin, K. A. Gvozdev, P. N. Malyantovich), N. S. Chkheidze headed the Petrosoviet, and then, in June, even after the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, he took over the chair All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The party continued to strengthen its positions, expanding the possibility of its influence on the masses.

The Menshevik party, despite the obvious successes, again fell ill with its ailment typical of it: its forces were divided into three currents. The right (represented by Potresov) took extreme patriotic positions, the centrists (Dan, Tsereteli) reserved the right to continue to carry out revolutionary work in the conditions of bourgeois democracy, but only after defeating the external enemy, and the left (Martov) condemned participation in the work of the Provisional Government, demanded the immediate distribution of land and the conclusion of peace.

Before the new revolution

Immediately before the October Revolution, many prominent Mensheviks left the party ranks. The party program, with its fuzziness, repelled possible adherents and hesitants, among whom was Yuri Larin, and even Plekhanov himself. The process of political migration has become widespread, about 4 thousand Petrograd centrists - “inter-raionists” joined the Leninist wing of the RSDLP in the spring of 1917. The reasons for this behavior were compelling: the ideology of the Mensheviks was discredited by the support of the war, from which the population, disoriented by active Bolshevik propaganda, was simply tired. In addition, there was a frequent contradiction between political goals and a certain honesty of the party leadership, which did not dare to promise the people that it was not able to fulfill. The game for power was lost, and in October the Mensheviks fully understood this.

Coup

October 25, there was a coup and seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. The Central Committee of the RSDLP (o) immediately drafted a condemning resolution, calling these actions usurps, but it was too late. There was still no internal unity and sequence of actions. The calls to create a new government, "homogeneous", representing all political trends on an equal basis, and to support did not lead to anything. Ten members of the Central Committee and three candidates left the party ranks. An extraordinary emergency congress of the RSDLP (o) was convened, but it also remained inconclusive, except for the Bolsheviks at the very beginning of 1918. Then the Civil War began, during which the right-wing Mensheviks, led by V.O. Levitsky, V.N. Rozanov and A.N. Potresov, took a position extremely hostile to the new authorities.

During the Civil War, the leaders of the RSDLP (o) took an active part in the power structures created in territories beyond the control of the Bolsheviks. Then the Mensheviks changed the name of the party and began to call themselves simply Russian Social Democrats, without any letters in brackets. They held ministerial posts in the Samara COMUCH, the interim Siberian government, the Central Caspian, the Ufa meeting, and the Ural regional government. In 1918, they (the SPD) actually seized power in Georgia after the declaration of a democratic republic there. In response, the Bolsheviks expelled representatives of the RSDLP from all councils. However, already in August 1918, the Menshevik party was partially rehabilitated as having abandoned the coalition with bourgeois associations.

The rout of Menshevism

The repression continued in the spring of 1919, after the Bolshevik positions were strengthened during the Civil War. In Kiev, Odessa, and then in Georgia, the Cheka conducted large-scale purges of identified members of the RSDLP. In collaboration with the Denikin Volunteer Army, the Bolsheviks accused them. The Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets and representatives of other parties were isolated, in some cases (not infrequent) they were shot, and their leaders were "settled" with the goal of neutralizing them. What this term meant is not known for certain, but you can guess. Yu. Martov and R. Abramovich were lucky: they managed to escape from the country in 1920. Two years later, another leader of the Russian social dedeks, the Menshevik F. Dan, was sent abroad. Then in Moscow, a whole group of the youth wing of the RSDLP was arrested, an open trial was being prepared over it, but, in the end, Soviet justice was limited to exile. Repression led to the almost complete defeat of Menshevism; individual cells that went underground survived until 1925.

What happened to the Mensheviks later

The fate of the Mensheviks who found themselves in exile is unenviable. Attempts to publish their own periodicals proved to be extremely costly; the “fathers of Russian democracy” who settled in Germany in 1933 were forced to move to France and then to America. But the unsuccessful “brand” became a kind of stigma for those who remained in the USSR and for one reason or another turned out to be objectionable to the Stalinist leadership. If necessary, any member of the party could recall his Menshevik past, present or imaginary. The first high-profile process took place in 1931: on charges of creating a counter-revolutionary organization, 14 employees of the State Planning Commission and the State Bank were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

However, the Bolshevik Party did not treat all the former Mensheviks so severely. Attorney General Vyshinsky, diplomats A. A. Troyanovsky and M. Maisky, and some other members of the disgraced organization, lived their lives quite well. Although their past hung over them